

Editorial

The first issue of the periodical *philosophy@lisbon* has deserved a very positive reception, confirmed by the atypical number of articles submitted to the editorial board, a fact that, to a great extent, explains the two-month delay in the edition of issue number two. Yet, the interest shown by our readers allows the present number of *philosophy@lisbon* to feature some excellent essays.

Within the domain of the History of Philosophy, two articles are published. The first is authored by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos and analyzes the relevance of the aesthetics of nature in Kant's philosophy, as well as its importance for ecological conscience. According to L. R. dos Santos, the representation of nature that we have today is indebted to critical philosophy, in particular, to the Critique of Judgment. The organic idea of nature, where finality is never external, being instead intrinsic to each natural being, is unmistakably expressed in the way Kant perceives the teleological judgment of nature. On the one hand, the latter finds its fundament in the idea of a finality without an end external to itself, and in the dependence of how the critical philosopher posits the aesthetic judgment; in turn, his way of thinking the rhythm of natural development roots his thought in an organic vision that transcends any kind of mechanistic view of the world. Jorge Vieira Rodrigues is the author of the second article in the section History of Philosophy, centered on the notion of *dispositif* (apparatus) in Giorgio Agamben. The origin of the concept goes back to the thought of Foucault; hence, the author of the article revisits Foucault's work to account for the meaning of the concept. In short, the notion of *dispositif* in Foucault translates the articulation of discursive and non-discursive practices on a certain social-historical moment. As underscored in the article, this concept crosses the notions of Hegelian positivism – especially, under the light of Jean Hyppolite's reading of Hegel – and 'disposition' (*Gestell*) in Heidegger. Moreover, as Vieira highlights, Foucault translates Heidegger's term by 'dispositif.' Modern technique 'disposes' nature as its object, and in this act, it composes a set of theoretical principles, which are linked both to institutions and to specific practices of manipulation. The article shows the novelty of Agamben's thought on the *dispositif*, since for the Italian philosopher there is something that lies beyond the *dispositif*, namely, subjects that refuse to be subdued, as for language, it is presented

as the most ancient dispositif, since it guides and controls our own behavior and discourse.

The section Language, Mind and Cognition also contains two articles. The first, by Luis Estevinha Rodrigues, analyzes the ‘theory of the extended mind,’ proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in an essay published in *Analysis* back in 1998. According to this celebrated text, the objects of our everyday life can be seen as extensions of the mind, as long as they preserve information and can be re-used later. Hence, it becomes arbitrary to consider that the information contained in the brain is the only information that may be assigned the quality of being mental. As stressed by L. E. Rodrigues, this thesis immediately brings about epistemological implications, by assuming that there may be processes of cognitive nature in the external world. But it also encourages metaphysical implications, not commonly taken into consideration, which have to do with the view that the authors of this theory express on the mind of the mind, as expressed by the authors of this theory. L. E. Rodrigues also aims at reflecting on the hypothesis that the theory of the extended mind might include other mental processes, e.g., emotional ones. This way, one could posit a radical transfer of the personal mind to new physical entities. In this case, the author concludes, this assumption would take us to a new revisiting skepticism. The second article, by Ana Falcato, is entitled “O Paradoxo Céptico das Investigações Filosóficas” (The Skeptical Paradox in Philosophical Investigations) and analyses an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work by Saul Kripke in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982). Kripke’s claim emphasizes the relevance of the skeptical paradox as formulated in § 201 of *Philosophical Investigations*, where it is stated that a rule cannot determine a form of action, since any form of action can be conciliated with the rule. According to Kripke, this is the key-problem in *Philosophical Investigations*; instead of a simple solution of the paradox, the philosopher defended a solution for the paradox, which in turn was skeptical, just as Hume’s paradoxes are. In Kripke’s view, the non-viability of a private language, founded on the idea that to follow a rule is already a public act, has its paradoxical moment in that paragraph. Any fact – or form of action – can confirm or invalidate a rule. As underscored by A. Falcato in her reading of *Philosophical Investigations*, it is *prima facie* that same rule which has apparently been emptied of its content. For Kripke, the skeptical paradox takes place because two visions of truth, one in *Tractatus* and one in *Philosophical Investigations* have been illegitimately crossed. The article by A. Falcato concludes by showing that the scope and the limits of Kripke’s interpretation, taking into account that despite the difficulty that lies in defending that the skeptical argument is the core problem concerning private language, nonetheless remains crucial to the understanding of the *Investigations*.

Three articles are included in the third and last section of philosophy@lisbon, dedicated to the Philosophy of Action and Values. The first, by Igor Caldeira, with title “Nozick versus Hayek. Why Nozick is wrong and a libertarian state should dare to do more,” discusses different configurations of the libertarian vision of society which range from the more radical forms, such as Rothbard’s, to more classic ones, like Friedrich Hayek’s; according to I. Caldeira, are still the most adequate to assure individual freedom. The second article, written by Maria José Varandas, is entitled *Estética Natural e Ética Ambiental, que relação?* (Natural Aesthetics and Environmental Ethics – what relation between the two?), argues for the privileged position of aesthetics in the area of environmental ethics, due to the crucial role it plays in the defense of the conservation of nature. Having in mind the claims of Aldo Leopold and of Allen Carlson, M. J. Varandas shows the existing contiguity between environmental aesthetics and ethics. Yuan Zhang authors the third and last article in the present issue of philosophy@lisbon; the object of Zhang’s article is to analyze the multiple translations of the great classical work in Chinese philosophy, *Dao De Jing*. It is here demonstrated how the usual translation of *Wu Wei* as non-action perverts the understanding of this key-concept, thus casting a shadow over the ways according to which Chinese culture was understood in the West.

The next number of philosophy@lisbon is scheduled for December 2012. All who are interested in submitting articles are requested to send their proposals until September 29th 2012.

Carlos João Correia, July 22th 2012.