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Our next issue submission deadline is June 1st 2013.
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Editorial

This first number of the digital magazine *philosophy@lisbon*, now introduced to the public, although still in experimental format, gives form to a long cherished project by the present researchers of the *Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa* [Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon] (www.centrodefilosofia.com).

It is an unquestionable fact that this research unit has a long history in the publishing sphere, marked by a very varied collection of publications; among them, deserve to be singled out monographic studies, critical editions of philosophical works, papers from conferences and seminars, as well as academic works by young researchers. But a dominant feature of this Centre has been the publication of philosophical magazines, among them *Philosophica*, *Disputatio* (www.disputatio.com) and *Phainomenon*. Besides the traditional edition in paper, some of these periodicals have now digital editions of excellent quality, which obviously obey to well defined methodological concerns. *Disputatio* is a magazine of international reputation in the domain of analytical philosophy, and *Phainomenon* is a periodical of reference in phenomenological studies. As for *Philosophica*, it is a magazine that results mostly from the intense collaboration between Philosophy professors of the University of Lisbon and other Universities.

philosophy@lisbon is obviously aimed to achieve other goals. On the one hand, it is totally and solely in digital format, and it wants to cultivate the plurality of knowing and methods put in practice in the modern philosophical world. On the other hand, it will allow researchers from all parts of the world to publish essays, in many cases, written in their own languages. *philosophy@lisbon* has naturally its own editorial rules, the first being that it only publishes philosophical essays of recognized scientific value. Accordingly, after this experimental issue, which publishes a collection of essays written by invited authors, the subsequent articles will be submitted anonymously to the scrutiny of a national and international Advisory Board. The rule of anonymous submission will be rigorously applied. Therefore, all those wishing to publish texts in this magazine must conform to the submission rules which are expressed and listed in the website of the magazine. They should also apply the formatting rules, quite simple and consensual in the domain of edition in philosophy and humanities, designated as the APA style, rules that will also be shown in the different issues

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of our magazine. philosophy@lisbon will cultivate a plurality of themes, in particular the ones that constitute the body of research in the Centre of Philosophy (Metaphysics, Logic, epistemology, Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Bioethics, Metaethics, Political Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Language, The Teaching of Philosophy, Gender Philosophy, Philosophy in Portugal and in other areas of the world, the History of Philosophy, among other topics that constitute the main body of our present philosophical research). In accordance, the issues won't be dedicated solely to a topic. There will be two numbers a year, the first in Spring (April/May), and the second in Autumn (November/December). Thus, on behalf of the editors and the editorial board, I formally wish to invite all philosophy researchers to present their essays to the next number of the periodical, to be submitted according to the rules until February 29th 2012 to the following address: philosophyatlisbon@centrodefilosofia.com.

Lisbon, the cosmopolitan, multicultural capital on the West coast of Europe, has all the requirements to be a privileged meeting point of distinct philosophical worlds. This is what reality has actually demonstrated.

Carlos João Correia, December 16th 2011.

Phenomenological Thought @LISBON

The texture of dreams

Phenomenological approaches to “originary space”

Inês Pereira Rodrigues
Universidade da Beira Interior

Certes, nous avons refoulé la magique dans la subjectivité, mais rien ne nous garantit que le rapport entre les hommes ne comporte pas, inévitablement, des composants magiques et oniriques.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le Visible et L'Invisible*

Our existence is spatial, writes Merleau-Ponty in *Phenomenology of Perception*. But the spatiality of our existence is of a special character: we *are* a place. The heideggerian expression for existence – Being-there (*Dasein*) – seems precisely to indicate something about being a place in the world.¹ *Being* a place is infinitely different from *having* a place. One could say that a chair has, or occupies, a certain place in the room. In speaking of the place a certain thing “has”, we are conceiving space as a geometrical field - definable and capable of being mapped in coordinates: it would be possible to say that the chair occupies the position (for example) G4. By reflecting about what it means to “be a place” we come to a very different understanding of space itself. “Being a place” seems to indicate a dynamic structure; in so being we are, it seems, an incorporation, or an incarnation of space: instead of having a defined space we occupy, as if superimposed on it, we are space, habiting it in such a way that we are also its expression. We lose the notion of a impermeable object occupying indifferent surroundings; we lose, after all, the very distinction between object and surrounding: the relationship between what is in space and space itself loses rigid borderlines and loses, above all, the passive and placid character regarding both terms – being-space implies an interaction, almost a fusion between the terms.

Even when we consider some of the pre-theoretical ways we think of space, we realize that our originary conception of space is not of a physical, objective and objectifiable, geometrical field. We speak of the different

1. More recently, I have become aware, through the work of Jeff Malpas, that works by late Heidegger focus precisely on the conception of “space” (or, in the heideggerian terms, “place”) that I try to give a preliminarily exposition here. I will be excited to continue this research including those pathways.

spaces we ourselves inhabit, or the places something or someone has in our life, the space they occupy, and we mean not only their dimension or limits, but also the time, importance, and emotional meaning they have. These reflections lead to our relationship with space, to what Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka and M. Heidegger tried to explore as “the spatiality of our own existence”. In the end, to try to understand space itself not through a conceptual objective approach, but through the way we ourselves are (in) space, defending, besides, that we are only able to reach an abstract conception of space because we have this other and more originary relationship with space, one that is lived and affective.

1. Being (in) originary space

What is, then, our originary manner of being in space? We are in space always oriented, with a certain sense of orientation from the perspective of a “here”. That orientation, just as the idea of being a place, implies a body. A being without a body wouldn’t be anywhere, just as only with a body can we make sense of orientation expressions – basic in our relationship with space – such as up-down, right-left, near-far. The body, just as Merleau-Ponty has said, is our place. However, it’s important to note that, by saying this, we are not again falling to an objective conception of space, in which the body would be a mere object occupying a certain position in a matrix field, and this, in part also because we are speaking of the personal or phenomenal body and not of the body as an object. Patočka writes: «The personal body is not a thing in objective space. It is a life which, in itself, *is spatially*, which *produces* its own localization, makes itself spatial.»² *The body is the condition for being a place*; it is precisely what allows us to have a special relationship with space, of *being spatial*. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty writes that the body is what allows a sense of orientation and a “practical understanding” of space, in the same manner that my voice permits me to change tones without any technical knowledge of music.³ Having personal corporeity as a necessary condition for our relationship with space already lets us extract some components of our manner of being spatial. In what way does our body produce its own spatialization?

Our bodily orientation, the body’s dynamic of being in space, *where* we are, does not correspond to what we would call merely a physical orientation, but rather to a practical, profound, and overall rootedness in the world:

2. Jan Patočka, *Papiers Phénoménologiques*, trad. Erika Abrams, Millon, Grenoble, 1998, p.59: «Le corps personnel n’est pas une chose dans l’espace objectif. Il est une vie qui, par elle-même, *est spatialement*, qui *produit* sa propre localisation, qui se rend elle-même spatial.»

3. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 290.

Human beings have the need to know where they are not only like animals, to not crash into something else, fall, or get themselves hurt, but to recognize themselves in the place they're in, to be able to work, fulfill their most essential tasks, assume social roles these also being spatially articulated and connected to activities, that is, to movements.⁴

Merleau-Ponty's examples, in *Phenomenology of Perception*, about reactions to orientation experiments – like visual perception reverted by glasses, or that of a person who can only see the room he is in through a mirror tilted 45° - show that our “coordinates” of orientation are indissociably connected to a world rooted corporeity, that is, that they are not absolute and indifferent coordinates, but that they adapt to the *necessarily bodily* lived experience of a subject, they are tightly connected to the body as the center of activities we are involved in.

According to the description of the experiment of visual perception reversal through the use of special glasses, after a short time, the perception loses its sense of unreality and regains its “normal” up-down orientation, and it's the *body which seems to be inverted*. During repetitions of the experiment, after the initial phases, the body seems to readopt its normal disposition “especially when the subject is active”⁵, and even more so in habitual activities, like washing his hands. Our orientation in space is corporeally inscribed in the surrounding environment, and its proper dynamic is while actively immersed in space:

What matters for the orientation in the spectacle isn't my body as it is in fact, as a thing in objective space, but my body as a system of possible actions, a virtual body for which the phenomenal “place” is defined by its task and situation. My body is there where it has something to do.⁶

We are reminded, within the same idea, of the difference between “concrete” and “abstract movements”, exposed in an earlier chapter of the same work⁷: concrete movements would be those that are a part of a certain situation, belong to a lived rootedness in space, such as washing the hands, or waving at a friend across the street. In contrast, abstract movements are those in response to a command of coordinate directives, for

4. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 290.: «L'homme a besoin de savoir où il est non seulement comme l'animal, pour ne pas se heurter à autre chose, tomber ou se faire écraser, mais pour se reconnaître dans le lieu où il demeure, pour pouvoir travailler, remplir ses devoirs les plus essentiels, s'acquitter de rôles sociaux eux aussi toujours spatialement articulés et liés à des activités, c'est à dire, à des mouvements.»

5. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p.283.

6. *Ibid.*, p.289: «Ce qui importe pour l'orientation du spectacle, ce n'est pas mon corps tel qu'il est en fait, comme chose dans l'espace objectif, mais mon corps comme système de actions possibles, un corps virtuel dont le “lieu” phénoménal est défini par sa tâche et par sa situation. Mon corps est là où il a quelque chose à faire.»

7. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, “La spatialité du corps propre”, p.119.

example, raise your arm 50cm. The patient in question, having suffered a cerebral lesion, showed difficulty in performing abstract movements, in which he had to adopt a “cognitive” attitude towards his own body and to space, but none in concrete movements. What is at stake in concrete movements is the originary relationship of body and space, the practical and lived communication which Ponty says is “older than thought”.⁸

This older-than-thought relationship, which comprises our movements inscribed within our active living experience, reveals another tonality of our orientation in the world: it is affective. The very way in which our body is anchored in the world through its activities, its projects – made evident by the examples of how we are able to orient ourselves from an already rooted corporeity, whose directions are not independently determined, but in consonance with the world in which we are inserted – already points to this affective relationship to space (we move within familiar places, for example, recognizing this water basin here, or what it is for). “Where” we are indicates our global situation, not merely physical location. The “place” where I am at a given moment implies a project in which I am already involved, and appears thus with a certain emotional weight (as well as, we may notice, it also includes a notion of temporality). Both Merleau-Ponty and Patočka point to the meaning of the fact we use orientation expressions to describe emotional states, such as “being down in the dumps”, or “up in the clouds”.⁹ The up of the clouds and that of exuberance, says Ponty, are «symbolic of one another because they both express the same essential structure of our being as a being situated in relation to an environment [...]».¹⁰ The relationship is bilateral: it isn’t only that our emotions are inscribed in the structure of bodily being-in-the-world and, because of it, are inscribed in our orientation, it is the very orientation itself and all of our relationship to space that is emotional. Like in another example of *Phenomenology of Perception*, the primitive man that heads towards his tribe camp, does not do it with reference to any indication marker, but rather heads towards his natural place of peace or joy.¹¹ In his turn, Patočka writes:

[S]ubjective spatiality doesn’t know precisely the external *parts extra parts*, characteristic of geometrical relations. Far from it, the spatiality is here metaphorical. The up and the down, the near and the far are characters all together *affective* and spatial, and the movement of dispositions acutely reveals something in the world like “places” of entwining, horizons in which one may enter to make explicit.¹²

8. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p. 294.

9. J. Patočka, *PP*, p. 69; Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p. 329.

10. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p. 329.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 230

12. Jan Patočka, *PP*, p. 70: «[L]a spatialité subjective ne connaît justement pas le *partes extra partes* externe, caractéristique des relations géométriques. Loin de là, la spatialité est ici métaphorique.

Emotions, or dispositions, are what reveal this entwining of existence and world. They open and close horizons of possibilities, they are, writes Patočka, the contribution of the world to the movement we are; it is in them that we know where we are in the world.¹³ According to Heidegger, for example, angst shows us the “being nowhere”, the “not being at home” in the world. On the other hand, the experience of joy or love dissolves barriers; we become enchanted, permeable, our horizons opened in an enthusiastic being able of all possibilities. Disposition, in an indistinction of subject and world, colors the horizon of possibilities, disposes the world itself.

M. Heidegger introduced, in an innovative fashion, the emotions as belonging to the structure of being-in-the world, in contrast to the idea of emotions as subjective states which would then be imposed upon a neutral world. Dispositions arise here as the interpellation of the world itself, the way it speaks to us, what it says and, in turn, could only do from a structure which includes beings with the capacity for disposition, openness, to feel the “prose of the world”. They belong neither to the subjective sphere, nor do they lie independently in the world; dispositions belong to the very relation that is being-in-the-world: «Tonality assails us. It comes neither from the “exterior”, nor from the “interior” but rather, as a manner of being-in-the-world, it arises precisely from it.»¹⁴ Both Merleau-Ponty and Patočka follow this intuition. However, because he did not explore (although he did indicate) the central role of corporeity in his analysis of existence, Heidegger also neglects the important character of the *corporeity of emotions*, which allows us to understand the phenomenon of our global insertion in the world, and the dynamic relationship with space. Hence, in Heidegger, the dispositions, as well as the general structure of being-in-the-world lose the character of being enmeshed, the dynamic of profound rootedness, because the author does not explore the corporeal intertwining of human existence in the world (as would, later, Merleau-Ponty in *Le Visible et L'invisible*).

2. The texture of dreams – illustration of primordial space

As Merleau-Ponty intuited, dreams could be used as (at least) an effective analogy for our experience in primordial space. «[T]he phantoms of dreams reveal even better the general spatiality within which clear space

Le haut et le bas, le proche et le lointain sont des caractères tout ensembles *affectifs* et spatiaux, et le mouvement des humeurs dévoile gritamment dans le monde quelque chose comme des “lieux” des replis, des horizons dans lesquels on peut pénétrer pour les expliciter.»

13. Jan Patočka, *PP*, p.61.

14. M. Heidegger, *Être et Temps*, trad. E. Martineau, Éd. Hors-commerce, p.136.

and observable objects are incrustated.»¹⁵ In our dreams, space is stylized in accordance to our rootedness.

The spaces through which we move in dreams are covered without obeying rules of distance as in a map: we open our bedroom door unto a sea-side cliff; the train does not take us, really, from one point to the next, its movement is not through space understood objectively as distance. The running through spaces, like the atmosphere that drenches each one, is emotional. Space in dreams has a palpable texture: we leave the dense darkness of the bedroom to the clear-cutting atmosphere of the sea-side; the air of the forest is heavily sweet, the train suffocates us in its enclosed ambience. Things in dreams – and not only ambiances – also appear to us with a specter of color and texture; they are, in a way, exaggerated. In the same way that in “bad” movies we always know which is the wicked character by the clothes she wears, and the music and aura accompanying her when she comes on the scene, so it is in our dreams: what is scary is permeated by a dark light, the sweet appear in pastel colors and soft texture, the unknown is rough, cutting and crystalline, like a sea-side cliff. And what does appear does not undergo a cognitive judgment, it is *lived* as such. A muddy river with a strong current is *felt* as frightful aversion; the aversion does not follow from a judgment regarding the mud and the dangers of drowning. In a way, the river is nothing else but the emotion of frightful aversion. What is thus absent in dreams is the dividing distance between subject and the surrounding world, or between subject and object. Objects and space permeate us, wave-like.

I want to defend, with the help of Merleau-Ponty, that the relationship to space in dreams *corresponds* to our relationship, or manner of inhabiting, originally in space, before any calculation or objectivation assuring us a geometrical space. «In dreams as in myths, we learn where the phenomenon is by feeling towards which our desire moves us, what frightens our heart, of what our life depends. Even in awake life, it doesn't happen otherwise.»¹⁶

This affirmation needs to be clarified, of course, if not qualified. We want to argue that our manner of being awake in space is significantly different than that of dreams. Our awake life does not happen like in a “bad” movie, we do not have obvious signs for what is beneficial or malefic, just as we have to obey rules of distance and of going across spaces.

Another possible argument would be that it is precisely when we are asleep that we are, so to speak, absent from space: there is an interrup-

15. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p. 328: «[L]es fantasmes du rêve révèlent encore mieux la spatialité générale où l'espace clair et les objets observables sont incrustés.» [Eng. Version: p. 284]

16. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p.330: «In dreams as in myths, we learn where the phenomenon is by feeling towards which our desire moves us, what frightens our heart, of what our life depends. Even in awake life, it doesn't happen otherwise.»

tion of perceptive activity, we leave the world, nested within ourselves. All the arguments about the supposed essential corporeity of inhabiting space would seem out of place, contradictory, in face of a sleeping, inactive body. But we must remember that the body as a condition for living space is the phenomenal body and not the body as an object. And that one, intuited Patočka about the Descartes' meditations, is needed even in dreams:

One may find strange that Descartes did not realize that the dreamer also has a body. It is clearly a dreamt body, but the one who is dreaming is not without a body – the body is indispensable even to the onirical world. To have a general experience – even if it is a quasi-experience – I must be *somewhere*, which is impossible without a body. [...] It is true that if I fly in dreams, it's an unreal movement; but what is flying, or has the illusion of flying, is indubitably *my own body*, and not a strange body.¹⁷

Our dream living is fundamentally corporeal. We suffer aches, we move, we fall, we feel the pulsation of our surroundings; it is impossible to think of a dream in which we are not incarnate beings; dreams are what they are because they are lived corporally. The themes of flight and falling in dreams, Ponty points out, are associated to the bodily movements of breathing or of sexual desire¹⁸; they imprint in images the rising and falling of certain bodily pulsations – the corporeity of our existence is inscribed in the space of our dreams.

And in reply to the first objection, I wish to defend that the relationship we have to spaces and phenomena in our awake life is, in fact, permeated by emotional textures. The characters in our life are not accompanied by elucidating soundtrack, of course, but we feel the spaces of intimacy and distance, just as we feel the presence of those who are with us in life and the tones of the space they are in. A nightclub's door still open in the daylight has, for newly awakened eyes, a dark aura, contrasting with the bright colors of the morning. The people we love gain increased beauty, and a character flaw imprints ugly traits in the face of the other. I mean to say by this that we see people, phenomena and spaces permeated by emotion, they are emotionally inhabited: «We hardly perceive any object, just as we don't see the eyes of a familiar face, but its look and expression. There is a latent meaning there, diffused across the landscape or the town, that we

17. J. Patočka, *Le Monde Naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine [MEH]*, p. 144-145: «On peut trouver étrange que Descartes ne se rende pas compte que le rêveur lui aussi a un corps. C'est évidemment un corps rêvé, mais celui qui rêve n'est pas pour cela sans corps – le corps est indispensable même au monde onirique. Pour avoir une expérience en général – ne serait-ce qu'une quasi-expérience – je dois être *quelque part*, ce qui est impossible sans corps. [...] Il est certain que si je vole en rêve, c'est un mouvement irréel ; mais ce qui vole, ou qui a l'illusion de voler, est indubitablement *mon propre corps*, et non pas un corps étranger.»

18. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p. 329.

find in a specific evidence without feeling the need to define it.»¹⁹ We apprehend what Merleau-Ponty calls the “style” (in the sense of stylization) of each environment, each “space”. And the style of each person, present in the features of their expression, also has an aura, a presence inundating her and ourselves.

A very simple and well known example, also given by Merleau-Ponty, is able to show this inhabiting of emotionally meaningful space: we don’t see colors as in a sample of indifferent gradations. We feel the sensuality of the red dress, the comforting redness of a wool shirt. Reds, even in the same tone, are not all the same, just as the whites of the bride and the monk have nothing to do with each other, even though both symbolize purity; the emotional presence in each one is completely different from the other.

With perception training by the cognitive posture, and the “impartiality” of consciousness, we acquire a distance from this existential space, and that is precisely the distance that is lacking in the mental patient, or in hallucinogenic experiences:

What makes the hallucination and the myth, is the narrowing of the lived space, the rooting of things in our bodies, the vertiginous proximity of the object, the solidarity of man and world that is, not abolished, but repressed by every day perception or by objective thought and that the philosophical conscience recovers.²⁰

What dreams (and the experiences of some mental illnesses or hallucinogenic effects) show, or so I wish to defend, is the originary – emotional – inhabiting of space. Patočka describes the primitive relationship to space as “originary within” (in the French, accepted translation: “*dedans originaire*”).

The originary “within” still doesn’t have the character of a univocal localization, characteristic of all positions in the systemic space. [] [It] is a ‘within’ that is more an enmeshment of oneself in the things and of the things in oneself than a precise delimitation of space occupied by this or that. In short, the originary ‘within’ is not a relation purely and simply exterior, geometrical. It is what directs all our affairs to realities by defining what will be near and far from us. [] It is the originary disposition and the availability for

19. Merleau-Ponty, *PhP*, p. 325: «Nous ne percevons presque aucun objet, comme nous ne voyons pas les yeux d’un visage familier, mais son regard et son expression. Il y a là un sens latent, diffus à travers le paysage ou la ville, que nous retrouvons dans une évidence spécifique sans avoir besoin de le définir.»

20. *Ibid.*, p. 337: «Ce qui fait l’hallucination comme le mythe, c’est le rétrécissement de l’espace vécu, l’enracinement des choses dans notre corps, la vertigineuse proximité de l’objet, la solidarité de l’homme et du monde, qui est, non pas abolie, mais réfoulée par la perception de tous les jours ou par la pensée objective et que la conscience philosophique retrouve.»

that with which we come into contact.²¹

Patočka seems to consider originary space as the same as our own orientation within it, to the emotive pulse that directs us. Originary space would then be indistinct from the pulsating of meaning that embraces us, disposes us in the spaces in which we are and draws them around us, entwining us, inviting or closing us off. It would be nothing else but this same pulse that radiates through things and is made in the place which we are. The link that connects and unites us in the feeling of the river *as* repulsive danger, is this pervading that is originary space, lived meaning, uniting subject and world, through corporeal rootedness.

But unlike in dreams and some (severe) hallucinogenic experiences, our way of being-in-the-world is not reducible to this type of uterine experience; space, understood “classically”, cannot be completely done away with, or we lose the dimensions of practical activity, of project, of realization of possibilities, and an entire scope of perceptual experience (horizon, near-far, etc.), that in phenomenology has come to reveal so much and so well of what it is to be in the world. However, what may come of this is to defend that those dimensions are supported and enmeshed in this one, and would thus benefit from our being aware of it. The awareness of this synergetic belonging could affect the manner in which we face, choose and realize our possibilities, for example. It may change and tonalize the manner in which we already *are* in the world, by revealing this shared emotional tissue that binds us. This is what is meant by “originary”.

Glen Mazis, an American philosopher mostly dedicated to Merleau-Ponty’s work, defends that this pulse that is space itself, the dynamic of the “flesh of the world” that runs through us like the “systole and diastole” of our own existence, is something he calls “e-motion”. Meaning that the tissue in which we are laced through is precisely a pulse – an emotional pulsating – that *moves* us, that is a type of *movement*, running through space like a current, continuously in transformation and transforming.

In the following and last section, I will explore Mazis notion of “e-motion” and try to find if there are any similarities with, or light to be shed by Patočka’s central conception of “movement”.

21. Jan Patočka, *Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie?*, p. 56: «Le “dedans” originaire n’a pas encore le caractère de localisation univoque, propre à toute position dans l’espace systématique. [...] [C’est] un “dedans” qui est plutôt une *immixtion* de soi dans les choses et des choses dans soi-même qu’une *délimitation* précise de l’espace occupé par ceci ou cela. En bref, le “dedans” originaire n’est pas une relation purement et simplement extérieure, géométrique. Il est ce qui *dirige* tous nos rapports aux réalités en marquant ce *qui* nous sera proche ou lointain. [...] Il est la disposition originaire et la disponibilité pour ce avec quoi nous entrons en contact.»

3. Pulsating space – Glen Mazis’ “e-motion” and Jan Patočka’s “movement”

With Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy at its base, specially his posthumous work, *Le Visible et L’invisible*, Mazis describes the flesh of the world like the intertwining of meanings uniting subject and world and – he suggests – propelled by “e-motion”, like the heart that pumps this entwining of meaningful veins.²² “E-motion”, for Glen Mazis, points to the essentially human dynamic of being-in-the-world in which we are *moved*; we are moved by, or in, a certain situation in such a way that the situation is transformed, the “reality” is altered, and ourselves with it.

I now *am* something different in this situation: namely, the-one-angry-and-hurt-about-the-spoiled-dinner. I am now something new, but *in terms of the world*, drawn out into its meaning as having become my ownmost identity at that moment. [...] Becoming has occurred: my emotional apprehension, which has transformed me, also has re-turned or transformed the situation into a new one, which now includes my anger as part of it. My being at this moment of e-motion is in no sense external to this situation. This is the sense in which e-motion throws us palpably, dramatically into the world, into a place of happening.²³

“E-motion”, just like Heidegger’s dispositions, are not subjective states imposed on the world, nor are they states-of-affairs about the world, but they are rather the structure that composes the “happening”, the meaningful tissue, that is subject and world. “E-motion” not only constitutes the situation, but the subject in the situation, uniting them in the becoming, perpetual and perpetually changing, of a meaningful situation. To conceive human experience in this way is to leave behind the conceptual model – associated to Cartesianism - of an insular mind and of a world composed of dead matter. “To be moved” in a certain situation implies an emotional current that isn’t purely subjective; that precisely assaults us, transforms us, in a way we do not freely choose. A pairless shoe seemingly abandoned on a sidewalk may raise a number of different dispositions in different situations, but which it will be is not a product of choice. We may even feel impatient with feeling uncomfortable or sad faced with an image that more easily would seem absurd, or even funny, but we can’t “shake off” the anguished perplexity that suddenly assailed us. At the same time, however, we are not passive victims of the mood swings of a capricious world. The emotions *are* our rootedness in the world; they are, therefore, integrated in the history and meaningful experience of each one, they arise within the context of one’s experience, they are not identical replicas from one

22. Glen Mazis, *Emotion and embodiment. Fragile Ontology*, Peter Lang, NY, 1993, p.99.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

person to the next, and they are expressive of the world (understood as already relational) which may then explain why the meaning may escape us in a first impression: a pairless shoe is, in fact, quite sad, we may realize, and we had tried to ignore or avoid this sadness in our first, immediate, meeting. The shoe may raise completely different dispositions in two different persons, but each one of them is “true” of the pairless-shoe-on-the-sidewalk situation itself. The tissue that is weaved in our experience is, for this reason, changing; it arises from something like a synergy, a circulation, or emotional current of meaning. That this model seems so strange is perhaps a symptom of the strong influence of modern tradition, with its atomistic models of independent units, making this a difficult conceptual exercise. But in any case, our emotional rootedness in the world is easily made evident by the anguishing fact that there may occur – indeed, throughout our lives, they do occur – cuts in this connection, that our emotional tie to the world is severed, and we find ourselves disconnected from the world, from the possibilities of meaning, from the warmth and texture that – we discover then – normally characterize our experience. At those moments we find the despair of a loneliness that far surpasses that of the personal one.²⁴

In a parallel project to Patočka’s, Glen Mazis tries to bring together the heideggerian emotions as composing the structure of being-in-the-world, with the corporeity and the theory of meaningful tissues in Merleau-Ponty’s work. The capacity for openness, of being a “clearing of meaning”, would arise from bodily rootedness, from the organic tie – like veins – that tie us, that have always already tied us, to the world:

Although Merleau-Ponty did not focus on the specific role of e-motion to bring to palpable registration the circulation of meaning, within becoming, he did articulate a new sense of embodiment, spatiality, temporality, depth, and what he called the “flesh of the world”, which is Being seen as relatedness, process, and interweavement. These notions form much of the inspiration of this study of e-motion, and if followed can begin to bring us further down the path opened by Heidegger in uncovering the “openness to the world” allowed by e-motion.²⁵

Our enmeshment in the world, the organic nature of our tie to the world permitting the circulation of emotions, can only be conceived through a corporeal existence and the corporeity as flesh, flesh of the world. At the same time, this same reflection points to the essential corpo-

24. Jan Patočka discusses the “experience of loss of meaning” in his work, *Essaies Herétiques*, trad. Erika Abrams, Verdier, LaGrasse, 1981, p.68-ff. The emotional charge is not as explicit, but the model of a meaning that is a *relation* between subject and world is the same (as it is in Merleau-Ponty).

25. Glen Mazis, *Emotion and embodiment. Fragile Ontology*, Peter Lang, NY, 1993, p.73.

reity of the emotions themselves, contradicting the manner of conceiving emotions as merely psychic or brain events in face or reaction to an objective state of affairs. The “e-motion” Glen Mazis wants to propose as the event of meaning is made, or happens, in the body. The event of meaning is a bodily one. We are thus not speaking of the mind’s or consciousness’ openness, nor – even less – of some kind of cognitive operation. At the same time, of course, we are not taking it to the opposite extreme: the body is the body-subject, the body as a subject, not the body (or the emotions) in a physicalist reductionist sense. We are such beings that we are bodily and it is in and because of this (specific way of being) body that we have a connection to the world that we can feel and become the pulsating of emotional space.

Because it is a continuous interchange, this tissue of meaning is in permanent becoming. Mentioning Bergson, Mazis recognizes the permanent instability of this event structure: just as there isn’t an emotion or disposition that isn’t in constant mutation (even when remaining joyful or sad, the emotion goes through continuous and constant changes, it never really stays the same), so does the structure of being-in-the-world, emotionally weaved, renew and transform continuously. «[H]e [Merleau-Ponty] sees this lace-work as one made up of strands ever becoming and returning to themselves, always transforming, a temporality of radical embodiment.»²⁶

It is in regard to this idea of being in continuous becoming that Patočka’s concept of “movement” comes in fruitfully. Jan Patočka’s “movement” tries, initially, to define human existence, understood in the heideggerian sense of realization of possibilities. Inspired in Aristotle’s concept of movement, it is precisely a movement of becoming, but without the stable substrate defining the possible alterations between determined contraries; that is, the patočkian movement would create its own unity and identity instead of merely revealing it – a movement that would be constitutive of the very thing that *is* in movement. In this way, the sense of human existence as an open project would be preserved.

Aristotle defined movement as the being-in-act of the possibility, while it is in possibility. The possibilities of existence differ from the Aristotelian *dunamis*, determined by the presence or absence of certain determinations of the substrate within the interval between two contraries. [...] The movement of existence is instead the project of possibilities *as* their realization; they are not possibilities given in advance in a previously determined area determining a “substrate”. The “I” is not a passively determined substrate by the presence or absence of a certain *eidos*, by a “figure” or “privation”; he is something that freely determines himself, and in that sense, freely chooses his possibilities.²⁷

26. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

27. Jan Patočka, *Le Monde Naturel et le Mouvement de l’Existence Humaine*, trad. Erika Abrams, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, p.263: «Aristote a défini le mouvement comme être-en-acte

From the idea of a “movement of existence” arises another and more originary movement: the movement of the appearing itself, the movement of phenomenalization of the world. Although seldomly explicitly thematized in Patočka, it arises from the reflection of the primordially of the phenomenal sphere in his conception of an “asubjective phenomenology”. Although we freely determine ourselves and, “*in that sense*, we freely choose our possibilities”, the possibilities themselves are not product of our choice, just as neither is our freedom, or that we are the ones to whom the appearing appears. In this manner, our movement of existence is not only intertwined to the movement of the appearing, but it arises from it.

The world, that is, the possibilities of our own being as an essentially “ekstatic” being, is not given to us by our own freedom. That very freedom is opened by the understanding of being, along with all the phenomenality of the world. It is not us, or our *Dasein*, who in a project in the world, decide with which beings we may relate to and in what way, but is rather to the understanding of being, to the phenomenon as such that we owe such understanding [...] ²⁸

According to Renaud Barbaras, there is also present in *Le Visible et l'Invisible* the idea of a phenomenalization of Being which, to be better understood, would benefit from the idea of the patočkian movement.²⁹ Rather than Being remaining attached to the determination of substance, Being would *be becoming*. Even in *Phenomenology of Perception*, we already read: «The mobile, or rather, like we have said, what is moving, is not identical *beneath* the phases of movement, it is identical *in* them.»³⁰ The move-

de la possibilité, pour autant qu'il est dans la possibilité. Les possibilités de l'existence diffèrent de la *dunamis* aristotélicienne, déterminent par la présence ou l'absence de certaine détermination du substrat dans l'intervalle compris entre deux contraires. [...] Le mouvement de l'existence est en revanche le projet des possibilités *en tant que* leur réalisation; ce ne sont pas des possibilités données à l'avance dans une zone préalable déterminant un “substrat”. Le “moi” n'est pas un substrat passivement déterminé par la présence ou absence d'un certain *eidos*, par une “figure” ou une “privation”; il est quelque chose qui se détermine soi-même et, en ce sens, choisit librement ses possibilités.»

28. J. Patočka, “Le subjectivisme de la phénoménologie husserlienne et l'exigence d'une phénoménologie asubjective”, in: *Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?*, Millon, Grenoble, p. 247-248 : «Le monde, c'est-à-dire, les possibilités de notre propre être comme être essentiellement “ekstatique”, ne nous est pas ouvert par notre liberté propre. Cette liberté même est ouverte par la compréhension de l'être, avec tout le reste de la teneur phénoménale du monde. Ce n'est pas nous, ou notre *Dasein* qui, dans un projet sur le monde, nous donne à entendre à quel étant nous pouvons nous rapporter et de quelle manière, mais c'est à la compréhension de l'être, au phénomène comme tel que nous sommes redevables de cette entente [...]»

29. R. Barbaras, *Le Tournant de l'Expérience*, Vrin, Paris, 1998, p.29: «Comme le voit très bien Patočka, qui thématise ici ce qui demeure implicite chez Merleau-Ponty, la découverte d'une puissance propre de la phénoménalité correspond à une radicalisation de la thèse aristotélicienne dans la mesure où elle suspend et interroge la détermination catégoriale de l'Être, dominée par la substantialité.»

30. Merleau-Ponty, *La Phénoménologie de la Perception*, Gallimard, Paris, p.316 : «Le mobile ou plutôt,

ment here is genésic; it proposes a conception of Being that rather than being previously determined, is *as* becoming. The movement rather than modifying a being through the alteration of one determination to another while always maintaining its identity throughout those alterations, it would form the very being of the being in question – the being, and Being, *is* movement.

In Mazis, this movement has an explicitly and core emotional character. Curiously, we discover in Patočka a notable resonance: «It is a domain [that of the contact with the world] in which, more than moving ourselves as free beings, we are *moved*. For that reason, it is also the proper sphere of emotionality, of *emotio*, in which etymon is already contained the idea of movement, as being moved, emotion.»³¹

All of the tissue of experience would then be a part of this incessant becoming, permanent transformation – our existence enmeshed in an emotional pulsation. The originary space we would then *be*, would be this way sea of meaning, which we go on revealing as we also reveal ourselves. The “curve of the movement of our existence”, according to Patočka, is precisely this one: movement out of ourselves and, through the world, back to ourselves.³²

But this place that we are and come back to is never – could never be – a protected reservoir, as if we could discover *what* we are – as essence – through the activities we realize in the world. The place we are *is* world, and by realizing possibilities we are simultaneously realizing the movement of our own existence and we are also participating in the movement of the world’s realization – movements which are really only one. In Glen Mazis, we find an idea similar to this return to the place we are, by the movement that both includes and surpasses us: the e-motions are that which, at the same time, most profoundly root us in the world, and most closely reveal us to ourselves, something which is revealing of the structure in which we are inserted:

If we followed the e-motions *in their own trajectory* we might find an image of some dimension of our being and the being of the world in which it is *precisely because we are most thrown outside ourselves in emotion that we are most thrown back and into ourselves*. [...] [I]t is the invitation of e-motion itself, as the name literally means, to “move away” from the self in order to find the locus of e-motion, which is also a locus of the self, perhaps a decentered one, a wordly one.³³

comme nous avons dit, le mouvant, n’est pas identique *sous* les phases du mouvement, il est identique *en* elles.»

31. Jan Patočka, *PP*, p.102.

32. *Ibid.*, p.71.

33. Glen Mazis, p. 67.

In the words of Patočka, we are “the place where the world comes to appearance and to words”.³⁴ Let’s remember that these “words” (*logos*) are not restricted to the linguistic sense, but instead, they express the articulation of meaning; it does not lead us to a notion of subjectivity centered on the consciousness, but instead to this global being-rooted, to an expression and assimilation of meaning that is essentially bodily, since the realization of possibilities could not be otherwise. The “locus” we are is the place of expression of meaning. «Merleau-Ponty saw human being as a being whose *body* is the locus of the unfolding of meaning.»³⁵

From this bodily rootedness we also arrive at an understanding of space itself as dynamic and organic, as opposed to the sterile conception of a field on which objects are disposed. Originary space, like the emotional pulsing of meaning, like the idea of movement, forces the dividing line between subject and world.

The originary “within” is not a simple position, but a gaze that encompasses the group of our possibilities and a relation to those possibilities [...]. Their constant presence constitutes an environment that no longer has a purely objective character – an environment which is exterior to the dividing line between subject and object, or more (perhaps) that is at the base of that demarcation.³⁶

Like in dreams, we live space by incorporating it. The idea that everything in dreams is an expression of ourselves acquires here a new, and richer, meaning.

Conclusion

Our manner of inhabiting space, which is loosely what was meant here by “originary space”, has come to reveal structures poignantly absent from a mathematized, geometrical or “objective” conception of space. Space is affective, it is permeated and *moved* emotionally, and this motion occurs through our bodily rootedness in the world, in the organic *being space*. What is revealed, or defended, is an underlying shared tissue of meaning – emotionally twined – that circulates through organic existence – ours and wordly – thus opening the path for a different conception of being, each and as one.

34. Jan Patočka, *PP*, p. 72.

35. Glen Mazis, p. 75.

36. Jan Patočka, *Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?*, p. 57: «Le “dedans” originaire n'est pas une simple position, mais un regard qui embrasse l'ensemble de nos possibilités et un rapport à ces possibilités. [...] Leur présence constante constitue un “environnement” qui n'a pas encore un caractère purement objectif - un environnement extérieur à la ligne de partage entre sujet et objet, ou plutôt (peut-être) qui fonde cette démarcation.»

Reflecting upon significant experiences while allowing for the confusing and often dismissed aspects – the muddy emotions, what seem to be projection, anticipation, or plain illusory – may open a new spectrum or dimension of existence and of our relationship with the world.

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Philosophy of Action and Values @LISBON

A Nonconceptual Ontology of Music

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Abstract

Much has been written about music's intrinsic or inherent meaning- the idea that musical sound has its own value without referring to anything outside itself. I review the views of various writers that reconcile on this point (Scruton, Kant, Hanslick, Samson, Cage, Zbikowski) and indicate a tendency to cite the conceptual elusiveness of music as a premise for the argument that music has *transcendent* meaning. This argument may entail a conflation of a lack of observable evidence (of meaning) with evidence for an unobservable meaning. To refute this transcendentalist position I invoke a range of studies in the psychology of music that ascribe *nonconceptual* content to music (Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat, Jones, Stevens and Byron, Clarke, Zbikowski, Moore, Larson and Van Handel) and a number of studies that evidence music's status in culture as a universally accessible, often trivial practice (Agawa, Nettle, McDermott and Hauser.) In addition I critique two approaches that assume a high-order communicated meaning. Subsequently, I draw on a wealth of supporting evidence in Cook that demonstrates the 'disparity between the experience of music and the way in which we imagine or think about it,' but argue that the transcendentalist assumption is nonetheless manifest in Cook's work too.

The conclusion I draw is that music is a *nonconceptual cognitive* phenomenon and affords a rich description as such via music psychology. It pertains to those aspects of the mind that *facilitate* rather than *constitute* understanding, and it is due to this ontological condition that music appears meaningless to the experiencer but nonetheless provokes a powerful phenomenological response. It may be music's lack of meaning that affords it such powerful effect: the lack of mediation by understanding implies a direct engagement with the faculties for feeling; meaning can be regarded a constraint that is lifted to allow freedom of cognitive structuring.

That music consists in the exercise of nonconceptual cognitive mechanisms could have implications for the wider debate on phenomenal consciousness or *qualia*. As Gray states, science '*can't find anything for consciousness to do.*' Music may be a good indicator of how the mind can experience while not having anything 'to do.' Citing a number of studies that suggest music is an exclusively and universally human prerogative (Agawa, Nettle, McDermott and Hauser, Cook,) I suggest that music is an ability contingent on a sophisticated concept of self. Taking music to be an exploration of nonconceptual cognitive mechanisms implies that it is a practice of subverting perceived *meaning* and engaging with aspects of *self* for the experience that entails. This ability to conceive of the conceiver is perhaps how sound can be something in itself: when environmental

information- the world- is separated from the aspect of self that is affording the means of perception- sound- and the *act* rather than the *object* of cognition is thus taken as a subject of experience. This experience lies behind meaning; ontologically removed from any form of explanation; hence the explanatory gap. Music could be an instructive form of qualia since, although it is conceptually inaccessible, it is well studied and affords various means of analytical evaluation.

Key-words

nonconceptual, cognition, self-perception, music-psychology, aesthetics, qualia, experiential autonomy.

Music's Intrinsic Value

It seems that music philosophy is somewhat closed to science. Rodger Scruton exemplifies this closure in saying:

It is obviously the case that advances in the neurosciences have begun to impinge upon what for me was a sacred and protected territory (music) and one has to, as it were, herd the call to rush to the boundary to defend it.¹

This position ties in closely with ideals concerning music's *autonomy*- the notion that music's meaning is somehow inherent or intrinsic to it. As Eduard Hanslick- the progenitor of such a view- put it, music's meaning 'inheres in the combinations of musical sounds and is independent of all alien, extra-musical notions.'²

The postulate that musical sound has its own intrinsic value, obtaining in lieu of any external mediation, is a pervasive one, seemingly persisting in various quite disparate approaches. Jim Samson, for example, while opposing himself to the likes of Hanslick (and Scruton), nonetheless seems to concede to the inaccessible, exclusively musical meaning:

Music, it might be argued, is so utterly and irreducibly specific, its meaning so embedded in its essence, that we are forced to borrow from other systems of thought in order to attempt any kind of description at all.³

And John Cage, perhaps significantly, strongly opposes the tradition of Western art music and musicology generally while still apparently sharing the same intuition with the above: 'Music means nothing as a thing'⁴ he argues; for Cage, 'sounds should be just sounds.'⁵ Note the uncanny resemblance of the latter comment to something that his ideological oppo-

1. Scruton 2011

2. Hanslick 1854/1891; 12

3. Samson 1999; 47

4. Cage 1961; 66

5. Cage 1961; 61

nent Hanslick wrote: ‘music speaks not only by means of sounds, it speaks nothing but sounds’⁶

This circumscription and consequent isolation of music from the world of meaning is by no means exclusive to philosophy either. Lawrence Zbikowski, writing in music-cognition, makes an exemplary case, suggesting that “Musical concepts are of another world, another order, because they extend into a domain that is beyond words.”⁷

I argue that this widespread tendency to hold music apart from science and, indeed, the world, can be construed as a response to and thus indicator of a particular ontological condition of music, and perhaps aesthetic experience generally, namely, that music consists of *nonconceptual cognitive* content⁸. It seems that the commonality to be gleaned from the views mentioned above- highly diverse in their wider intentions and ideas- is that music is indeed inherent to sound. However, I suggest that this does not simply open doors for transcendentalist discourse (discussed below) but rather distinguishes psychology as the appropriate means of explanation, sound being understood as a form of psychological content. And indeed there is a rich and ever growing discourse on nonconceptual musical content in the psychology of music, which I will review in the following. That music is nonconceptual implies that it appears as a *meaningless* phenomenological event, thus aiding and abetting those who claim music is *beyond* the world. However, I see nothing wrong with Cage’s approach- that of rejecting meaning outright but nonetheless pointing out that “the grand thing about the human mind is that it can turn its own tables and see meaninglessness as ultimate meaning” (p.195.) Nonconceptual cognitive content from music psychology may be useful in explaining how this can be the case.

After reviewing the psychological literature, I consider writings from philosophy, psychology and musicology, with the aim of critiquing *conceptual* assumptions- i.e. the assumption that music can be treated as a fixed abstract object. Subsequently I return to the transcendentalist argument and refute it. Finally I make some suggestions of how a nonconceptual cognitive music might bear on the wider debate on phenomenal consciousness (qualia,) if music is held to be a *self-directed* behaviour. While my view is indebted to Cage in how it paints music as something pertaining to an individual listener, that is meaningless to the individual listener, it owes something to Kant in attributing aesthetic experience to the engagement

6. Hanslick 1854/1891; 119

7. Zbikowski 2002; 326

8. I use ‘nonconceptual’ here in the loosest possible way, so loose as to be effectively interchangeable with ‘nonrepresentational.’ My definition for these terms perhaps owes more to psychology than philosophy, but I devote much of this essay to clarifying what I mean by saying music is nonconceptual, so I think that any immediate ambiguity should be resolved in the following.

of general cognitive faculties rather than abstract/mental objects:

Aesthetic judgement is not based on ‘an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (and so not a concept at all.)... [this] pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties (p.14)

It is nonconceptual content that can explicate this ‘conformity,’ brought about without mediation from concepts, thus reconciling the views of various philosophers *along with* work in music psychology. Music psychology provides such content from various areas.

Examples of Nonconceptual content

General indications as to music’s nonconceptual ontology

Generic musical materials have been explicated without referencing external processing units or representations, e.g.: tonal hierarchy modelled in connectionist architecture.⁹ This research demonstrates that human responses to an aspect of musical sound can be modelled by a system that has no mediating external processor, and thus affords the conclusion that the pertinent experience of such materials can be associated with non-conceptual cognitive mechanisms. Also, rhythm has been theorised as neurological entrainment,¹⁰ which suggests a neural (rather than epistemic) mechanism for the development of rhythm-expectancies.

These are means of explicating general properties of music that do not appeal to conceptual knowledge, then. For another general indication of a nonconceptual cognitive music, consider that Stevens and Byron have indicated universal musical constraints,¹¹ i.e. those that obtain across all epistemic/conceptual frameworks and so are not conceptually specific.

Description at the level of structural components.

Other studies, taken together, afford a rich description of music at the level of *specific structural components*.

Lawrence Zbikowski¹²

9. Bigand and Poulin-Charronnat 2009

10. Jones 2009

11. Stevens and Byron 2009

12. Zbikowski 2002

Zbikowski used models from cognitive science to explicate music in terms of inherent properties of the mind. One such model pertained to *cognitive categorisation*:

[Our] recognition of... things reflects the categories through which we structure our thought: to recognise a book is to identify it as a member of the category *book*; to recognise a tree is to identify it as a member of the category *tree*. Categorization occurs in all sensory modalities and throughout the range of mental activities: we categorize smells and sounds, thoughts and emotions, skin sensations and physical movement. Categories are...basic to thought. (p.13)

It was Zbikowski's insight to demonstrate how this fundamental cognitive process is essential to music listening. He did this in the form of a motivic analysis- i.e. explicating the musical motif as a cognitive category- although, as he puts it, while this 'is a good example of a musical category, categories can be much more various and structured around whatever set of musical relationships seems best to account for what is salient about a particular repertoire' (p.59.)

In which case categorisation, as a cognitive *facility* rather than a meaningful object or *concept*, could be a significant source of musical effect; it's a big part of music and a big part of the mind.

Image Schemata

Another form of nonconceptual content I'm going to mention is *image schemata*.¹³ These structures are *embodied*, so derive their content from the body as opposed to abstract mental objects; they are *metaphorical* in that they can apply to lots of different experiences. As Zbikowski puts it:

[a]n image schema is a dynamic cognitive construct that functions somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby connects up a vast range of different experiences that manifest this same recurring structure.¹⁴

This structuring thus helps us 'carve up our world'¹⁵ into manageable bits. Hence they *facilitate* rather than *constitute* understanding. Image schemata have been applied in music analysis by Moore (2010) and Larson and Van Handel (2005.)

13. see Johnson's *The Body in the Mind* (1987)

14. Zbikowski 1998

15. Johnson 1987

Eric Clarke¹⁶

Lastly, Clarke developed an approach to music based on James Gibson's¹⁷ work on *ecological theory*.

This is the theory that there is much inherent structure in the environment and in the perceiver that thus affords the perceiver *direct* perception- without mediation from abstract knowledge or representations. The ear and sound is a good example of this relationship- we don't need to know anything about sound or the ear in order for us to respond in a structured way to sound and thus perceive with efficacy.

Ecological theory refers to- and is supported by- work in the field of robotics and connectionism; for a review of embodied and ecological cognitive content see Leonard Shapiro, *Embodied Cognition* (2011.)

Summary of Nonconceptual Argument

The views of various philosophers reconcile on the notion of musical sound's inherent value.

General indications as to music's nonconceptual ontology can be gleaned from music psychology

- Connectionist modeling of tonality
- Rhythm as neurological entrainment
- Universal properties of music

Nonconceptual content can be explicated at level of music structure:

- *Cognitive categorisation*
- *Image Schemata*
- *Ecological theory*

It's important to remember that nonconceptual content explicates *cognitive facilities*: means by which we come to understand rather than objects of understanding; these are the processes *behind* conceptualisation.

This ties into Kant's description of aesthetic experience as: '[T]he harmony of [the] form with the cognitive faculties' (p.16)

16. Clarke 2005

17. Gibson 1966, 1979

Objective Views

I'm now going to talk about the opposition to a nonconceptual argument: objective/conceptual views.

Zbikowski¹⁸

To begin I will just briefly mention Zbikowski, since his view is explicitly conceptual; he believes music has concepts, and yet I have claimed that his research can be interpreted to support a nonconceptual view- viz. the cognitive categorisation methodology.

His argument is that the efficacy of cognitive theory models in music analysis indicates the existence of musical concepts, since these models are typically applied where concepts are indeed assumed. Ultimately, he fills the explanatory gap that the musical concept creates by appealing to mysticism; hence the quote considered above: 'Musical concepts are of another world, another order, because they extend into a domain that is beyond words.' (p.326)

However, there's quite a lot of literature in philosophy that suggests nonconceptual content *alone* can constitute experience, so it is not clear that conceptual content is necessarily implied by Zbikowski's evidence for nonconceptual content.

For example, this quote from Bermúdez and Cahen:

Arguably, I can perceptually discriminate many more colors and shapes than I currently have concepts for. Although I may be capable of discriminating between two color chips of very similar shades of red, red_{27} and red_{29} , not being an expert on colors I will not have the concepts red_{27} and red_{29} . With my limited conceptual repertoire, I will correctly judge both color chips to be red. However, I will so judge on the basis of experiences whose contents are much more specific and fine grained in a way that cannot be captured by my conceptual capacities.¹⁹

So, I can discriminate between things I do not have distinct concepts for- like two different shades of red, or, perhaps more pertinently, two different musical tones. This suggests that there are such things as nonconceptual experiences, so evidence for nonconceptual content is not necessarily evidence for conceptual content. Categorisation then, could be employed nonconceptually, just on the basis of sensory discrimination, I don't think Zbikowski gives any reason to doubt this.

18. Zbikowski 2002

19. Bermúdez and Cahen 2008

Debellis²⁰

Mark Debellis is important since he attempts to explicate music as an abstract object with semantic meaning, using established philosophical methodologies. This, then, is a strongly *objective, conceptual* approach.²¹

Debellis believes ‘musical hearing is representational... being a representation entails having a content, something the representation is about, means or expresses’ (p.19.) Music’s effect is here attributed to its associated representation- something extrinsic to sound; some ‘aboutness,’ ‘meaning’ or ‘expression’ that the sound carries or refers to.

That Debellis locates ‘music’ in some external, objective realm, apart from the subjective listener, is further revealed here: ‘[A]re musical organisation and other music-theoretic properties to be understood... as features of mental states or as features *of music* (which said mental states represent the music as having)? Here I opt for the latter conception...’ (p.22) Debellis views music as an *abstract object* then, and as having content equivalent in kind to theoretical/analytical representation. This is a central assumption which allows Debellis to employ Fregean semantic theory. In positing a representational ontology, Debellis is able to render music in terms of individuated, meaningful subjective objects that can then relate to real objects in the world.

After giving Frege’s example of the Morning and Evening Stars (modes of presentation, or ‘m.p.’s’ hereafter) relating to Venus (a referent or intension), Debellis discusses the musical case:

two kinds of hearing ascription may be distinguished: one whereby the kind of hearing ascribed is type-distinct- involves a different mode of presentation- from the belief expressed by the content sentence [‘untrained listener’]- and one where hearing and belief are type-identical [‘trained listener’]. Let us call the former theory-inequivalent hearing and the latter theory-equivalent (indicating epistemic equivalence, or lack thereof, to theoretical belief.) (p.40)

This suggestion of ‘epistemic equivalence’ between the expert listener’s experience and music theory is problematic since analysis is *informative*, even for the analyst, as Debellis recognises:

First we recognise... that the analysis is true to the way we have heard the passage, prior to encountering the analysis. Second, we feel we have learned something, either about the piece or about how we have been hearing it,

20. Debellis 1995

21. In fact Debellis postulates a nonconceptual level of content for music, but his work is firmly grounded in representational theory of mind; he tries reduce all musical content to Fregean semantic theory and he rejects the notion that nonconceptual content is distinct from conceptual content (pp.70-3) against Peacocke (1986, 1992a) and Crane (1992b). So his notion of ‘nonconceptual’ is in stark contrast to the one I offer here.

from the analysis.

‘The assumption of epistemic equivalence of analysis and hearing that I have made... leaves quite unintelligible the element of discovery. (p.78)

The notion of shared m.p.’s between theoretical description and the listening experience of the expert is unconvincing, then, and it seems that the notion of different m.p.’s holding in relation (in virtue of an abstract object to which they relate) is no less so, as Debellis implies here:

it is an open question whether the psychological state the trained listener is in when she hears a pitch as a 5 is the same state as the untrained listener’s [psychological] representation of 5- differing only in its *relations* to linguistic capacities- or a different state entirely... I do not pretend to know the answer to [such] questions, but certainly there is no a priori reason to think that the answer to any of them is yes; the burden of proof is to show that it is. (p.42)

Although the absence of evidence of such a relation could equally suggest that it needs to be evidenced if it is to be assumed (Cook (1990) argues that the relation between theoretical representation and listener experience is tenuous at best). This illustrates how Debellis’s approach fails to delineate some fundamental property ‘music’ that would give different experiences of a musical particular a single referent, and so make semantic theory workable.

This point is reified, I think, when Debellis discusses the specification of musical meaning in terms of semantic theory:

[The note] G is scale degree 5 in [the key of] C as well as 1 in G. Since any pitch that is 5 in C is 1 in G and vice versa, ‘5 in C’ is cointensional with ‘1 in G.’ But... one may hear a pitch as 5 in C without hearing it as 1 in G. So the difference is... not to be found in that common intension. (pp.51-2)

The note G is a single distinct musical material, but it can be heard to function as two different theoretical constructs, depending on its context. A ‘G,’ then, does not sufficiently individuate musical content, since it affords a range of musical contents. Thus it cannot be the objective content. Debellis’s solution is to posit a novel level of content- ‘structure:’

[Structure] is a level of content shared by hearing and theoretical belief (p.52.)

This accounts for the content of the ‘ordinary listener’, links it to that of the expert listener, and also links the ‘intension’ (i.e. the particular instance of music) and the m.p. That this ‘structure’ has such an integral role in Debellis’s theory- holding together the subjective attitudes, forms of music-representation and elements of semantic theory, as well giving ‘ordinary’ music content- implies that it should be an important point for him to argue. However, he disagrees:

Exactly how this is done does not seem a crucial issue; my purpose here is not to suggest a particular candidate for this kind of content but to point out the need for such a level (p.53.)

The need for such a level is a symptom of his approach. This seems more to acknowledge an explanatory gap than to give a solution: it is the objective content that he is here forced to invent. So, an objective approach like Debellis's seems to be critically flawed even on its own terms. However, there may be reason to believe that music not only doesn't afford reconciliation of subjective viewpoints, or modes of presentation, on some abstract object analogous to the Planet Venus, but doesn't actually afford reification as a subjective viewpoint or mode of presentation, analogous to 'Morning/Evening Stars' in Frege's example. In other words, I would argue that music doesn't afford representation by a first-person experiencer *as well* as a third-person analyst. Neither intensions nor modes of presentation are evident.

My reasons for arguing this relate to the work of Nicholas Cook. Cook cites a wealth of empirical, theoretical and phenomenological evidence to argue that forms of music representation and forms of music experience are 'two essentially different things,' that there is a 'disparity between the experience of music and the way in which we imagine or think about it' (p.135.)

Having reviewed empirical research by himself (1987*d*) and Alan Smith (1973), Cook argues that analytical representation does not seem to play a role in normative listening attitudes, even of expert listeners

Unless they have both the training and the inclination to track the form of a piece of music in theoretical terms as they listen, people experience recurrence without actually observing what recurs; they experience coherence but not the unitary organization in terms of which a theorist or analyst would explain that coherence²²

So, normative music listening- pertaining to whatever kind of listener- is a practice that little resembles the individuation of distinct representational objects- e.g. the Morning/Evening Star or the Planet Venus. In which case, Debellis's *first* assumption- that the subjective experience of music listening is representational- is itself questionable. Hence why I am arguing that music is an exclusively subjective experience consisting in direct, unmediated feeling; of a different kind to that which a subject can conceive of and thus objectify. These illuminating phenomenological reports, cited in Cook, give some credence to this view:

[according to Artur Rubinstein] "understand" is a word one shouldn't apply

22. Cook 1990; 68

to music; there's nothing to be *understood* for me, music must be felt.²³ Igor Stravinsky used almost the same words when he remarked, "I haven't understood a bar of music in my life; but I have felt it." (p.186)

It seems Debellis does not respect this basic ontological principle, and that the failure of his approach can be attributed to this incongruence between his approach and his subject

Nicholas Cook (1990)

While Cook's work seems to strongly oppose Debellis's, he does not endorse a nonconceptual view as I am presenting it. He does seem to drive a wedge between experience and conception, so his research is very useful when arguing for a nonconceptual music, but his discourse does not seem to conform to such a notion of music, I would argue. His view can actually be linked to Debellis's in that it implies music is equivalent in kind to representations.

Evidence for this can be found in various places. For one, he rejects potential explanation from several plausible candidates for nonconceptual psychological content

- the 'Gestalt principle of closure' and 'grouping' (p.22-3)
- the 'Phi phenomenon' (pp.24-5)
- "perceptual construction" (p.25)

All are collectively subordinated to listening for 'form' and dismissed as being 'prior to the stimulation of the [listener's] disposition' (pp.25-6.) I think he considers such perceptual mechanisms to be at too low a level of cognition to account for music.

Indeed, this I think reflects an assumption that Cook proceeds under—that the ineptitude of analysis is not due to objective models being inappropriate but is due to music's *complexity*. These next passages allude to this conception quite clearly:

Music is, as John Blacking says (1973: x), "too deeply concerned with human feelings and experiences in society... for it to be subject to arbitrary rules, like the rules of games": that is why symbols and images of music can never fully embody the coherence and quiddity of a piece of music' (p.185) In the final chapter he explains the inefficacy of theoretical constructs for being 'no more than representations of a reality that is itself more complex' (p. 236.) And again, here invoking 'context' as a possible problem with analytical representation: 'formal classifications of pitch-class content do not suffice to specify the context within which musical sounds are heard as similar

23. Quoted in Mitchell 1966: 19

or dissimilar, coherent or incoherent (p.234.)

Music, then, seems to be too 'complex' in its 'coherence' or 'quiddity,' too dynamic in its changing 'context', to be adequately explicated.' In other words, 'it is *too meaningful* to be conceptualised; it is *beyond* means of representation. Hence this is actually a particular form of a *transcendentalist* view- Cook assumes that the problem of explaining music stems from music's superlative or profusion of meaning. Even in a study which seems highly congenial to a nonconceptual view- that repeatedly separates experience and conception (e.g. p.135); that argues music is not constituted by objects (p.223); that emphasises 'the essential role that the listener... plays in the constitution of any event as a musical one' (p.11); that suggests analytical representations are 'explanatory metaphors or fictions' (p.241)- the conclusion that music is simply meaningless and so inconceivable is circumvented.

Revisiting music's transcendent meaning

The question begged, then is why do musicologists and philosophers so frequently conflate a lack of observable meaning with evidence for an unobservable meaning? Well, I think that the first answer would be that this view *glorifies* the musicologist's subject, and therefore (vicariously) the musicologist. Jim Samson describes this glorification when it was at its height, in the 19th Century:

[The artwork] could stand for the indivisible Absolute, beloved of idealist thought. There are numerous variants of such idealist aesthetics in the nineteenth century. And there are closet supporters of it among more recent thinkers too... What they all share is a commitment to the closure which separates the work of art from the world, and the consequent capacity of the significant work to draw us into its healing "real presence."²⁴

While this extreme perhaps is only rarely advocated nowadays, as Samson states, I would suggest that the assumption underlying it is still prevalent- that music is beyond meaning: Samson himself concedes to it in a quote mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and Zbikowski's comment (above) is indeed exemplary ('Musical concepts are of another world...') And yet, it seems that the notion of there being something unique, or even peculiar about music's content seems to be at odds with certain cultural realities:

- The most typical listening attitude has been shown to be one of indif-

24. Samson 1999; 40.

ference, where music is not the focus of attention.²⁵

- Musical experience has been observed, in the form of a favourable response to consonance, in children in the early stages of infancy.²⁶
- Music is practiced by all known peoples of the world.²⁷
- Music is highly heterogeneous both in its production and its interpretation.

These properties seem to far better reconcile with a practice of engaging fundamental cognitive mechanisms that are unconstrained by concepts than the communication of an exclusively musical, piece-specific, high-order meaning. Furthermore, what I think is a primary motivation for the transcendent view- phenomenological/experiential intensity- is accounted for in a nonconceptual view: the lack of mediation by understanding implies a direct engagement with the faculties for feeling; meaning can be regarded a constraint that is lifted to allow freedom of cognitive structuring. Consider the profusion of distinct categories that play out simultaneously in a piece of music (rhythm, harmony, melody, phrasing...), it's hard to see how such structural complexity would be possible in a conceptual narrative. So it may be by having no meaning that music has its powerful effect.

The most salient virtue a nonconceptual view has over either a transcendent view, or a straight conceptual view like Debellis's, however, may just be its potential for empirical observation couched in terms of the listener's psychology. Nonconceptual content can be revealed in formal-representations and music discourse and as such allows the attribution of psychological content to an experience of music. The transcendent conceptual view, on the other hand, relies on the possibility that a meaning could be expressed without evidencing itself if its evidence were unobservable.

That music is nonconceptual could have clear implications for how we think about music, then, since this view attributes music's effect to aspects of the embodied cognitive machinery rather than anything epistemic or transcendent. But I think that there could be scope to use this conception to move beyond 'thinking about music' and inform the wider debate on consciousness, if music is taken to be an example of phenomenal consciousness- what philosophers call *qualia*.

25. Juslin 2009; 133

26. Trehub: 2009; 231

27. Agawu 1999

Beyond ‘thinking about music’: Qualia

Qualia are *qualitative feels*: It feels a certain way to be perceptive of, say, the colour red, which is different to the way it feels to be perceptive of yellow. While science has detailed explanations of how we perceive colour, there appears to be a disparity between the notion of electrical signals passing along neuron fibres and the quality of experience that is my perception of a colour. This experience is often called qualia, and the problem of this disparity between understanding and experience has been called the *explanatory gap*:

By appeal to the physical properties of the brain we seem able to explain how we process information, how our bodies react to the environment, and even- on analogy with computers- how we reason. But why any of these processes should give rise to consciousness, that there should be something it’s like for creatures who have these processes going on inside them, this seems mysterious to us.²⁸

And it is this ‘what it is likeness’ of experience that is the source of the mystery. The last quote is from a philosopher- Joseph Levine- but I think it is instructive to also consider the problem as expressed by the neuroscientist Jeffrey Gray:

given that there is a scientific story that goes seamlessly from sensory input to behavioural output *without* reference to consciousness then, when we try to add conscious experience back into the story, *we can’t find anything for consciousness to do*.²⁹

Gray highlights the efficacy of science in describing the mind as a means of *behavioural output* here. Now, there might be mileage in the idea that music is a good indicator of how the mind can experience while not having anything ‘to do,’ in Gray’s sense. If music is nonconceptual it is isolated from observable behaviour because it is not integrated with a person’s representation of the world- it is not conceived as meaningful for the person so the person cannot produce a response that reflects its meaning and thus makes it scientifically accessible.

In order to flesh out this idea, I’d like to state that music is a *self-directed practice*. Consider that music is a ‘species-specific trait’³⁰; it is one that, “All cultures regard... as at least minimally valuable”³¹ and one that

28. Levine 2009; 286

29. Gray 2004; 40, his emphasis

30. Agawa 1999; 102-138

31. Nettl 2005; 23

non-human primates dislike- they prefer silence;³² it is trivially accessible.³³ These points suggest music rests on a distinctively human characteristic that is basic to humans generally, one such characteristic being that of a sophisticated concept of self. Taking music to be an exploration of non-conceptual cognitive mechanisms implies that it is a practice of subverting perceived *meaning*- concepts- and engaging with aspects of *self* for the experience that entails. This ability to conceive of the conceiver is perhaps how sound can be something in itself: when environmental information- the world- is separated from the aspect of self that is affording the means of perception- sound- and the *act* rather than the *object* of cognition is thus taken as a subject of experience.

So an experience of sound in itself may be an exclusively human prerogative constituted by self-directed behaviour that does not refer outwardly, and so is empirically inaccessible. In precisely the same way, an experience of an image in itself- like a colour- could be contingent on the ability to conceive of the means of perception- vision- and engage them purely for the sake of engaging them. Hence why any attempt to attribute a purpose or meaning to the phenomenal experience of perception- as science tries to do- is inherently flawed; such experience underlies any concept we might use to describe it by consisting in the intentional exercise of those aspects of self that facilitate conceptualisation. It lies behind meaning; ontologically removed from any form of explanation, hence the explanatory gap.

Music could be an instructive form of qualia since, although it is conceptually inaccessible, it is well studied and affords various means of analytical evaluation; I've highlighted some of the more sophisticated ways in which a perceiver might engage itself with sound in the section on non-conceptual content, but other highly pertinent examples include value-constraints like the tonal system and sound production in recorded music (of course, there are many other examples.) Music as an artefact has developed in culture to reflect certain invariant characteristics of cognition in order to provoke an experiential response, so provides a detailed and precise correlate to phenomenal consciousness or qualia.

Summary

I have argued a nonconceptual view of music by invoking philosophical, musicological and music-psychological data to give both a positive argument, and a critique of conceptual approaches from psychology, philosophy and musicology. In addition I have tried to demonstrate the tendency

32. McDermott and Hauser 2006

33. Cook 1990; 218

to conflate a lack of observable meaning with evidence for unobservable meaning and I have suggested that a nonconceptual view of music can inform the wider debate on phenomenal consciousness or qualia.

Conclusion

My view is that a plethora of nonconceptual content can be ascribed to music via work in the psychology of music, which can account for its experiential salience and conceptual elusiveness.

The notion of being able to generate intense experience purely subjectively, through an intentional but meaningless free play or ‘harmony’ of the cognitive faculties, might just as well be as interesting philosophically as the well-trodden ground of music’s extra-lingual expressivity. However, I think that the notion of a meaningless music seems to be contentious, and that many prefer to make the conclusion that music means too much than nothing at all. Again, I reiterate my contention in proceeding under Kant’s description of aesthetic experience:

[T]he [aesthetic] pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties (p.14)

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Stress, Gesundheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit

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Strukturierte Zusammenfassung

Ziel: In diesem Beitrag wird die These entwickelt und verteidigt, dass arbeitsbezogener Stress ein gerechtigkeits-theoretisches Problem darstellt. Damit wird eine Forschungslücke in der Debatte um eine Ethik der öffentlichen Gesundheit geschlossen. **Methode:** Es werden die Schlüsselkonzepte von arbeitsbezogenem Stress, Gesundheit als Ressource zweiter Ordnung und sozialer Gerechtigkeit dargelegt. Hiernach wird das Konzept der sozialen Gerechtigkeit auf die Verteilung von Gesundheit und die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress angewendet. **Erkenntnis:** Arbeitsbezogener Stress kann als sozial ungerecht bewertet werden, da er zu einer ungerechten Verteilung von Gesundheit in der Gesellschaft führt. Daraus folgt, dass seine Prävention und die Förderung psychischer Gesundheit geboten ist und in die Gestaltung und Regelung von Arbeit und Beschäftigung einfließen sollte. **Originalität:** Arbeitsbezogener Stress wird zumeist als psychologisches, medizinisches, arbeitsrechtliches oder gesundheitspolitisches Problem angesehen ohne nach seiner gerechtigkeits-theoretischen Relevanz zu fragen. Eine solche Klärung ist aber notwendig, um widersprechende Ansprüche und Forderungen klären und Prioritäten festlegen zu können.

Schlagworte:

Stress, soziale Gerechtigkeit, Arbeit, öffentliche Gesundheit

Structured Abstract:

Purpose: This paper develops and defends the thesis that work-related stress is a problem of social justice. This closes a research gap in the debate on public health ethics. **Approach:** The key concepts of work-related stress, health as a second order resource, and social justice are presented. Then, the concept of social justice is applied to the distribution of health and the prevention of work-related stress. **Findings:** Work-related stress violates social justice as it leads to an unjust distribution of health in society. Therefore the prevention of work-related stress and the promotion of mental health at work are demands of social justice. **Originality:** Work-related stress is mostly seen as a psychological, medical, legal or health policy issue and not as a matter of social justice. But such a perspective is necessary to clarify potential conflicting claims and set priori-

ties.

Keywords

Stress, Social Justice, Work, Public Health

Die philosophische und besonders die ethisch-normative Beschäftigung mit Fragen von Gesundheit, Gesundheitsversorgung und Gesundheitspolitik hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten rasant zugenommen (Anand, Peter, & Sen, 2004; Dawson, 2011; Ruger, 2010a; Venkatapuram, 2011). Dabei zeigt sich, dass die Philosophie zum Verständnis und auch zur Lösung von Problemen in diesen schwierigen und vor allem existentiell bedeutsamen Bereichen beitragen kann und hier gerade gerechtigkeits-theoretische Überlegungen wichtig sind. Gesundheitspolitik und die öffentliche Gesundheitsversorgung wird mitnichten nur durch medizinische Erkenntnisse bestimmt, sondern basiert vielmehr auf oftmals unreflektierten normativen Voraussetzungen und unterliegt selbst wiederum normativen Ansprüchen. Dieser Beitrag versteht sich somit als einen weiteren Baustein zur philosophisch-normativen Durchdringung eines zunehmenden und gesundheitspolitisch drängenden Themas.

Arbeitsbezogener Stress stellt in Europa sowie in allen modernen Arbeitsgesellschaften ein weit verbreitetes und wachsendes Problem dar. Er hat vielfältige Auswirkungen auf das psychische und physische Wohlbefinden der Betroffenen und kann weitergehendes Leid in Form von psychischen Störungen, physischen Erkrankungen oder schädlichen Verhaltensweisen begünstigen und hervorrufen. Die Erforschung der Ursachen, Häufigkeit und Folgen sowie Möglichkeiten und Instrumente der Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress auf individueller, organisatorischer und gesellschaftlich-politischer Ebene wurde in den letzten Jahren entsprechend vorangetrieben. Ein Aspekt der bislang keine Beachtung gefunden hat, ist die Frage, wie arbeitsbezogener Stress aus gerechtigkeits-theoretischer Perspektive zu beurteilen ist bzw. ob dieser überhaupt ein gerechtigkeits-theoretisches Problem darstellt. Offensichtlich ist er mit Leid für die Betroffenen verbunden und kann daher als beseitigungswürdig beurteilt werden. Doch klärt dies nicht, ob er nicht auch eine Form der sozialen Ungerechtigkeit darstellen. Soziale Ungerechtigkeit impliziert, dass arbeitsbezogener Stress wesentlich etwas mit einer gesellschaftlichen Fehlverteilung, nämlich der ungerechten Verteilung von Ressourcen, Fähigkeiten oder Ähnlichem zu tun hat. Damit ist der philosophische Horizont eines ansonsten vornehmlich in der Medizin, Psychologie und den Sozialwissenschaften angesiedelten Thematik abgesteckt. Um jedoch eine solche philosophische – hier genauer: gerechtigkeits-theoretische – Perspektive einnehmen zu können, müssen die relevanten Konzepte und Erkenntnisse aus anderen Disziplinen aufgenommen werden.

Dieser Beitrag entwickelt und verteidigt nun drei Thesen. (1) Arbeitsbezogener Stress beeinflusst die gerechte Verteilung der Ressource Gesundheit in einer Gesellschaft. Gesundheit als Ressource zu verstehen, wurde von der Weltgesundheitsorganisation in der Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion eingeführt und ist für diesen Artikel die Leitlinie (WHO, 1986; Williamson & Carr, 2009). (2) Eine solche möglichst gerechte Verteilung von Gesundheit kann als eine Forderung sozialer Gerechtigkeit verstanden werden. Um dies zu zeigen, bedarf es einer Klärung dessen, was Gesundheit als Ressource überhaupt ausmacht, nach welchen Prinzipien und mit welchen Mitteln sie gerecht verteilt werden kann. Offensichtlich ist Gesundheit eine besondere Ressource, da sie das Wohlbefinden, Lebenschancen und Fähigkeiten sowie auch die Möglichkeiten des Umgangs mit anderen Ressourcen wesentlich beeinflusst. Gesundheit kann als ein essentieller Teil eines guten Lebens verstanden werden. Gesundheit ist nun dadurch charakterisiert, dass sie erstens (a) zu einem nicht unerheblichen Anteil auf biophysischen Grundlagen basiert, die einer gesellschaftlichen Verteilung prinzipiell unzugänglich sind, zweitens (b) ist Gesundheit jedoch auch sozial determiniert und kann drittens (c) durch den Zugang zu Gesundheitsversorgung entschieden beeinflusst wird. Daher können gerechtigkeits-theoretische Überlegungen sehr wohl einen entscheidenden Einfluss haben (Anand u. a., 2004; Ruger, 2010a). Arbeitsbezogener Stress ist dabei vor allem auf den Ebenen der Gesundheitsförderung und präventiver Maßnahmen anzugehen. Seine Reduktion kann sowohl Leid und Krankheit vorbeugen als auch Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden steigern und somit zu einer gerechteren Verteilung von Gesundheit beitragen (Awa, Plaumann, & Walter, 2010; Kuhn, 2006; Noblet & Lamontagne, 2006). (3) Die Reduktion von arbeitsbezogenem Stress durch Maßnahmen der Förderung und Prävention stellt somit eine Forderung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit dar, welche durch die gerechte Verteilung der Ressource Gesundheit gefordert ist. Sie ist damit auch eine Aufgabe und regulative Idee individuellen, organisatorischen und politischen Handelns, der Gestaltung von Arbeit und Beschäftigung und allgemein der Einrichtung von Wohlfahrtsstaat und Gesellschaft (McDaid, Curran, & Knapp, 2005; Mittelmark, 2001).

Dieser Beitrag wird nun in vier Schritten diese Thesen entwickeln und verteidigen. Zunächst werden die Konzepte von (1) arbeitsbezogenem Stress, (2) Gesundheit als sozial determinierter Ressource zweiter Ordnung und (3) ein Grundriss von sozialer Gerechtigkeit dargelegt. (4) Die Konklusion lautet schließlich, dass die Förderung von Gesundheit und die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress ein vorrangiges Ziel der Umsetzung sozialer Gerechtigkeit sein sollte und hierfür auch die entsprechenden Mittel einzusetzen sind.

(1) Prävalenz und Folgen von arbeitsbezogenem Stress

In diesem Abschnitt geht es um eine kurze Darstellung von arbeitsbezogenem Stress als sozialem Faktor für Gesundheit. Dafür werden zunächst die Prävalenz und häufige Folgen von arbeitsbezogenem Stress dargestellt werden und danach ein Überblick über Möglichkeiten der Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung am Arbeitsplatz. Der Begriff arbeitsbezogener Stress ist sowie der Begriff des Stresses im Allgemeinen nicht abschließend definiert und es finden sich in der Literatur und Forschung unterschiedliche Konzepte und Anwendungen (Cohen, Kessler, & Gordon, 1995; Contrada & Baum, 2010). Es wird schon terminologisch von arbeitsbezogenem, arbeitsbedingtem oder beruflichem Stress genauso gesprochen wie von Stress bei der Arbeit, Stress am Arbeitsplatz oder Stress durch Arbeit. Stress ist ein Sammelbegriff, der sowohl die Auslöser des Stresses (Stressoren), die physischen, psychischen oder mentalen Reaktionen auf Stress, das Verhalten der Betroffenen oder auch langfristige Stressfolgen bezeichnen kann. Zwei der vorherrschenden Modelle sind dabei das Demand-Control-Support Modell und das Effort-Reward Modell (Karasek & Thorell, 1990; Siegrist, 1996). Aus der Vielzahl an Definitionen wird hier derjenigen der European Agency for Safety and Health at Work gefolgt.

[W]ork-related stress is experienced when the demands of the work environment exceed the workers' ability to cope with (or control) them. (Milczarek, Schneider, & Rial González, 2009, S. 14)

Die Verbreitung von arbeitsbezogenem Stress, die maßgeblichen Stressoren und häufige Folgen von Stress sind durch umfangreiche Forschung sowohl aus psychologischen, medizinischen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen gut belegt. Für die europäische Perspektive können die Daten der European Agency for Safety and Health at Work für das Jahr 2005 herangezogen werden (Milczarek u. a., 2009). Arbeitsbezogener Stress ist vor Rückenschmerzen und Müdigkeit das zweithäufigste arbeitsbezogene Gesundheitsproblem in der Europäischen Union (EU-27). Demnach sind 22 % aller Beschäftigten betroffen, wobei große Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Ländern festgestellt werden können. In Griechenland liegt die Rate etwa bei 55%, während sie in Großbritannien nur 12% ausmacht. 60 % der europäischen Beschäftigten berichten, dass sie in sehr hohem Tempo arbeiten müssen und 30% haben wenig bis keine Kontrolle über Inhalte, Methoden und Tempo ihrer Arbeitsaufgaben. Das Ausmaß des Problems ist auch in den Unternehmen präsent, wie aus den jüngsten

Accidents are reported as the main concern for European managers (80% major or some concern), followed by work-related stress (79%) and musculoskeletal disorders (78%). (Rial González, Cockburn, & Irastorza, 2010, S. 6)

Die Ursachen für arbeitsbezogenen Stress sind dabei äußerst vielfältig: fehlende Kontrolle über die eigene Arbeit, Überstunden, unsichere Beschäftigungsverhältnisse, Unzufriedenheit mit der eigenen Tätigkeit, Überanstrengung, Druck durch Kolleginnen und Kollegen sowie von Vorgesetzten, Mobbing, sexuelle Belästigung, Diskriminierung aufgrund von Geschlecht, Ethnie, Sexualität oder Religion, fehlende Work-Life-Balance, fehlende Ruhepausen und nicht ausreichende Möglichkeiten der Erholung oder Ungerechtigkeit in der betrieblichen Organisation (Milczarek u. a., 2009; Pandey, Quick, Rossi, Nelson, & Martin, 2010). Diese Ursachen von arbeitsbezogenem Stress können in drei Kategorien unterteilt werden: (a) individuelle, (b) organisatorische und (c) gesellschaftliche. Es ist innerhalb der Forschung nicht abschliessend geklärt in welchem Zusammenhang und in welcher Gewichtung diese drei Faktoren zueinanderstehen, jedoch nehmen die organisatorischen und institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen eine wichtige Rolle ein, die gegenüber individuellen Faktoren dominieren (Levi & Levi, 2000; Milczarek u. a., 2009). Weiters ist das Verhältnis von inneren und äußeren Faktoren von arbeitsbezogenem Stress auch abhängig von dem jeweils angewendeten Konzept von Stress.

Stress hat einerseits kurzfristige - etwa Nervosität, steigender Puls, Herzrasen, Zittern, Angst, Unkonzentriertheit, Alkohol- oder Zigarettenkonsum usw. - als auch langfristige Folgen. Die langfristigen und besonders schwerwiegenden Folgen von arbeitsbezogenem Stress können nun ebenfalls in drei Gruppen gegliedert werden. (a) Physische Folgen können kardiovaskuläre Erkrankungen, koronare Herzkrankheit, Bluthochdruck, Angina Pectoris, Herzinfarkt, Zuckerkrankheit oder Erkrankungen des Stütz- und Bewegungsapparates sein (Backé, Seidler, Latza, Rosnagel, & Schumann, 2011; Chandola u. a., 2008; Rosenthal & Alter, 2011). (b) Als mögliche psychische und mentale Folgen können Depression, generalisierte Angststörung, Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung, Panikstörung und soziale Phobie genannt werden. Prominent ist hier auch an Burn-out zu denken, welches mittlerweile ein Sammelbegriff für eine Vielzahl von arbeitsbezogenen Erkrankungen und Störungen ist (Blackmore u. a., 2007; Kopp, Stauder, Purebl, Janszky, & Skrabski, 2008; Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001). (c) Schließlich beeinflusst arbeitsbezogener Stress das Verhalten der Betroffenen. Sucht, Aggression bis hin zu Selbstmord können die schädlichen Folgen sein (Gershon, Barocas, Canton, Li, & Vlahov, 2008; Johan Hauge, Skogstad, & Einarsen, 2007; Siegrist & Rödel, 2006). Unkonzentriertes Arbeiten, Unpünktlichkeit, Verlust an Leistungsfähigkeit, Absentismus und sogar Arbeitsunfähigkeit werden ebenso durch arbeitsbezogenen Stress beeinflusst oder hervorgerufen. Dieser ist also auch mit immensen Kosten für alle Beteiligten - die Betroffenen, die Unternehmen, Kranken- und Pensionsversicherungen - und die Gesellschaft verbunden (Dewa, McDaid, & Ettner, 2007; Johnston, Westerfield, Momin,

Phillippi, & Naidoo, 2009). Die Europäische Union schätzt die Kosten aller arbeitsbezogenen Erkrankungen und Störungen für das Jahr 2000 auf drei bis vier Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts, also bis zu 265 Milliarden EURO für die EU15 (Levi & Levi, 2000, S. 13). Hiervon entfallen mindestens zehn Prozent auf die gesundheitlichen Folgen von arbeitsbezogenem Stress, was Kosten von bis zu 26 Milliarden EURO pro Jahr entspricht. Die drastische Zunahme von Krankschreibungen, Arbeitsunfähigkeit und Frühpensionierung aufgrund von psychischen und Verhaltensstörungen hängt ebenso mit arbeitsbezogenem Stress zusammen. Aus der Vielzahl an empirischen Belegen seien hier exemplarisch Daten für Deutschland angeführt.

Die Arbeitsunfähigkeiten aufgrund von psychischen und Verhaltensstörungen haben in den letzten Jahren kontinuierlich zugenommen. In dem seinerzeit betrachteten Zeitraum von 1997 bis 2001 betrug die Zunahme der Fehltage über 50%. Die Krankheitsgruppe der „Psychischen und Verhaltensstörungen“ zeigt damit im Kontext des gesamten Arbeitsunfähigkeitsgeschehens eine ganz singuläre Entwicklung. (DAK Versorgungsmanagement, 2005, S. 39)

Dieser kurze Überblick zeigt, dass arbeitsbezogener Stress ein wesentliches Problem in modernen Arbeitsgesellschaften darstellt. Es kann an dieser Stelle nicht geklärt werden, ob und inwieweit sich darin die tiefgreifenden Veränderungen in der Gesellschaft insgesamt widerspiegeln, wie sie in den Thesen der Individualisierung, Subjektivierung oder Entgrenzung von Arbeit und Leben zum Ausdruck kommen (Beck, 1994; Frey, 2009; Gottschall & Voß, 2005). Die generelle Zunahme psychischer Störungen in den letzten Jahren sowie weitreichendere Studien zur Zunahme psychischer Anforderungen in der Arbeitswelt und Gesellschaft legen einen solchen Schluss allerdings nahe (Ehrenberg, 2009; Keupp & Dill, 2010). Psychische Störungen werden die modernen Arbeitsgesellschaften des 21. Jahrhunderts bestimmen.

From a broader perspective, our prevalence findings underline impressively that mental disorders as well as neurological disorders must be considered to be Europe's foremost health care challenge of the 21st century. (Wittchen u. a., 2011, S. 670)

(2) Gesundheit als sozial determinierte Ressource

Es haben sich in der Literatur verschiedene Konzepte von Gesundheit herausgebildet (Cameron, Mathers, & Parry, 2008; Ruger, 2010b; Tengland, 2007). Larson unterscheidet etwa vier vorherrschende Modelle von Gesundheit, das medizinische, das holistische der WHO, das Wohl-

philosophy @LISBON

fühlmodell und ein umweltbezogenes Modell (Larson, 1999). Die bekannte Definition der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO), Gesundheit nicht nur als Abwesenheit von Krankheit und Leiden zu verstehen, sondern vielmehr positiv als einen „Zustand des vollständigen körperlichen, geistigen und sozialen Wohlergehens“ (WHO, 1948), ist ebenso nicht unkritisiert geblieben (Jadad & O’Grady, 2008). Für die hier anvisierte Frage, ob Gesundheit Gegenstand der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und nach welchen Prinzipien diese zu verteilen wäre, soll aber eine andere Perspektive eingenommen werden. Im Rahmen der Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion hat die Weltgesundheitsorganisation Gesundheit als eine Ressource für das tägliche Leben definiert und diese Definition wurde in weiterer Folge in wissenschaftliche, medizinische und gesundheitspolitische Kontexte aufgenommen (Williamson & Carr, 2009).

To reach a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must be able to identify and to realize aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to change or cope with the environment. Health is, therefore, seen as a resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. Health is a positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as physical capacities. Therefore, health promotion is not just the responsibility of the health sector, but goes beyond healthy life-styles to well-being. (WHO, 1986)

Gesundheit als Ressource zu verstehen impliziert also, dass diese wesentlich für die Gestaltung und ein Gelingen des Lebens und eine Grundlage für die Wahrnehmung und Nutzung weiterer Ressourcen ist. Gesundheit ist somit eine Ressource zweiter Ordnung. Ressourcen erster Ordnung sind Ressourcen, die gebraucht und verbraucht werden, Ressourcen zweiter Ordnung sind jene Ressourcen, die mit Ressourcen umgehen lassen – Bildung ist das wohl einleuchtendste Beispiele einer Ressource zweiter Ordnung. In einem solchen Verständnis wird auch deutlich, dass Gesundheit als ein „thick concept“ im Sinne von Bernard Williams zu verstehen ist, also deskriptive und normative Elemente vereint (Williams, 1985). Wenn jemand gesund ist oder als gesund bezeichnet wird, so ist dies nicht nur eine beliebige Eigenschaft und Zuschreibung, sondern besitzt auch normativen Gehalt.

Ich möchte vorschlagen, ‘Gesundheit’ als eine Ressource zweiter Ordnung zu verstehen, die in der Fähigkeit besteht, bestmöglich mit der jeweiligen körperlichen Ausstattung umzugehen. Man könnte darüber nachdenken, „Gesundheit“ als Fähigkeit zu charakterisieren, mit jenen Fähigkeiten und Ressourcen umzugehen, die eine anspruchsvolle Lebensgestaltung realisieren lassen. Gesundheit als Ressource zweiter Ordnung ist das Bündel der Einstellungen und Fähigkeiten, die das Leben bejahen lässt – oder weniger poetisch ausgedrückt: Gesundheit als Ressource zweiter Ordnung ist das Bündel von Fähigkeiten, die eigene physische, psychische und soziale Aus-

stattung zu affirmieren. (Sedmak, 2010, S. 3)

Eine ähnliche Argumentation lässt sich aus Perspektive des Fähigkeitsansatzes von Amartya Sen (Sen, 2010) über das Konzept von Fundamentalfähigkeiten explizieren (Sedmak, 2011). Solche Fundamentalfähigkeiten besitzen ebenso wie Ressourcen zweiter Ordnung einen herausragenden Stellenwert für jedes Individuum und beeinflusst wesentlich ihre Möglichkeiten, eigene Ziele zu verfolgen und zu erreichen. Gesundheit ist, wie in der obigen Passage der WHO bereits angelegt ist, Teil eines gelungenen menschlichen Lebens, welche nicht durch andere Ressourcen oder Fähigkeiten kompensiert werden kann, sondern vielmehr erst erlaubt mit diesen gestalterisch und produktiv umzugehen. Als eine Ressource zweiter Ordnung hat Gesundheit auch weitreichende Wirkungen und Potenziale über das einzelne Individuum hinaus, da sie den Einsatz von Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten für andere – Familie, Freunde, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft – ermöglicht. Es muss jedoch auch festgehalten werden, und dies ist explizit Teil eines solchen Verständnisses von Gesundheit als Ressource, dass Gesundheit eben nicht das letzte Ziel und Zweck des Lebens ist, sondern nur ein Bestandteil, ein Mittel, ein wichtiges Gut zur Verfolgung und Realisierung selbstgewählter Zwecke des Lebens. Gesundheit wird damit – richtigerweise – nicht überhöht, sondern auf seine Funktion für den Menschen festgelegt.

Importantly, though, the benefits of health do not stop with the individual in which health is embodied. Similar to positive externalities of human and social capital, the benefits of positive health returns have broad societal benefits. People's stock of biopsychosocial resources affect their ability to provide unpaid care to family members and friends, volunteer in community agencies, and engage in paid work. Because health facilitates people's participation in society, its benefits contribute to the well-being of families, communities, and societies. (Williamson & Carr, 2009, S. 110f)

Gesundheit ist nun eine soziale Ressource. Damit ist gemeint, dass sie durch soziale Prozesse beeinflusst und bestimmt wird. In der Forschung wird dies unter dem Konzept der sozialen Determinanten von Gesundheit expliziert. Gesundheit ist zwar durch individuelles Handeln beeinflusst ebenso wie durch den Zugang zu Gesundheitsversorgung, jedoch auch wesentlich durch soziale Faktoren und Prozesse, die für den Einzelnen unverfügbar sind und in der Einrichtung der Gesellschaft liegen. Einkommen, Armut, Geschlecht, Bildung, sozialer Status, Arbeitslosigkeit oder Obdachlosigkeit können hier genannt werden. Die Ungleichverteilung von Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten beeinflusst die Gesundheit und Lebenserwartung der Betroffenen (Braveman, Egerter, & Williams, 2011; Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008; Marmot & Wilkinson, 2003).

Considerable evidence now indicates, however, that social and economic conditions - apart from access to and quality of medical care, which have undeniable importance - play a fundamental, powerful, and pervasive role in the health of populations in both resource-poor and resource-rich countries. The evidence includes, for example, widening social inequalities in health in the UK in the decades following the introduction of the National Health Service, which removed financial obstacles to medical care; the currently poor and progressively deteriorating US ranking on health internationally, despite higher medical care spending than any other nation; and increasing evidence and understanding of the health impact of social conditions. A large and rapidly growing literature documents strong and pervasive links between social and economic conditions and health in nations of all economic levels; although much remains unknown and contested, the biologic plausibility of many of those links has been documented by studies of pathways and physiologic mechanisms. (Braveman, 2010, S. 32)

Arbeitsbezogener Stress kann nun als eine solche soziale Determinante von Gesundheit verstanden werden, die in bestimmten Segmenten der Arbeitswelt häufiger auftritt und auf dem Individuum enthobener Strukturen beruht. Stress beeinflusst, wie oben gezeigt, Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden und ist nicht auf individuelles Fehlverhalten zu reduzieren ebenso wie er nicht alleine durch individuelles Gesundheitshandeln vermieden werden kann. Neben die Reflexion der individuellen Ebene gilt es auch die Strukturen und Bedingungen zu reflektieren, durch die Stress erzeugt oder gemindert wird und in deren Rahmen das betroffene Individuum lebt, arbeitet und handelt.

Es ist eine weitere Folgerung dieser Erkenntnisse, Gesundheit aus einem eng fokussierten medizinischen Diskurs herauszuführen und vielmehr die sozialen, gesellschaftlichen und politischen Einflüsse, Ursachen und Gründe zur Disposition zu stellen. Gesundheit als eine sozial determinierte Ressource zu verstehen, betont die Verantwortung der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsebenen und öffnet dem Diskurs um die normativen Grundlagen der Einrichtung und Gestaltung von Gesellschaft neuen Raum. Gerade im Verhältnis zu den Ländern des Südens und der Verantwortung gegenüber den Verhältnissen in diesen Ländern kann soziale Gerechtigkeit als ein wesentliches Gebot verstanden werden, welches bislang hinter den ökonomischen Interessen zurückgedrängt wurde (Anand u. a., 2004).

(3) Prinzipien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit

Soziale Gerechtigkeit wurde in den letzten Jahrzehnten, besonders in Auseinandersetzung mit den Arbeiten von John Rawls (Höffe, 2006; Rawls, 1975) verstärkt und ausführlich, dabei jedoch keineswegs abschließend,

sowohl aus normativer als auch aus empirischer Perspektive, diskutiert (Becker & Hauser, 2009; Kersting, 2000; Koller, 2001; Liebig, Lengfeld, & Mau, 2004). Der komplexe Zusammenhang von Gesundheit bzw. Krankheit und sozialer Gerechtigkeit hat sich dabei als ein besonderes Feld der interdisziplinären Forschung etabliert, welches von augenscheinlicher individueller, organisatorischer und gesellschaftlich-politischer Relevanz ist (Anand u. a., 2004; Ruger, 2010a). Da an dieser Stelle weder Platz noch Ort ist, um auch nur annähernd ausführlich die Vor- und Nachteile einzelner Konzeptionen der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und ihre Positionen zu Gesundheit bzw. Krankheit zu diskutieren, wird sogleich eine bestimmte Form der sozialen Gerechtigkeit vorgeschlagen, welche in kurzen Zügen argumentativ ausgewiesen wird. Diese Überlegungen werden vor allem in Anlehnung und Auseinandersetzung mit der Konzeption sozialer Gerechtigkeit von David Miller in dessen Werk *Die Grundsätze sozialer Gerechtigkeit* dargelegt. (Bell & de-Shalit, 2003; Honneth, 2008; Miller, 2008) Aufgabe solcher Überlegungen ist es, Regeln für die gesellschaftliche Verteilung von Ressourcen, Gütern, Vorteilen aber auch Nachteilen und Einschränkungen zu finden.

Abschließend sei gesagt, dass wir bei der Abgrenzung des Gegenstandsreichs der sozialen Gerechtigkeit nicht dogmatisch sein sollten. Man kann einiges Ressourcen ausmachen, deren Verteilung ein zentrales Anliegen jeder Theorie der (sozialen) Gerechtigkeit sein muss – so etwa Einkommen und Reichtum, Arbeitsplätze und Bildungsgelegenheiten, medizinische Versorgung und so fort. Außer diesem Kernbestand gibt es sicherlich andere Vorteile und Lasten, deren Einbeziehung strittig ist; wir sollten aber denen bereitwillig zuhören, die geltend machen, dass mangelnder Zugang zum Gut X oder Belastung mit Y die Lebensumstände der Betroffenen in einer Weise verschlechtern, die jedermann anerkennen können. (Miller, 2008, S. 52)

Soziale Gerechtigkeit soll nun als das Zusammenwirken von drei unterschiedlichen Prinzipien verstanden werden, die Verteilung dieser Dinge regeln und zwar so regeln, dass dies dem ethischen Ideal einer gerechten Verteilung nahekommt. Die Forderung, dass sich eine Gesellschaft überhaupt um die gerechte Verteilung kümmern sollte oder dass soziale Gerechtigkeit eine wichtige Idee für die Gestaltung einer Gesellschaft ist, entspringt dabei zwei Quellen: (a) einmal gibt es eine starke empirische Forschung zu Forderungen nach sozialer Gerechtigkeit auf allen gesellschaftlichen Ebenen. Die Menschen erstreben und fordern – sowohl implizit als auch explizit – Gerechtigkeit in der Gesellschaft, in ihrer Arbeit, in ihrem Privatleben usw. (b) Neben diesen empirischen Hinweisen darauf, dass Gerechtigkeit etwas Wichtiges für den Menschen ist, gibt es eine Reihe explizit ethischer und moralphilosophischer Begründungen für soziale Gerechtigkeit. Diese können hier natürlich nicht ausführlich dargestellt

werden und, zugegebenermaßen, Miller kümmert sich recht wenig darum. Daher sei hier nur der Hinweis darauf gebracht, dass die im Folgenden explizierten drei Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit dahingehend normatives und ethisches Gewicht besitzen, dass sie dem Schutz und der Förderung von drei wesentlichen Formen des menschlichen Selbstverhältnisses zugeordnet werden können. Axel Honneth, der auch das Vorwort zur deutschen Übersetzung von Millers Werk verfasst hat, weist daraufhin, dass eine solcherart verstandene soziale Gerechtigkeit dem menschlichen Anspruch und Bedürfnis nach verschiedenartiger Anerkennung entspricht ohne dem ein gelungenes menschliches Leben nicht möglich wäre (Honneth, 1994, 2008). Soziale Gerechtigkeit ist somit – und dies ist für den weiteren Verlauf dieses Beitrags und die Frage der Auswirkungen von arbeitsbedingtem Stress nicht unerheblich – eine Forderung, die nicht eine bloße politische Leitidee ist, sondern die notwendig für die Linderung und Verhinderung menschlichen Leids und die Einrichtung einer guten Gesellschaft in der ein gutes Leben überhaupt möglich wird.

Miller unterscheidet nun drei Prinzipien der sozialen Gerechtigkeit: Bedürfnis, Verdienst und Gleichheit. Das Bedürfnisprinzip, welches in solidarischen Gemeinschaften (*solidaristic communities*), das Verdienstprinzip, welches in Zweckverbänden (*instrumental associations*) und die Gleichheitsidee, welche in der Staatsbürgerschaft (*citizenship*) ihre jeweilige Entfaltung findet. Das Bedarfsprinzip orientiert sich dabei nicht nur an einem biologischen Minimum, sondern an den jeweiligen im Gemeinwesen akzeptierten und möglichen Standards eines angemessenen Lebens. Bedürfnisse konstituieren sich somit entlang sozialer Normen und sind in diesem Sinne auch in großem Maße kontextabhängig. Näher spezifiziert Miller dies in Rückgriff auf Amartya Sen als ein Set von Fähigkeiten (*capabilities*) und Funktionen (*functionings*), die jedes Mitglied verwirklichen können soll (Alkire, 2002; Sen, 2010).

Das Verdienstprinzip wiederum kann anhand ökonomischer Beziehungen und des Marktes einsichtig gemacht werden. In diesen treten die Menschen in Zweckbeziehungen zueinander und es ist der Gerechtigkeit Genüge getan, wenn alle bekommen, was sie auf Grund ihrer Leistung verdienen. Die Schwierigkeiten Leistung und Verdienst überhaupt sinnvoll zu bestimmen, räumt Miller zwar durchaus ein, er verteidigt aber dennoch die Vorzüge einer leistungsabhängigen Vergabe von Positionen oder Gütern gegenüber deren zufälliger Vergabe genauso wie gegenüber deren egalitaristischen Einebnung. Damit ist noch nichts über die Ordnung und Beurteilung verschiedener Leistungen gesagt, also ob etwa sportliche Erfolge oder Kindererziehung einen höheren Verdienst darstellen, sondern nur, dass es in Beziehungen, in denen es um die Verwirklichung instrumenteller Zwecke geht, Güter und Lasten auf Basis des Verdienstes und der Leistung und nicht etwa auf Basis der Bedürftigkeit vergeben werden

sollten. Damit ist auch das Ideal einer „Meritokratie“ verbunden, in der Talent und Leistung über soziale Positionen und Verdienst entscheiden.

Das dritte Prinzip der Verteilung ist jenes der Gleichheit, welches in einem Verband von Staatsbürgern zur Anwendung kommen sollte. Darin eingeschlossen sind die Rechte und Pflichten sowie Freiheiten und Möglichkeiten der politischen Partizipation, die jedem Staatsbürger gleichermaßen zukommen, ebenso wie soziale Rechte, die den Status als Staatsbürger und die Ausübung der damit verbundenen Freiheiten und Rechte absichern. In diesen Fällen ist es ein Gebot der Gerechtigkeit, alle Menschen bzw. Staatsbürger gleich zu behandeln. Hier können distributive Gleichheit und „Statusgleichheit“ oder „sozialen Gleichheit“ unterschieden werden. Während erstere auf die strikte Gleichverteilung von Gütern und Lasten zwischen Staatsbürgern abzielt, bezieht sich die zweite Form der Gleichheit auf ein „Ideal der Gesellschaft“, in der sich die Staatsbürger als Gleiche respektieren und begegnen. Gesellschaften, die sich der sozialen Gerechtigkeit verpflichtet sehen, sollten beide Arten der Gleichheit verfolgen.

Soziale Gerechtigkeit beschreibt nun das Zusammenspiel dieser drei Prinzipien und ihre jeweils gerechtfertigte Anwendung. So wäre es ebenso ungerecht das Prinzip der Leistung des Verdienstes dort anzuwenden, wo auf den Bedarf zu achten ist, oder staatsbürgerschaftliche Grundrechte nach diesem Prinzip zu verteilen. Für das Thema dieses Beitrags ist daher zu klären, wie arbeitsbezogener Stress und Gesundheit einzuordnen sind, also welche Prinzipien bei ihnen zur Anwendung kommen sollten und welche Folgerungen daraus abzuleiten sind. Miller selbst hat sich mit diesen Fragen nicht eingehend beschäftigt, weshalb in weiterer Folge nur einige wenige seiner Hinweise aufgenommen werden.

(4) Konklusion: Die gerechte Verteilung von Gesundheit und die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress

Nachdem in den vorangegangenen Abschnitten die Schlüsselkonzepte von arbeitsbezogenem Stress, von Gesundheit als Ressource sowie von sozialer Gerechtigkeit vorgestellt wurden, werden nun die Thesen expliziert, dass Gesundheit sowohl ein Gegenstand der gerechten Verteilung ist als auch daraus geschlossen werden kann, dass die Aufgaben der Gesundheitsförderung und Stressprävention hieraus folgen.

(a) Die gerechte Verteilung von Gesundheit

Gesundheit ist für Miller nun eigentlich überhaupt kein Gegenstand

der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, wenn er dies auch nicht explizit festschreibt. Seine Argumentation, warum Wohlfahrt und Wohlbefinden keine Gegenstände der sozialen Gerechtigkeit sind, lässt sich jedoch auf Gesundheit übertragen.

Ich möchte jetzt ein bisschen näher auf die Gründe für die Einbeziehung oder den Ausschluss bestimmte Posten eingehen. Zu den Dingen, die nicht auf der Liste zu suchen haben, gehört Wohlfahrt (oder Glück) im Sinne eines psychischen Zustands von Individuen. Soziale Gerechtigkeit hat etwas mit den Mitteln zur Erzielung von Wohlfahrt, nicht aber mit der Wohlfahrt selbst zu tun. Das mag vielleicht paradox erscheinen. Wenn die Güter wegen der Art und Weise relevant sind, in der sie die Lebensqualität der Individuen erhöhen, warum betrachten wir bei der Einschätzung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit nicht gleich diese Verbesserung der Lebensqualität? Ein wichtiger Grund dafür ist, dass zwischen dem Zugang zu einem Gut und dem möglicherweise daraus folgendem Wohlbefinden oft eine persönliche Entscheidung steht. (Miller, 2008, S. 48–49)

Es sollte demgemäß nur um die gerechte Verteilung von Gütern und Ressourcen, die gesundheitliche Folgen haben oder Gesundheit beeinflussen, gehen, während die Verteilung von Gesundheit selbst kein Thema ist. Diesem Befund kann jedoch entgegengehalten werden, dass obwohl solche Güter oder Zustände wie Gesundheit, Glück, Wohlfahrt oder auch Bildung, jeweils auf anderen Gütern und Ressourcen oder Fähigkeiten ruhen, sie dennoch selbst Gegenstand der sozialer Gerechtigkeit sein sollten, da ohne sie überhaupt keine Idee hinsichtlich der Verteilung, solcher abhängiger Güter gewonnen werden kann. Miller durchbricht diesbezüglich auch seine Einschränkung, indem er wie oben erwähnt, auf fundamentale Fähigkeiten im Sinne von Sen Bezug nimmt. Miller nennt hier die Fähigkeiten zu lesen und zu schreiben, zu arbeiten oder eine Familie zu gründen. All diese Fähigkeiten sind keine direkt verteilbaren Güter, sondern basieren auf der Verteilung anderer Güter und Ressourcen etwa einem Zugang zum Bildungssystem oder die Absicherung einer freien Partnerwahl. Es ist somit durchaus sinnvoll über die gerechte Verteilung von Gesundheit nachzudenken und nicht nur über die Verteilung von Gesundheitsversorgung. Als letztes kann angemerkt werden, dass gerade die Forschung zur sozialen Determiniertheit von Gesundheit eindrücklich zeigt, dass Gesundheit viel weniger durch individuelle Entscheidungen beeinflusst wird als durch institutionelle und gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen.

Das Verständnis von Gesundheit als Ressource für das tägliche Leben meint, dass diese eine Ressource zweiter Ordnung ist. In den Gegenstandsbereich sozialer Gerechtigkeit fällt diese Ressource nun aber erst dann, wenn sie überhaupt verteilt werden kann. Dies trifft auf Gesundheit nicht vollständig aber in ausreichendem Maße zu. Die Forschung zu sozialen Determinanten von Gesundheit, den relativ geringen Einflüssen individuel-

len Handelns und den Möglichkeiten der Gesundheitsversorgung zeigen, dass Gesundheit eine soziale Ressource ist. Sie kann daher auch verteilt werden oder ihre Verteilung in großem Maße gesellschaftlich und politisch beeinflusst werden. Einerseits durch die verschiedenen Maßnahmen der öffentlichen Gesundheitsversorgung, also der Gesundheitsförderung, der verschiedenen Stufen der Prävention und schließlich der Behandlung und Linderung von Leid, Gebrechen und Krankheit. Andererseits kann Gesundheit durch die gerechte Verteilung anderer Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten, etwa einer materiellen Grundversorgung, Bildung oder Arbeit positiv beeinflusst und gestärkt werden. Gesundheit ist somit ein plausibler Gegenstand der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Da nun Gesundheit aber nicht direkt, sondern über die oben genannten Faktoren indirekt verteilt wird, ist die Sachlage etwas komplizierter als bei anderen Ressourcen erster Ordnung, wie etwa Nahrungsmittel, Geld oder Kleidung auch die der direkten Verteilung zugänglich sind.

Im Rahmen der Theorie sozialer Gerechtigkeit, wie sie hier vertreten wird, ist daher zunächst einmal festzuhalten, dass Gesundheit der Idee der Gleichheit zuzuordnen ist. Sie steht jedem Menschen unabhängig seiner Leistung und unabhängig eines spezifischen Bedürfnisses zu. Gesundheit ist damit auch dem Bereich der Gesellschaft und des Staates zugeordnet und weder dem vornehmlich ökonomisch geprägten Markt noch dem familiären Bereich. Es gibt somit auch keine guten Gründe dafür, dies es rechtfertigen würden, dass jemand ohne eigenes Verschulden eine schlechtere Gesundheit aufweist als irgend jemand anderer. Es gibt natürlich solche Fälle, wie die Vielzahl an angeborenen, genetisch begünstigten oder unfallverursachten Beeinträchtigungen, Krankheiten, Störungen oder Behinderungen leider zeigen. In diesen Fällen kann jedoch auch nicht von einer sozialen Ungerechtigkeit gesprochen werden. Die Gleichverteilung von Gesundheit, zumindest als Ideal gefordert, wenn auch nie vollständig einlösbar, findet sich in dieser Form nicht bei Miller. Er behandelt Gesundheit implizit unter dem Aspekt des Bedarfs, also der Befriedigung grundlegender biologischer und psychischer Bedürfnisse. Diese zwar notwendig Gesundheit zu erhalten und Gesundheit als Ressource nutzen zu können. Jedoch ist die Frage der Verteilung von Mitteln und Ressourcen, um gesund zu sein und zu bleiben, eine andere Frage als jene, wie Gesundheit selbst zu verteilen ist.

Neben der Forderung einer prinzipiellen Gleichverteilung erhebt sich die Frage, wie die jeweiligen, die Gesundheit beeinflussenden Ressourcen zu verteilen sind. Hier kommen offenbar auch andere Prinzipien zur Geltung als die Idee der Gleichheit. Die Behandlung von Krankheit und Gebrechen, die prinzipiell jedem Menschen zugänglich sein sollte, erfolgt nach Bedarf. Je schwerer das Leiden desto höhere Priorität besitzt die Patientin, wobei auch dieses Prinzip hinsichtlich der Abwägung von

Erfolgschancen durchbrochen sein kann, wenn es darum geht, knappe Güter wie Organe oder medizinische Versorgung in Krisengebieten zu verteilen (Menzel, 2008). Die Verteilung von materiellen und immateriellen Ressourcen, die die Gesundheit beeinflussen wie Einkommen, Bildung und Arbeit erfolgt ebenso nicht nur hinsichtlich ihrer positiven wie negativen Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit. Während Bildung der Idee der Gleichheit folgt, werden Einkommen und Arbeit vornehmlich hinsichtlich der Leistung verteilt. Notwendig ist aber aus dem Bedarfsprinzip heraus eine materielle Grundsicherung und effektive Armutsbekämpfung, die einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Gesundheit haben. Gesundheit muss in diesen Fällen fester Bestandteil gerechtigkeits-theoretischer Überlegungen sein, ist aber nicht alleine bestimmend. Die Umsetzung von Gesundheitsförderung und Präventionsmaßnahmen ist wiederum gesondert zu betrachten. Sie sind einmal hinsichtlich der Idee der Gleichheit zu verteilen, also so, dass alle Menschen Zugang und Möglichkeiten von Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung besitzen. Hinsichtlich besonderer Schwerpunkte und einzelner Maßnahmen sind aber wiederum Überlegungen hinsichtlich des Bedarfs bestimmend, also welche Gruppen besondere Bedürfnisse oder Gefährdungen aufweisen und inwieweit bestimmte Krankheiten oder gesundheitlichen Probleme verbreitet sind. Weiters müssen Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich erfolgreicher und effizienter Methoden sowie deren Reichweite und nachhaltige Wirkung einbezogen werden. Bei Zielkonflikten hinsichtlich der Finanzierung von unterschiedlichen Ansprüchen, die aus sozialer Gerechtigkeit folgen, etwa Ansprüche aus Leistung gegenüber Ansprüchen aus Bedarf, ist eine Priorisierung und Abwägung der einzelnen Ansprüche notwendig. Gesundheit genießt hier als Ressource zweiter Ordnung Vorrang vor anderen Ressourcen. Wenn sich daher zeigt, dass Armut ein wesentlicher Faktor für Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden ist, so ist ihre Bekämpfung auch aus diesem Grund vorrangig und nicht als eine Mildtätigkeit zu verstehen.

(b) Stressprävention und Gesundheitsförderung am Arbeitsplatz

Die dargelegten Erkenntnisse zu Prävalenz und Folgen von psychischer Fehlbelastung und arbeitsbezogenem Stress zeigen eindeutig, dass dieser die Verteilung von Gesundheit negativ beeinflusst. Daraus kann geschlossen werden, dass die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress und die Förderung von physischer, psychischer und sozialer Gesundheit am Arbeitsplatz eine eindeutige Forderung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit sind. Dies sind sie aus zwei Gründen: (a) Zum Einen gilt, wie vorhin gezeigt, Gesundheit als eine Ressource, die unabhängig aller anderen Eigenschaften oder Leistungen, jedem Menschen in größtmöglichem Ausmaß zur Verfügung

gestellt werden sollte. Dies kann als allgemeiner Grund für die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress bezeichnet werden. (b) Zum Anderen ist das Gesundheitsrisiko und die Beeinträchtigung des physischen, psychischen und sozialen Wohlbefindens und der Gesundheit durch arbeitsbezogenem Stress durch Maßnahmen der Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung am Arbeitsplatz reduzierbar (Awa u. a., 2010; Kasperczyk, 2010; Kuhn, 2006; Noblet & Lamontagne, 2006). Der Arbeitsplatz, der Betrieb und die Ausgestaltung von Arbeitsbedingungen und Beschäftigungsverhältnissen sind einerseits besonders gut geeignet für die Gesundheitsförderung und andererseits bergen sie spezifische Risiken für Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden. Diese Spezifität von Erwerbsarbeit kann als besonderer Grund für die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress bezeichnet werden. Er ist eben durch Arbeit erzeugt und mit ihr verbunden und ist daher auch an seinem Ursprungsort anzugehen. Dass Arbeit auch wesentlich persönliche, soziale und gesundheitliche Funktionen für die Beschäftigten hat, die sich mit den ökonomischen Interessen der Unternehmen oftmals nicht decken, ist ein Konflikt, der der Abwägung von unterschiedlichen Gründen bedarf. Die gerechtigkeits-theoretische Perspektive steht hier eindeutig auf der Seite der Betroffenen, deren Gesundheit nicht für die Durchsetzung ökonomischer Interessen geopfert werden darf. Ebenso sind es oftmals gerade Menschen in ohnehin bereits benachteiligten Lebenslagen, die unter schlechten und belastenden Bedingungen arbeiten und über keinen Zugang zu Präventions- und Gesundheitsförderungsmaßnahmen verfügen. Dies ist zutreffend, obwohl arbeitsbezogener Stress niemals vollständig kontrollierbar ist, da hierbei die unterschiedlichen individuellen Faktoren und Reaktionen der Betroffenen einen nicht unerheblichen Einfluss besitzen.

Thus, the workplace is a core target of health-promoting interventions that include both interpersonal and structural or organizational measures. These interventions are particularly relevant among those occupational groups that suffer from high burden of disease. As mentioned, these are less educated, socially less privileged populations within the workforce. (Siegrist, 2002, S. 52)

Weiters ist es so, dass es sehr viel einfacher und vor allem für die Betroffenen weniger leidvoll ist, Stress zu reduzieren als die durch Stress hervorgerufenen Störungen und Erkrankungen zu behandeln. Die Notwendigkeit einer verstärkten Förderung und Finanzierung von Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung folgt hieraus. Es ist ungerecht, Menschen nicht davor zu bewahren durch Stress zu erkranken und erst im Nachhinein ihre Krankheit oder Störung zu behandeln oder gar mit dieser zurück zu lassen. Die negativen Langzeitfolgen von arbeitsbedingtem Stress können auch in vielen Fällen nicht mehr oder zumindest nicht mehr vollständig

behooben werden. Wer einmal an einer schwereren physischen oder psychischen Krankheit leidet, kann für dieses Leid auch nicht mehr durch eine, wenn auch bestmögliche und lindernde Behandlung, entschädigt werden. Daher sollten Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung immer einen prioritären Stellenwert in der Diskussion um die Verteilung von Ressourcen und der Finanzierung und Ausgestaltung von öffentlicher Gesundheit einnehmen.

Dass eine Form der Prävention und Reduktion von arbeitsbezogenem Stress sowie der Gesundheitsförderung am Arbeitsplatz gerade auch in der Durchsetzung von gerechteren Arbeitsbedingungen liegt, zeigt noch einmal, dass Gerechtigkeit und gerechte Verhältnisse auf allen Ebenen Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden positiv beeinflussen und nicht einfach ein normatives Anhängsel sein dürfen (Elovainio, Kivimäki, & Vahtera, 2002; Fujishiro & Heaney, 2007; Lawson, Noblet, & Rodwell, 2009).

Im Falle von arbeitsbezogenem Stress treten neben diesen vorgebrachten normativen Gründen auch handfeste ökonomische und soziale, die eine breite Allianz für seine Prävention eigentlich positiv beeinflussen und stärken sollten. Die oben bereits genannten Zahlen zu zunehmenden Krankenständen und Frühpensionierungen treffen nachhaltig auch die Unternehmen und die sozialen Sicherungssysteme.

The human and economic costs of job stress strongly suggest that it is in everybody's interests - employees, employers and the community at large - that stress prevention/reduction initiatives are high on the agenda of any workplace health promotion (WHP) programme. (Noblet & Lamontagne, 2006, S. 347)

Insgesamt kann somit festgehalten werden, dass es eine politische, gesellschaftliche, unternehmerische und individuelle Verantwortung für eine gerechte Verteilung von Gesundheit und ihrer Förderung durch die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress gibt. Diese Verantwortung ist auf allen Ebenen, international, national, regional, organisatorisch und individuell einzumahnen. Besonders betrifft sie dabei die Forderung nach gesetzlichen Regelungen, etwa im Rahmen des Arbeitsschutzes (Leka & Cox, 2008) und nimmt die Unternehmen, Arbeitgeberinnen und -geber und Führungskräfte, die nicht selten selbst von arbeitsbezogenem Stress betroffen sind, in die Pflicht. Diese sind gegenüber den Beschäftigten in einer stärkeren Position und können auch jenseits gesetzlicher Regelungen und über diese hinaus im Rahmen von betrieblicher Gesundheitspolitik wesentlich zur Reduktion und Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress beitragen. Soweit sie dies nicht tun (wollen), ist jedoch auf Basis des normativen Vorrangs von Gesundheitsförderung einzugreifen. Die Kosten für solche Maßnahmen sind analog zum Verursacherprinzip den Unternehmen anzulasten, die von der Verausgabung und dem Arbeitsein-

satz ihrer Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter profitieren (Pffner & Weber, 2008; Piñeiro & Wallimann, 2004). Ebenso ist jedoch festzuhalten, dass der gerechtigkeits-theoretische Zugang festlegt, dass Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung nicht primär aus ökonomischen Interessen heraus gefördert und gefordert werden sollen, etwa da hierdurch die Arbeitsleistung erhöht werden kann oder die Pensions- und Krankenversicherungssysteme entlastet werden, sondern aus genuin ethischen Gründen heraus. Es ist einer Instrumentalisierung von Gesundheit Vorschub zu leisten, die in manchen Diskursen über ihre öffentliche und betriebliche Förderung mitschwingen.

(5) Schluss

Ziel dieses Beitrages war es, die Auswirkung von arbeitsbezogenem Stress auf das physische und psychische Wohlbefinden und die Gesundheit als gerechtigkeits-theoretisches Problem zu verstehen und die daraus ableitbaren Folgerungen zu explizieren. Eine solche gerechtigkeits-theoretische Perspektive fokussiert darauf, dass es sich bei arbeitsbezogenem Stress um ein soziales, mithin organisatorisches, gesellschaftliches und auch politisches Problem handelt. Es geht hier also nicht nur um medizinische oder psychologische Interventionen, sondern um die gesellschaftliche Verantwortung einer effektiven Prävention, die zu einer möglichst gerechten Verteilung von Gesundheit führen sollte. Die Ressource Gesundheit ist als Ressource zweiter Ordnung auf jeden Fall prioritär zu behandeln und genießt Vorrang vor ökonomischen Interessen. Die Prävention von arbeitsbezogenem Stress und die Förderung von Gesundheit, gerade auch psychischer Gesundheit, am Arbeitsplatz stellt eine Verpflichtung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit dar, die effektiv Leid verhindern und Wohlbefinden fördern kann. Die Bedeutung und Aufgabe - ehemals vielleicht sogar von Vielen belächelter - philosophischer Forschung in diesen Fragen ist evident.

Social justice is a matter of life and death. It affects the way people live, their consequent chance of illness, and their risk of premature death. (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008)

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Idea de una Geografía universal en clave cosmopolita

El enlace de lo fisiológico y lo pragmático en la Antropología de I. Kant¹

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«Kant es menos prisionero de lo que se suele creer de las categorías de objeto y de sujeto, puesto que su idea de revolución copernicana pone el pensamiento directamente en relación con la tierra» (G. Deleuze/F. Guattari, *¿Qué es filosofía?*).

Resumen

El artículo pretende señalar la función que el concepto de Geografía física cumple en la distinción entre una Antropología planteada en sentido fisiológico y en sentido pragmático en Kant. Destacaremos, en primer lugar, la inviabilidad de un conocimiento de sí centrado en la conciencia, toda vez que es la participación en los juegos que acontecen en el mundo el único cauce que confirma y enriquece nuestra identidad. A continuación, nos detendremos en el rendimiento pedagógico que Kant le concede a la geografía y, por último, nos ocuparemos, de la mano de un diálogo entre Kant y Rousseau, tanto de la dependencia que la noción de *commercium* mantiene con el conocimiento de la Tierra como del ascendiente de este concepto para el descubrimiento del estatuto y tareas de un Derecho cosmopolita.

Palabras clave

Kant, Antropología, Geografía física, *commercium*

Abstract

The article attempts to point out the role which the concept of physical geography plays in the Kantian distinction between an anthropology in a physiological sense and in a pragmatic sense. We will emphasize, at first, the infeasibility of a knowledge of ourselves focused on the own conscience, given that it is the participation in the games that occur

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in the world the only channel which confirms and enriches our identity. Moreover, we will emphasize the pedagogical outputs which Kant recognize to geography and, finally, we will deal, by means of a dialog between Kant and Rousseau, both with the influence that the geographical knowledge has on the notion of *commercium* and with ascendant of this concept for the discovery of the sense and tasks of a cosmopolitan right.

Key-words

Kant, Anthropology, Physical Geography, *commercium*

En las páginas siguientes intentaremos delimitar el espacio que ocupa frente a una *Antropología en sentido pragmático* una “Antropología en sentido fisiológico”, a la que Kant relega a un lugar algo sombrío en el sistema de la Crítica de la razón, debido a lo inviable de sus propósitos teóricos. La segunda vertiente mencionada de la investigación antropológica se dirige hacia lo que descubrimos como *pasividad* radical del hombre y revela lo que la naturaleza ha hecho de nosotros. A propósito de la aclaración de esta “obra” de la naturaleza, Kant pone de manifiesto en el conjunto de sus *Cursos de Antropología* que la vía de la “experiencia interna” no resulta en absoluto fructífera. En efecto, cuando nos volvemos hacia nuestra conciencia poco más podemos establecer que la presencia de un *continuum* de representaciones dotadas cada una de ellas de un grado de *claridad* —de grados de conciencia— y rodeadas de un horizonte de *oscuridad* que no está en nuestra mano conducir al estado contrario. La conciencia alberga, pues, en su faz oculta representaciones que nos convierten fácilmente en juguete de *lo inconsciente*, en lugar de dejarse dominar por nosotros, de suerte que pocos progresos cognoscitivos cabría esperar realizar con ellas, más allá de la aceptación de esta desequilibrada distribución entre las representaciones —a las que podemos prestar atención o de las que podemos hacer abstracción— y las meramente latentes. Sin embargo, bien podría ocurrir que, sin abandonar el orden de lo pasivo en nosotros, encontráramos otro medio para reencontrarnos con los otros —verdaderos observadores de nuestro modo de conducirnos— en una comunidad peculiar, que consideramos fundamentalmente hermenéutica, puesto que se basa en conjeturas, expresiones y signos. Advertir, por ejemplo, que la Tierra no es una llanura de extensión indeterminada, sino una superficie finita esférica, que todos tenemos el mismo derecho a habitar y poseer, o cobrar conciencia de que cada uno de nosotros cuenta con un modo de sentir y un natural físico determinado, remite a procesos que la Naturaleza ha realizado sobre un espacio de juego que somos nosotros mismos. Pero, si bien no podemos conocer nada en este orden de cosas, sí nos está permitido interpretar la *finalidad* replegada en esos fenómenos. La menesterosidad en la que nos encontramos cuando pretendemos levantar acta del *diario de un observador de sí mismo* desaparece de la mano del hallazgo que la Geografía pone en nuestras manos, a saber, que podemos llevar or-

denadamente un *diario del mundo*, sobre cuya superficie hay, no tanto una *gramática* preestablecida, cuanto un *orden* que somos capaces de generar e interpretar simultáneamente en tanto que seres capaces de actuar.

I. La Antropología desde un punto de vista fisiológico: del mapa gris del inconsciente a la conciencia del mapa de la Tierra

Ya en el Prólogo de la *Antropología desde un punto de vista pragmático* se precisa la diferencia de respectos que *lo fisiológico* y *lo pragmático* desde los que puede abordarse la pregunta *¿qué es el hombre?* Si, como ocurre en el segundo caso, la atención se dirige a aquello que el hombre *hace o puede y debe* hacer de sí mismo (*ApH*, VII 119)², en el primero nos vemos reflejados como seres que se encuentran con frecuencia en manos de sus representaciones, a las que no pueden controlar a su antojo. Nuestro sentido interno muestra lo descompensado que está en el ánimo el reparto entre representaciones inconscientes y conscientes, de manera que toda indagación o exploración de sí mismo, como muestra de dominio sobre la “experiencia interna”, está llamada a fracasar. El campo de las representaciones oscuras “sólo se deja percibir en su parte pasiva como juego de sensaciones” (*ApH*, § 5, AA VII 136). He ahí una manifestación de lo fisiológico en punto al hombre que nos habla de una pasividad insuperable. La auto-observación pone de manifiesto que contamos con más representaciones de las que en cada caso podamos convertir en objeto de nuestra atención. Dado que los *Principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza* sostienen de manera inequívoca que no hay anfibología posible en el título *ciencia de la naturaleza*, pues únicamente la hay de los cuerpos, de los fenómenos del sentido interno habrá sólo una “doctrina histórica”, ni siquiera una “doctrina psicológica experimental” (AA IV 471). Los pretendidos registros del paso de lo involuntario en nuestro ánimo difícilmente conducirían a otra cosa que a meras quimeras, pues el único medio del que disponen para desplazarse en el pensamiento es, a su vez, un acto de pensamiento, que antecede a la observación —«los principios del pensar» siempre van delante (*ApH*, § 4, AA VII 134)—. Todo proyecto de un diario interior, nada íntimo³, por tanto, pretende apostarse en el umbral de la conciencia, confiando en sorprender la llegada paulatina de los actos de la fuerza representativa, lo que sumerge al observador en una tierra de nadie, en la que oscila entre la ensoñación y la locura, tras lo que sólo cabe recetarle una buena dosis de

2. Todas las referencias a obras de Kant reflejarán la edición de la Academia Prusiana de las Ciencias. Las citas incluirán las siglas de los títulos de las obras, seguidas de la abreviatura AA, del volumen en romanos y del número de página en arábigos. Las citas de la *Crítica de la razón pura* aparecerán con las referencias de las ediciones A y B.

3. Con respecto a la diferencia que cabe establecer entre *lo privado* y *lo íntimo* remitimos al trabajo de J.L. Pardo (1996).

elébora de Anticira. No debe olvidarse que, si hay conciencia, cada grado de la misma corresponde ya siempre a un grado determinado de claridad (*KrV*, B 414-415), acompañada de mayor o menor distinción, de modo que el escritor de diarios interiores llega siempre demasiado tarde para emprender su hercúlea tarea.

El § 5 de la *ApH*, titulado “De las representaciones que tenemos sin ser conscientes de ellas”, pone de manifiesto que no podríamos pensar absolutamente nada, ni tampoco desplazarnos de una representación a otra, en el caso de que la distribución mencionada de representaciones se viera alterada, es decir, si todos nuestros pensamientos, como por arte de magia, se activaran simultáneamente, alcanzando todos plena nitidez o distinción. Si ese mapa, en el que el alma hace acto de presencia como una “presencia virtual” (*Epílogo de «Sobre el órgano del alma» de Sömmerring*, AA XII 32) —no local—, dejara de ser un inmenso campo de representaciones oscuras con unas pocas posiciones iluminadas, no podríamos seleccionar entre nuestras representaciones aquellas que nos interesaran en cada momento, en definitiva, no sabríamos qué significa pensar, al no poder abandonar ese estado de iluminación perpetua. Cabe preguntar si para nosotros habría siquiera algo así como objetividad en caso de no poder pasar de la actitud de *atención* (*attentio*) a la *abstracción* (*abstractio*) (*ApH*, § 3) —siendo ambas operaciones igualmente activas, aunque en relación de *oposición real*—, incluso en caso de no poder abandonarnos a las representaciones que llegamos a tener de la mano de la siempre reparadora *distracción* (*distractio*) (*ApH*, § 47). Kant valora la capacidad para hacer abstracción de una representación como una marca de la “libertad” de la facultad de pensar y de la autarquía del ánimo (*animus sui compos*) (AA VII 131), capaz de concentrar su atención sobre algo que precisamente quiere hacer desaparecer. Si bien la distracción no es nada aconsejable para el trato con los otros en sociedad, y su repetición nos deja en mal lugar social como seres ausentes de sí mismos, su adecuada posología pertenece a la dietética del ánimo, estando especialmente recomendada en personas ocupadas, con el propósito de que recobren fuerzas.

Así pues, advertimos que nuestra conciencia sigue un orden, aunque no haya manera de convertirla en objeto de conocimiento. Tampoco podemos evitar que aquí y allá nos dominen pensamientos desvinculados de aquello que nos ocupaba o que toman cuestiones absurdas como una tarea decisiva. ¿Qué le ocurre a quien se preocupa por conseguir un lugar soleado o dotado con buenas vistas en el cementerio? Sabe muy bien que ninguna sensación tendrá sentido para él en aquellas circunstancias, pero no puede evitar que su ánimo se comporte en sus representaciones como si todo fuera a seguir igual para él una vez fallecido. Ello se debe a que las imaginaciones resultantes están enlazadas con una ilusión [*Täuschung*] que no se puede impedir, pues, si el pensar es un hablar consigo mismo,

“el pensamiento *no soy* no puede *existir*” (*ApH*, § 28, AA VII 167). Por ello, al adelantar en la reflexión el acontecimiento de la muerte, nos encontramos jugando con representaciones que siguen configurando aquello que nunca se materializará, de manera los mortales —los que esperan la muerte— *no pueden evitar* pensarse como cadáver o imaginarse encerrados en un lúgubre sepulcro, a pesar de *comprender* lo absurdo de esas elucubraciones. Aquí el horror no lo produce la muerte en sí, sino la vida que intenta presentarse con los rasgos de su privación. Como leemos en la *ApH*, no es tanto el pavor a *morir*, cuanto a la idea de *estar muerto* (AA VII 167), lo que confirma la imposibilidad de pensar la muerte sin mediaciones, porque —insistimos— en esas imágenes no hay muerte a secas, sino una *muerte en vida*, mucho más terrible que la primera y, en realidad, producto de nuestra hipersensibilidad e imaginación.

Indagar en nuestra experiencia interna evidenciará que solo la actividad y la fuerza —la *virtus*— con la que las facultades se abren paso en nuestro ánimo estarán en condiciones de orientarnos:

[E]l alma es un objeto del sentido interno y no ocupa, consiguientemente, espacio alguno. Pero, si le doy un espacio, hago de ella un objeto del sentido externo y la convierto en materia. Por eso su presencia en el cuerpo no puede determinarse *localiter*, sino *virtualiter*, por el influjo que tiene sobre el cuerpo (*Metaphysik Mongrovius*, AA XXIX 909).

Tal y como leemos en el *Epílogo* de Kant a la obra «*Sobre el órgano del alma*» del anatomista Sömmerring, “aunque la mayoría de los hombres crean sentir el pensamiento en la cabeza, sin embargo, se trata sólo un error de subrepción”, pues toman el juicio sobre la causa que haya podido producir esa sensación por la sensación de esa causa localizada efectivamente (AA XII 32). Quizás la subrepción pueda formularse también, con arreglo al vocabulario manejado en la nota de *KrV* (B 423), como la pretensión de hacer de una *intuición empírica indeterminada* una sensación [*Empfindung*] como otra cualquiera, a saber, el efecto que un objeto deja en nuestra sensibilidad. La observación de Kant parece convertir en marca positiva aquello que Hume esperaba que causara el sonrojo de cualquier docto, a saber, esa “débil agitación del cerebro” (Hume, *Diálogos sobre la religión natural*, parte II) que algunos han querido convertir en modelo del universo o, al menos, en patrón para conocerlo. Kant, lejos de incomodarse por la elevación de esa pequeña “agitación” a las alturas de modelo cosmogónico⁴, estima que nada mejor que estructuras minimalistas —con las que seguramente podamos componer finalidad— para disolver definitivamente la subrepción que la psicología racional tenía como motor. La

4. Podría decirse que la obra de Kant titulada *Historia general de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo* asocia precisamente ambos elementos, en cuyo enlace se basa la afirmación: “dadme materia, que yo os mostraré cómo debe nacer un mundo” (AA I 230).

apariencia que constituía el *Paralogismo de la Razón pura* comienza a desvanecerse, como un Goliat de la metafísica dogmática, a partir de la consideración del pensar como algo *real*, que sólo ilegítimamente se reduce bien a fenómeno, bien a objeto trascendente. Frente al ensayo de la psicología para hacer de su único texto una sustancia simple, Kant ve con mejores ojos la vibración del tejido cerebral o el espíritu nervioso del cerebro que Descartes había calificado como *idea material*⁵ —ya tenga por causa la sensación o la imaginación. Esta expresión —*idea material*—, cuya relación con la *reflexión* sería de interés establecer, le parece a Kant una hipótesis sumamente arbitraria, pero que al menos cuenta con la virtud de no confundir la fisiología con la Metafísica (*Sueños de un visionario*, AA II 325-326 y 345). El *Prólogo* de la *ApH* considera que toda meditación en la línea cartesiana de sutilizar “sobre las huellas de impresiones que permanecen en el cerebro y que han dejado las sensaciones padecidas” está llamada a no desembocar en ningún producto distinto de la sutileza, pues en ella sólo somos espectadores de operaciones que la naturaleza realiza en nosotros.

Frente a lo que la mera fisiología proporciona en punto al conocimiento del hombre, a saber, un espacio en el que la naturaleza ha intervenido, la *Antropología pragmática* encuentra una salida a este callejón sin salida de la observación de sí que sirve del punto de vista de los otros. También el punto de vista fisiológico ha de contar con una vertiente volcada hacia lo común. Como veremos más adelante, contar con un natural, con un temperamento o pertenecer a una raza determinada no son el resultado de ninguna decisión consciente, pero son diferencias que nos conciernen a todos por igual, pues todos nos caracterizamos por tener uno de ellos. La *Crítica del Juicio* delimita una comunidad que participa del mismo modo de enjuiciar y con la que nos encontramos al *reflexionar* ante dibujos *à la grecque*, la hojarasca para marcos —los ejemplos de belleza tradicionalmente incomprensidos de la *Crítica del Juicio*— o la decoración fantástica de los papeles pintados, todos productos de la mano del hombre “que no significan nada por sí mismos, no representan nada, ningún objeto bajo un concepto determinado” (*KU*, § 16). El Juicio ocasiona, así, experiencias adecuadas acerca de qué significa pensar y descubre la capacidad específica del hombre para sentir su propia excelencia, al experimentar “lo que significa poseer entendimiento” (*Logik-Jäsche*, AA IX 42) sin más. Dicha experiencia se produce con mayor facilidad cuando no se *sabe* propiamente si lo que se tiene delante es útil o no para nuestros cuerpos científicos, pero sí se *siente* la promoción de un material sin sentido algu-

5. Dada la dificultad para localizar la expresión en la obra de Descartes a la que parece que pertenece —la traducción latina de *Las pasiones del alma*—, no sabemos si se trata, en realidad, de un término acuñado por los seguidores de Descartes o incluso de una propuesta del propio Kant. Remitimos a la provechosa y erudita nota acerca de la aparición de esta expresión en Kant (Chamayou (ed.), 250-251, nota).

no —desordenado y caótico— a una figura que, por lo menos, entretiene nuestra contemplación⁶. Allí donde el objeto contemplado no ocupa un lugar, al menos inmediatamente, “en el reino de los bienes”⁷, ganamos cierta libertad para experimentar qué significa pensar —los “esfuerzos del cerebro” [*Anstrengungen des Gehirns*] (*Sueños de un visionario*, AA II 326)— en libertad con respecto a una distribución de funciones o de significados. Pues bien, nos parece que la comunidad de la que participan quienes se orientan sirviéndose de un *carácter* para habérselas en cada caso con la persona, el sexo, el pueblo, la raza o el género humano es una *comunidad de interpretación*. Si esto fuera así y siguiendo a G. Lebrun, también encontraríamos en las breves, pero brillantes apariciones de la fisiología en la *ApH*, y especialmente en la parte dedicada a la *Característica antropológica*, una *Menschkenntnis* en cuya fugaz apariencia [*Erscheinung*] se disipa la arraigada ilusión [*Schein*] trascendental (Lebrun 1970 294) que daba sentido al Paralogismo en la *Crítica de la Razón pura*.

El pasaje siguiente de *Sueños de un visionario* quiebra cualquier continuidad que una «Antropología desde el punto de vista fisiológico» pudiera mantener con la psicología empírica de Wolff y Baumgarten y abre un campo en el que curiosamente tratamos con representaciones. Ahora lo decisivo es la promoción del *signo* al lugar del instrumento más útil para saber lo que hacemos o lo que nos pasa cuando pensamos:

La causa que hace que se crea sentir el alma *pensante* principalmente en el cerebro es ésta: todo esfuerzo de reflexión exige la mediación de *signos* para las ideas que se quiere evocar, con el fin de que reciban de su compañía y su apoyo el grado de claridad necesario. [...] Pues, si la evocación de esos signos, llamados por Descartes *ideas materiales*, consiste propiamente en provocar en los nervios un movimiento análogo al que la sensación produjo anteriormente, el tejido del cerebro estará obligado esencialmente a vibrar en armonía con las impresiones anteriores; de donde se deriva su fatiga (AA II 325).

6. Vd. Charbonnier (1972: 130): “[M]e parece que lo que llamamos emoción estética consiste... En definitiva, me parece que es la manera en que reaccionamos cuando un objeto no significativo se encuentra promovido a una función de significación; eso ha sido, por otra parte, formulado hace ya tiempo, cuando Boileau escribe: ‘No hay serpiente ni monstruo odioso que imitado por el arte...’ (*L’art poétique*, canto III). Toma un caso débil, pero lo propio de la transposición estética, digamos, de la promoción estética es conducir al plano del significante algo que no existe bajo ese modo o bajo este aspecto en el estado bruto”.

7. Remitimos en este punto al texto de R. Sánchez Ferlosio (2005: p. 7), en el que comenta un pasaje de *El Quijote*: “Las cosas huelgan sueltas, desligadas las unas de las otras, yacen desperdigadas sin que nadie las tenga sometidas a control. Lo mismo vale para “una gallina o dos”, porque dos gallinas son una gallina, y una gallina dos gallinas son; los bienes no tienen cuenta; si es usa el número, una gallina o dos, es sólo porque vienen en cuerpos discontinuos, pero en la indiferencia, en esa misma dejadez del “una o dos”, el propio número se anula virtualmente, incoando un continuo “gallina” tal vez un poco a la manera de aquel “tigre continuo” que inventó el talento de José Luis Borges”.

La lectura kantiana de lo que Descartes haya podido entender bajo la expresión *idea material* reemplaza al esfuerzo baldío de convertir al sujeto que acompaña a todos mis pensamientos en sustancia por lo que nos atreveríamos a llamar una instancia de interpretación. Por ello, como decíamos un poco más arriba, nos parece que hay mayor conexión de lo que podría esperarse *prima facie* entre la destrucción kantiana de la psicología racional y la realización de una *Característica antropológica*, pues la segunda, en tanto que “arte de la interpretación”, manifiesta que el planteamiento de la experiencia interna a la luz de los debates sobre la unión mente-cuerpo marra diametralmente el objeto indagado. La observación de sí ha establecido los límites de una *Antropología fisiológica*, arrebatando toda esperanza de convertir progresivamente nuestras representaciones oscuras en claras. La ley de continuidad a la que se somete nuestra conciencia no encuentra punto de referencia alguno en su interior. Sin embargo, los otros, con los que compartimos un mismo mundo, pueden ayudarnos a salir de esta insatisfacción en que nos deja lo fisiológico. El modo de sentir de quienes nos rodean, los gestos y muecas con que nos expresan pensamientos y de los que tenemos noticia —nosotros que los observamos— antes que ellos mismos, despliegan en efecto mensajes que necesitan un intérprete⁸. Es posible, pues, que la fisiología del sentido interno (*KrV*, A 846/B 874) reciba un impulso insospechado de la mano de la fisiología del sentido externo. *El descenso más profundo que el investigador pueda realizar en el alma humana tiene que dejar su lugar, por lo pronto, a una demora en la superficie de los signos con los que los hombres se entienden de un modo universal*. A diferencia de las teorías defendidas por Lavater y compañía, Kant no encuentra en la fisiognómica, tampoco en los caracteres de la persona, de la raza o del pueblo, una confirmación de la armonía preestablecida entre la serie de fenómenos que afectan alternativamente al alma y al cuerpo, tampoco el descubrimiento del lenguaje cifrado con que Dios ha marcado los cuerpos de los hombres, sino una disposición específicamente humana para habérselas con un *sentido* que precede a toda fijación de *significados*, en el que no reina la anarquía o la arbitrariedad, pero que tampoco es sencillamente la exposición de un orden establecido de antemano. La hospitalidad con que

8. *Vd. Prólogo* de J. Ortega y Gasset a Bühler (1950: 7-8): “[S]i analizamos paso a paso la estructura de eso que llamamos «mundo», dentro del cual cada cual se encuentra, advertiremos que consiste en la articulación de una serie de «mundos» que están encapsulados uno en otro, quiero decir, que existen para el hombre fundados uno en otro, de suerte que cada uno de ellos supone el anterior y, viceversa, llega el hombre al posterior al través del precedente. Entonces descubrimos, con no parva sorpresa, que el «mundo» primero con que el hombre se encuentra y en que *ad initio* flota es un «mundo» de gestos y de palabras. El hombre, en efecto, nace en una sociedad o contorno formado por otros seres humanos, y una sociedad es, por lo pronto, un elemento de gestos y de palabras en medio de los cuales se halla sumergido. No es arbitrario llamarla «elemento» porque posee buen derecho para ser adjuntado a los cuatro tradicionales. Pues bien, todos los demás «mundos» que pueda haber, desde el físico hasta el de los Dioses, son descubiertos por el hombre mirándolos al trasluz de un enrejado de gestos y palabras humanos”.

la Metafísica aconsejó reservar un lugar insignificante a la *psicología empírica* (KrV, A 848/B 876s.) comienza a dar sus frutos justamente de la mano de la disciplina que instruye sobre lo necesario de esa recepción: la Geografía como estudio de la exterioridad.

II. La función pedagógica del “conocimiento teórico del mundo” [Welterkenntnis]. El preventivo de las sutilezas y la dimensión geográfica del Derecho cosmopolita

La *Geografía física*, según leemos en su *Introducción*, proporciona un “concepto preliminar de todo” [Vorbegriff von Allem] (§ 2, AA IX 157) lo que pueda encontrarse sobre la superficie de la Tierra y nos da una “idea del conocimiento del mundo” (AA IX 158). Esta primera noción de la disciplina la aproxima notablemente a lo que se entiende por Ideal trascendental, en tanto que *concepto originario* [Urbegriff] que encierra el “conjunto de toda posibilidad” (KrV, A 573/B 601), por tanto, el almacén que garantiza que no nos quedaremos sin predicados. Así como una casa no sería nada en ausencia de arquitecto, el hombre debe contar con una Idea suficiente del planeta que habita y no darse por satisfecho por delimitar “el mundo presente o actual” (AA IX 156) que le indican sus percepciones. Pero esta primera impresión se desvanece enteramente cuando caemos en la cuenta de que la Geografía no recibe el encargo de ofrecer como *omnitud realitatis* (KrV, A 582/B 680) la provisión para predicados posibles, sino que nos da la Idea de algo cuya totalidad es tan innegable, como el carácter “omniabarcante”⁹ del cielo estrellado sobre nosotros, pues la Idea se refiere aquí a algo tan fáctico como el fértil *báthos* (*Prolegomena*, AA IV 374, nota) de la superficie terrestre. La Tierra es el horizonte omniabarcante de nuestras acciones, pero curiosamente es un horizonte efectivamente real, aunque cueste más trabajo cobrar conciencia de él que de la bóveda celeste, que “conecto inmediatamente con la conciencia de mi existencia” (AA V 162). Esta superficie omniabarcante es, asimismo, *finita* —no hay más mundo esperándonos en algún afuera desconocido—, lo cual, sin embargo, no es óbice para que, por ejemplo, el listado de las tierras que conocemos deba cerrarse con una rúbrica dedicada a “las tierras cuya existencia se conjetura” (*ph. Geog.*, § 37, AA IX 228). Con respecto a nuestra estancia sobre la Tierra podemos convenir —con Carl Schmitt— en que “el hombre que se encuentra en una costa mira naturalmente desde la tierra al mar y no, al revés, desde el mar hacia la tierra” (1993 9). Pero gracias a la geografía advertimos que, en rigor, el Mar carece de figura propia —se

9. Adoptamos este adjetivo en el sentido en que la KrV recoge las expresiones “experiencia omniabarcante” [*allbefassende Erfahrung*], A 582/B 610 y “espacio omniabarcante” [*allbefassende Raum*], A 25.

compara con un “espacio inabarcable” [*unermesslicher Raum*]—, aunque le dé la suya a la Tierra¹⁰ (*ph. Geogr.*, § 16, AA IX 190). Si bien el hombre observa el mar desde la Tierra, un estudio del conjunto de elementos que constituyen el globo terrestre no puede ser parcial ni nacionalista. La primera parte de las lecciones de *Geografía física* examina las partes en que puede dividirse la Tierra, a saber, el mar, la tierra, la atmósfera, a las que se añade un examen de las transformaciones que el planeta ha sufrido a lo largo de su historia y un apéndice acerca de la navegación, como uno de los medios principales para progresar en su conocimiento. La segunda parte se centra en la observación de todo aquello que la superficie terrestre comprende, de manera que la enumeración parte del hombre y continúa con la descripción de los tres reinos naturales. Con todo, la enumeración de países que compone su tercera parte no tiene como hilo conductor la exhaustividad del catálogo que prima en las anteriores, sino lo *digno de nota* [*merkwürdig*], término que hace imprescindible tomar en consideración el interés que el hombre tiene en el conocimiento del mundo. Aquí no se pregunta sólo por lo que hay, sino por aquello que, de entre lo que hay, encontramos de mayor interés para el hombre.

Una de las menciones más célebres que Kant dedica a la Geografía — en el *Aviso sobre la articulación de sus lecciones...*— justifica su incorporación al listado de disciplinas académicas en virtud de su, por así decir, función preventiva de la tendencia a sutilizar [*vernünfteln*] (II, 312) entre los estudiantes jóvenes. Éstos, en cuanto reúnen la terminología técnica imprescindible, se atreven a pronunciarse acerca del lugar que la ciencia ha de ocupar en el mundo e incluso acerca de cómo deberían transformarlo. No sería de extrañar que incluso los mejores de ellos se empeñaran en no ser expulsados de un paraíso conceptual —como el que, a decir de Hilbert, los matemáticos debían a Cantor, o como el que parece que los filósofos habrían descubierto con Leibniz—, por mucho que su combinación con el mundo lo redujera a un auténtico infierno. En lo que concierne a los jóvenes, la falta de experiencia [*Erfahrenheit*] puede cubrirse vicariamente con ayuda de una conciencia suficiente de la «totalidad real» que representa la Tierra. Pero, más allá del vicio intelectual que le saldrá tan caro a la juventud, esta ausencia de conciencia de la co-presencia de otros hombres habitantes con nosotros de la misma Tierra conduce a Kant a comparar el proceder de quienes no saben cómo se lee un periódico, porque son incapaces de situar las noticias en su lugar geográfico, con la costumbre de un pueblo indígena peruano —del que no se dan más detalles— de llevarse a la boca todo documento que los “visitantes occidentales” les acercaban (*ph. Geogr.*, § 4, IX, 163). Es probable que la “lectura” resultase incluso de mayor

10. G.K. Chesterton comienza su *Breve historia de Inglaterra* con una semblanza de la relación de este pueblo con el mar, que las lecciones de *Geografía física* extienden al hombre como animal terrestre (20-22).

provecho para el último que para el primero, que carece enteramente, a pesar de los medios que el *comercio* ha podido poner a su disposición, de “un concepto extendido de la entera superficie de la Tierra” (*ph. Geogr.*, § 4, IX, 163). Esto explica el elogio que Kant dedica al pueblo inglés, que ha sabido extender el conocimiento del mundo hasta las clases inferiores y poner coto a la indiferencia que ante la lectura de la prensa diaria abunda en otros países. Más allá del probable punto de partida eurocéntrico¹¹, siendo éste el juicio más bondadoso que la mayor parte de los estudiosos de los textos de Kant relacionados con el conocimiento teórico del mundo, los comportamientos que Kant encuentra en otras razas y pueblos —lo propio de una *Geografía moral*— no se restringen a una época y una región determinada, esto es, a un cierre adaptativo particular, pues, por ejemplo, la falta de vitalidad y de previsión¹² son constantes a-históricas. Siempre podrá excusarse la indolencia del individuo caribeño porque su formación intelectual no pudo contar con los centros intelectuales del Viejo y Nuevo mundo, pero en la sociedad refinada de la Prusia del siglo XVIII lecturas aparentemente inocuas como ciertas revistas de moda y entretenimiento sumen al lector en un desazonador sopor intelectual que nada tiene que envidiar al de aquél:

Nuestro público literario, de un gusto refinado, tiene siempre abierto el apetito gracias a obras efímeras y siente incluso hambre de lectura (una forma de no hacer nada), no para cultivarse, sino para *gozar*; de suerte que las cabezas quedan cada vez más vacías y no hay que temer la sobresaturación; pues dan a su atareada ociosidad el barniz de un trabajo y se figuran tener en ella un digno empleo de su tiempo, que, sin embargo, no es en cada mejor que el que ofrece al público la *Revista del Lujo y de las Modas* (*ApH*, § 61, AA VII 233; cfr. carta de Kant a Borowski, marzo de 1790).

Así, con arreglo al texto kantiano, el caribeño o el tahitiano prueban que se da una inactividad asociada a un proceso fisiológico, sin que esto asigne ningún privilegio al hombre europeo, pues toda cultura fabrica me-

11. *Vd.* F. Duque, *¿Hacia la paz perpetua o hacia el terrorismo perpetuo?*, Madrid, Círculo de Bellas Artes, 2006, pp. 22-23: “Ciertamente, el desarrollo de la historia humana, tal como viene descrito por Kant, supone una clara *homogeneización* de todas las tendencias diferenciales de los pueblos, lograda a través de la guerra, de modo que, al fin, la universalidad *geográfica* habrá de coincidir con la universalidad *lógica*, sobre la base de una globalización *económica*. [...] Así las cosas, parece claro cuáles son los pueblos *punteros* que, según Kant, están destinados *sine die* a realizar la paz perpetua, con vistas a un cosmopolitismo en el que la Historia alcanzaría su fin, y la legalidad se reuniría con la moralidad. Se trata de un evidente *eurocentrismo*, que a todo heredero medianamente decente del kantismo no deja de producirle sonrojo, poniéndole sobre aviso de que los escarceos y mutaciones entre el viejo Dios, la Razón práctica y la novísima *freiwirkende Natur* bien podrían ocultar una exaltación, y más: una *absolutización metafísica* del *orden geopolíticamente establecido*”.

12. *Vd.* Kant, *Anthrop. prag.*, AA VII 186 y 233, nota; cfr. R 6583, AA XIX 94: “Las ciencias y las artes contribuyen a que el hombre resista menos. Con ello no mejora, sino que se vuelve dócil. [...] Deviene propiamente más débil, porque cada menesterosidad [*Bedürfnis*] es un lazo que le vincula a las leyes, aunque sean arbitrarias”.

canismos, sofisticados por la civilización, que distraen y alejan al hombre de un progreso del que él mismo es autor. El sueño de toda cultura residiría en que el hombre renuncie a su vocación de *fin final* de la Creación al darse por satisfecho con coronar el horizonte natural en tanto que *fin último*. El burgués europeo puede emplear el conjunto de la cultura que tiene a su alcance para adquirir como objeto de lujo la “más perfecta armonía, la frugalidad y el conformismo”, que poetas y viajeros han convertido en marchamo de la vida arcádica de ciertos aborígenes (*Idee*, AA VIII 21) y que Kant considera un nihilismo incompatible con la destinación racional del hombre. De lo que sí puede enorgullecerse el europeo —el único pueblo que ha viajado por el deseo de conocer [*Wißbegierde*]— es de haber dado con su acendrado amor hacia el saber un ejemplo que inmediatamente le convierte en maestro de otros (R 1356, AA XV/2 592). Quizás para ello sea recomendable seguir los pasos del pueblo alemán, un pueblo flemático en el buen sentido —a juicio de Kant— que se comporta como un “comerciante al por mayor” de erudición [*Großhandler der Gelehrsamkeit*] (*ApH*, AA VII 318). Un pueblo semejante tiene ante sí la tarea de llevar a término el progreso continuo que cabe esperar del género humano, con el propósito de poder exportarlo más tarde a otros lugares de la tierra¹³, sin caer en ninguna forma de colonialismo:

Si se compara la conducta *inhospitalaria* de los Estados civilizados de nuestro continente, particularmente de los comerciantes, produce espanto la injusticia que ponen de manifiesto en la *visita* a países y pueblos extranjeros (para ellos significa lo mismo que *conquistarlos*). América, los países negros, las islas de las especies, el Cabo, etc., eran para ellos, al descubrirlos, países que no pertenecían a nadie, pues no tenían en cuenta a sus habitantes para nada. En las Indias orientales (Indostán) introdujeron tropas extranjeras, bajo el pretexto de establecimientos comerciales, y con las tropas introdujeron la opresión de los nativos, la incitación de los distintos Estados a grandes guerras, hambres, rebelión, perfidia y la letanía de todos los males que afligen al género humano» (*Hacia la paz perpetua*, «Tercer artículo definitivo, AA VIII 358).

Si nos detenemos ahora un momento en los beneficios aportados por el conocimiento geográfico¹⁴, éste recuerda por de pronto que el *uso* es una piedra de toque decisiva de los conocimientos, pues, si bien podemos imponer una marca *in abstracto* a cada uno de los entes naturales, éstos se

13. R 1501, AA XV/2: 788-789: “Las naciones orientales nunca se mejorarían por sí mismas. En Occidente tenemos que intentar el progreso continuado del género humano hasta su completitud y, desde ahí, su extensión a la Tierra”.

14. Herder, asistente asiduo a las lecciones que Kant impartía sobre *Geografía física* quedó absolutamente prendado por la ampliación del campo cognoscitivo que permitía esta disciplina, como puede verse en su escrito *Von den Annehmlichkeiten, Nützlichkeit und Notwendigkeit der Geographie*, recogido en *Werke*, Frankfurt a.M., Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989.

encontrarán *in concreto* en diferentes regiones de la Tierra. El ejemplo que Kant propone en el § 4 de la *Introducción* de la *Geografía física* a propósito de lo que separa a una división o clasificación lógica de una división física recoge el caso de una diversidad de aspecto que, sin embargo, no se compatibiliza con una diversidad de origen. En efecto, el lagarto europeo y el cocodrilo egipcio son el mismo animal, ahora bien, como ocurre con los diferentes tipos humanos que habitan la tierra, cada uno de ellos ha de ser caracterizado con arreglo a sus diferencias (AA IX, 160). La geografía no impone a la filosofía natural por dónde debe realizar sus divisiones entre especies, sino que manifiesta una heterogeneidad que no es incompatible con la pertenencia a un mismo origen físico. Enseña que lo común no tiene por qué ser idéntico. La *descripción geográfica de la naturaleza* no sólo dispone un registro lógico para todas las cosas, sino que las sitúa en el espacio (AA IX 159-160). Esta atención al lugar de nacimiento no proporciona por sí sola ninguna indicación acerca del *orden* que las especies hayan podido seguir en su propagación. De esto ha de ocuparse más bien una disciplina de futuro incierto como es la *historia de la naturaleza*, que —sostiene Kant— algunos creen tener ya por el hecho de hablar de ella, dejándose llevar por la ilusión de que quien tiene la *palabra* se ha hecho desde ese momento con la *cosa* (AA IX 161-162). La *historia de la naturaleza* [*Naturgeschichte*], frente a la *descripción de la naturaleza* [*Naturbeschreibung*], tiene dificultades metodológicas innegables (AA IX 162), al proponerse como tarea la enumeración razonada de los distintos despliegues experimentados por los entes naturales a partir de un género original (AA II 434, nota y AA VIII 163). Este propósito parece destinado únicamente a hilar conjeturas unas con otras, pero el aspecto de éstas cambia si se conectan tomando como hilo conductor una finalidad, que en el caso de las diferencias físicas entre los hombres tiene como marca contingente la herencia indefectible del color de piel (*ph. Geog.*, II parte, § 3, AA IX, 314).

III. La Geografía y el *commercium* como aprendizaje antropológico de la comunidad político-jurídica

La geografía confirma la prelación de la experiencia externa sobre la interna cuando hablamos de la comunidad humana. La presencia del *comercio*, incluso de una *Geografía mercantil* entre los títulos de la “Geografía particular” que recogen las lecciones de Kant, ha sido considerada por algunos como una apuesta perspicaz por una suerte de comunidad cosmopolita capitalista¹⁵. Pero esto sólo sería válido si y sólo si un mercado pudie-

15. *Vd.* F. Duque, *op. cit.*, p. 22: “Con respecto al derecho internacional, Kant avizora en 1795 la posibilidad de una *federación* de pueblos libres, que se irá logrando justamente por el antagonismo natural entre los pueblos, dada la diferencia de idiomas y de confesiones religiosas, que entrañan

ra constituirse únicamente en tanto que mercado capitalista. Para hacerse una Idea del mundo es preciso empezar por recabar información de los habitantes de regiones remotas, de manera que se consideren más fiables los testimonios escritos que los meramente orales. El *comercio* coincide, en rigor, con el significado dinámico de la categoría de comunidad, de manera que forma parte del orden de una naturaleza en la que las existencias se encuentran en un régimen de acción recíproca. Las observaciones sobre qué significa lo mercantil o el comercio en este o en algún otro texto de Kant subrayan que este fenómeno “ha refinado a los hombres y ha fundado su conocimiento recíproco” (AA IX 165), siendo su propósito suyo remediar la sobreabundancia de materias primas en una región de la tierra de las que, sin embargo, otras están enteramente desprovistas. Gracias al cauce abierto por el comercio, el mundo entero alcanzará un “estado uniforme” [*gleichförmiger Zustand*], fruto de una redistribución de los bienes más razonable que la que la naturaleza parece haber dispuesto por sí misma. Si recordamos la definición kantiana de la *comunidad* o de *simultaneidad según el principio de acción recíproca*, principio que constituye la tercera analogía de la experiencia de la analítica trascendental del entendimiento puro, este término —se observa—está revestido de una clara anfibología en alemán¹⁶. En efecto, puede entenderse bajo el significado que tienen los términos latinos *communio* y *commercium*. Pero la segunda acepción de la acción recíproca cuenta con una prelación con respecto a la primera, pues ¿cómo advertiríamos que nos encontramos en un estado de *comunidad local* sin encontrarnos ya en un estado de *comunidad dinámica*? Tal y como establece la *Refutación del idealismo* en la *KrV*, con un alcance más amplio que el aportado por la tercera analogía de la experiencia, la experiencia externa tiene una irreductible primacía sobre nuestra experiencia interna. El descubrimiento de nuevos países amplía el conocimiento del hombre como hijo de la Tierra y fomenta la adquisición de una noción clara de comunidad humana (*ph. Geog.*, § 37, AA IX 231). La importancia concedida al comercio con vistas al conocimiento mutuo entre los pueblos obedece, a nuestro juicio, a una de las restricciones del egoísmo que la naturaleza

ciertamente la «propensión» [...] hacia el odio recíproco y dan pábulo a las guerras, pero que, con el crecimiento de la cultura y un acercamiento gradual entre los pueblos, sometidos a unos mismos principios, llevará —piensa Kant— a un entendimiento en paz, asegurado y promovido por un «equilibrio dentro de la más viva competencia» (*ZeF*, VIII, 367). Obviamente, Kant está pensando en la internacionalización del comercio, dentro de un mercado libre, según se afirma poco después: «El espíritu comercial, incompatible con la guerra, se apoderará tarde o temprano de los pueblos. De todos los poderes subordinados a la fuerza del Estado, es el poder del dinero el que inspira más confianza» (*ZeF*, VIII, 368). Así pues, ¡a la paz perpetua por el capitalismo!».

16. *Vd. KrV*, A 213/B 260. M. Puech (1990: 393): “La categoría de *comunidad* y el principio que le corresponde tienden, por tanto, a constituir la teoría trascendental del *nexus*, que hace del sistema crítico una cosmología filosófica completa, una filosofía acabada de la mundaneidad del mundo. La determinación del mundo como totalidad procede de una filosofía del *nexus*, porque un todo se mantiene unido por las relaciones internas de sus partes, es decir, por un *nexus*”.

física de la esfera terrestre que habitamos establece de antemano. Si bien los pueblos nunca hubiesen tendido por ellos mismos al intercambio, la variedad climática les fuerza a advertir lo necesitados que están de otros en punto a la recepción de ciertas materias primas, de la misma manera en que ellos podrán ofrecer, a su vez, otras mercancías posibles. Forma parte de las sabias disposiciones de la naturaleza el que la menesterosidad [*Bedürfnis*] haya empujado a los hombres a reunirse en las regiones menos dotadas de riqueza natural (*ph. Geog.*, § 43, AA IX 248).

Si bien no podemos detenernos en este punto por extenso, creemos que una larga nota de la *ApH*, perteneciente al § 46, titulado “De la debilidades del alma en la facultad de conocer”, puede delimitar el problema que está en juego en la Geografía mercantil. La nota se ocupa de un fenómeno que, en principio, se muestra como una paradoja, a saber, el pueblo palestino, con que Kant se refiere al pueblo judío en tanto que pueblo sin tierra, parece ser un “pueblo de meros mercaderes” (AA VII 205-206), título que se estima cercano al de una “nación de defraudadores” que tampoco le hacen ascos a defraudarse entre sí. En lugar de proponer inútiles planes de asimilación y moralización del pueblo judío, Kant propone una historia de la riqueza, que da razón de la situación actual de estos hombres, en la que sostiene que el comercio se encargó de trasladar a aquélla desde la India hasta las costas del Mediterráneo oriental, entre las que la región palestina destacó desde el principio por la proliferación del comercio. La conjetura establece finalmente que, tras la destrucción de Jerusalén por obra del emperador Tito, el pueblo judío se dispersó [*Zerstreuung*] a lo largo de la tierra, manteniéndose en relación sus miembros [*im Zusammenhang bleiben*] gracias a la práctica del comercio. Su religión es tildada en esta nota de «vieja superstición», reconocida por los Estados que los acogen. Tampoco se ocupan de alcanzar honores civiles, sino que se resarcen de la pérdida de su tierra con el amor al dinero que consiguen por medio del comercio. Aquí aparece una propiedad de la práctica comercial de la que no se ocupa la *Geografía física*, pues la comunidad de mercado del pueblo judío no presupone la diversidad de bienes intercambiados, tan sólo exige que haya distancia geográfica. Esta posibilidad que brinda el comercio —fundar comunidades que no tienen por qué ser naciones ni tienen por qué intercambiar los bienes que la tierra produce— constituye la “bendita maldición” del pueblo judío, que le permitió enriquecerse de un modo desconocido para cualquier otro pueblo, precisamente por carecer de arraigo en ninguna tierra particular. He ahí, pues, una observación acerca del motor económico que cabe encontrar en el desarraigo geográfico, que en caso de generalizarse modificaría notablemente lo que entendemos por comercio¹⁷. La nota del § 46 de *ApH* señala, a nuestro

17. El texto de Schmitt al que nos referíamos más arriba concluye con una nota final que cita el pasaje siguiente de las *Líneas fundamentales de Filosofía del Derecho* de Hegel: “Así como la tierra, el

juicio, que, si bien el comercio fomenta el contacto entre los pueblos, pues les fuerza a dejar de pensar que se encuentran solos en el mundo, el espíritu comercial [*Handelgeist*] a secas es decididamente insociable, tanto como el espíritu de nobleza. Kant recurre a la siguiente imagen para manifestar que el mero comercio, con independencia de las naciones que lo practican, no genera ninguna comunidad de trato: la casa que el comerciante tiene en su *comptoir* está tan separada de otra que se dedique a la misma actividad como el castillo de un noble está separado de otro por un puente levadizo (AA VII 315).

En tercer lugar, el conocimiento geográfico acostumbra a los hombres a no tomarse en consideración como si el mundo entero —todo en su existencia— tuviera que avanzar en la dirección marcada por su deseo y voluntad (*KprV*, AA V 124; AA I 196), exigencia vinculada a nuestra infatigable búsqueda de la felicidad. Los editores de la traducción francesa de la *Geografía física* han manifestado el contraste entre las coordenadas de estudio impuestas por una “geografía continua” (AA IX 161) y la enumeración de prejuicios con que los distintos pueblos se observan a sí mismos por comparación con el resto (Cohen-Halimi/Marcuzzi, 1999 37-38). Este catálogo de la inclinación de los pueblos a considerar, como hace también cada individuo singularmente, que el mundo entero tiene en ellos su meta, pertenece a la *Geografía moral* (*ph. Geog.*, § 5) y recoge circunstanciadamente las diversas manifestaciones de esta misma inclinación. Ahora bien, no debe olvidarse que se trata de una disciplina particular, que ha de examinarse a la luz de una geografía general, a saber, la que representa la geografía física. En algunos textos de Kant dedicados a asuntos relacionados con la geografía, como la *Pregunta acerca de si la Tierra envejece, examinada fisiológicamente*, Kant llama la atención sobre el absurdo en que incurren quienes se quejan de la pérdida de las antiguas virtudes en el momento histórico que les ha tocado vivir o incluso de la pérdida de fuerza que la Tierra habría padecido como planeta, pues hablan como si la Tierra les acompañase en su curso vital (AA I 196). Al comienzo de este escrito, se insiste en que es imprescindible conocer la unidad de medida apropiada para cada caso si uno quiere establecer el tiempo de vida que le corresponde a cualquier producto natural. Sin embargo, los hombres caen fácilmente en el intento ridículo de medir la edad y duración de la naturaleza con arreglo a la vara de medir de la edad de cada uno de ellos (*Ibid.*). Igualmente, en *Historia y descripción natural del terremoto que sacudió una parte de la Tierra en 1755*, se hace notar que el hombre, si bien es sólo

suelo firme, es la condición para el principio de la vida familiar, así el *mar* es la condición para la industria, el elemento vivificante que le impulsa al exterior”, trad. cast. por J.L. Vermal, Barcelona, Edhasa, 1989, al que siguen las palabras siguientes de Schmitt: “Dejo al lector atento la tarea de encontrar en mis consideraciones el comienzo de un ensayo para desarrollar este § 247 de manera semejante a como los §§ 243-246 han sido desarrollados por el marxismo”.

una parte de la naturaleza, quiere ser el todo, a saber, “el entero conjunto de la naturaleza” (AA I 460). La geografía contribuye a la curación de estas ilusiones, seguramente inevitables, junto con la certeza de que, aunque nos adentremos en las tinieblas más profundas cuando pretendemos descifrar los propósitos que Dios ha tenido a la vista al ordenar el mundo, hay una verdad que nos concierne directamente como hombres y a la que no podemos substraernos, a saber, que “el hombre no ha nacido para edificar chozas eternas en este escenario de la vanidad” (*Ibid.*). La *Geografía física* nos pone en contacto con una medida del tiempo radicalmente distinta de la que acostumbramos a manejar: el tiempo del mundo.

El conocimiento geográfico comporta una ampliación de nuestra noción de comunidad que necesariamente se compadece con la realidad total de la que se ha cobrado conciencia. En este punto, advertimos alguna cercanía entre la presencia de la geografía en el pensamiento de Kant y en el de Rousseau. El segundo propone con el sentimiento de *piedad*, al que no puede substraerse en sentido estricto ningún hombre, un sentimiento nada sentimental, sino activado por un concepto, a saber, el del respeto que nos merece cualquier otro hombre en tanto que ejemplar de la misma especie:

Para volverse sensible y compasivo, es preciso que el niño sepa que hay seres semejantes a él, que sufren lo que él ha sufrido, que sienten los dolores que él ha sentido, y otros de los que debe tener idea porque también puede sentirlos. En efecto, ¿cómo nos dejamos conmover por la piedad si no es trasladándonos fuera de nosotros e identificándonos con el animal sufriente: ¿Abandonando, por así decirlo, nuestro ser para tomar el suyo? Sólo sufrimos cuando juzgamos que él sufre; no es en nosotros, es en él donde sufrimos (Rousseau, *Emilio*, l. IV, p. 329).

Este pasaje refleja el modo en que somos afectados por la especie, una afección, que, a juicio de Rousseau, precede a la del sexo. Encontramos otro punto de contacto con el pensamiento de Rousseau en la consideración kantiana de que la Tierra nos enseña que nuestra igualdad en tanto que hombres es necesariamente solidaria de nuestra diferencia física, es más, que el *fin* representado por el despliegue óptimo de nuestras disposiciones naturales requiere como *medio* la adaptación particular de cada grupo humano a una región de la Tierra. La publicación del *Discurso sobre el origen y fundamentos de la desigualdad entre los hombres* provocó una polémica entre Rousseau y el naturalista Charles Bonnet, que le acusó de no advertir que la situación de desigualdad en que viven los hombres es obra de su modo de ser, de manera que carecería de sentido pretender modificar ingenuamente lo que los hombres muestran ser a la luz de sus obras. La repuesta de Rousseau, gracias al cual Kant reconoce haber cobrado conciencia de “los derechos de la humanidad”, observa, sin embargo, que el

análisis de Bonnet tiene un flanco débil, que procede de su identificación de la política y la historia con lo que le suceda al hombre blanco, europeo, nacido en climas templados (Rousseau 1995 256). Sin embargo, basta “un error de geografía para echar por tierra toda esa pretendida doctrina que deduce lo que debe ser de lo que se ve”. Con independencia de la *ignava ratio* que subyace a las opiniones de Bonnet —todo es lo mejor que puede ser—, éste pretende referirse al hombre universal, sin advertir que indebidamente lo ha recortado ya al hombre europeo. «Parece que el sentimiento de la humanidad se evapora al extenderse a toda la tierra», leemos en el *Discurso sobre la economía política* (O.C., III, 244). En una línea muy semejante, el *Manuscrito de Ginebra*, que contiene una versión del *Contrato social* no publicada finalmente, tilda a los filósofos cosmopolitas de corazones hipócritas, que bajo el pretendido amor dedicado a todo el mundo se adscriben el derecho a no amar a nadie (O.C., III, 287). No todos los discursos que preconizan el cosmopolitismo son igualmente de fiar. En efecto, ha de ponerse especial cuidado en la transposición política del sentimiento prerreflexivo de piedad, pues bien podríamos dejar de atender a ciertas limitaciones innegables, vinculadas al poder que ciertas causas, como las meteorológicas, ejercen sobre nosotros. Nada parece más alejado del ánimo de Rousseau que encerrar a los pueblos en una suerte de destino geográfico, pero una *falacia naturalista* como la propuesta por Bonnet sólo podía destruirse probando que todos los hechos antropológicos merecen el mismo trato, de manera que no se permita que ninguno se convierta en ley para otros. Del método roussoniano se concluye que si se quiere seguir siendo persa, griego o francés —y no depender en realidad de alguna nación con vocación imperialista— es menester recordar el tiempo —la eternidad desde la que se establece el contrato— en que se fue hombre a secas, a saber, como aquel ente que no puede consentir su propia destrucción ni la pérdida de su libertad. En otras palabras, el hombre es un ente sensible al *factum* siguiente: *la historia comienza ya siempre con las acciones de hombres de variopinto origen geográfico —con hijos de la tierra—, si bien no todo lo que acontece históricamente está sancionado por esa procedencia empírica.*

El clima forma un pueblo de la mano de su causalidad natural, mientras que las instituciones nacionales “forman el genio, el carácter, los gustos, las costumbres de un pueblo, que le hacen ser él y no otro” (*Consideraciones sobre el gobierno de Polonia*, O.C., III, p. 960), pero a estas dos causas ha de añadirse otra, a saber, aquella que procede del “acto por el que un pueblo es un pueblo” (*Contrato social*, II, 7). Esta vez la causalidad no pertenece ni a la naturaleza ni a la industria humana, sino exclusivamente a la razón. También ésta está llamada a dejar su huella en la historia. No es baladí que sea en el *Discurso sobre la economía política*, O.C., III, p. 251 donde se lea que “[e]s cierto que los pueblos son a la larga lo que el gobierno les ha hecho ser”, incluso con mayor determinación que lo que hacen de ellos

los climas y las regiones de la tierra. Cuando en las *Confesiones* se haga arqueo del esfuerzo invertido en la elaboración de unas *Instituciones políticas*, de las que el *Contrato social* debería ser el núcleo, Rousseau reconoce haber visto “que todo tendía radicalmente a la política y que, fuera cual fuese la forma en que se hiciera, ningún pueblo sería nunca otra cosa que lo que la naturaleza de su gobierno le hiciese ser” (libro IX, p. 555). El orden económico no es indiferente a este ascendiente ejercido por el gobierno con respecto a la elevación del hombre a ciudadano o a su condena al estado del desposeído. No hay un continuidad, pues, entre orden natural y orden político, pero una política que se adapte a las necesidades de un solo grupo humano tendrá consecuencias tan perniciosas como aquélla que pretenda gobernar al “hombre en general”.

Este breve excursus por la obra de Rousseau abre—a nuestro juicio—una llamativa coincidencia con el lugar que Kant concede a la *Geografía física*, pues esta disciplina combina dos fenómenos decisivos para elaborar una filosofía de la historia que vaya más allá de un bello relato o de las buenas intenciones —sin la geografía la historia, que debe ser una «geografía continua», corre el serio riesgo de «contar historias». Por un lado, las diferencias fisiológicas que han terminado por inscribirse en el cuerpo de los hombres, son el signo de que todos estaban igualmente preparados para habitar cualquier región de la tierra. Puede hablarse aquí de una *isonomía adaptativa* que vincula al hombre con la Tierra como hábitat. Lejos de sostener Kant que la *fusión* sea un principio deseable allí donde hablamos de pluralidad humana, aconseja dejar en manos de la naturaleza la “decisión” acerca de qué tipos se repetirán más o menos que otros (II, 431), pues la misma propagación de la especie alberga una sabiduría —de la que tenemos noticia por su voluntad de diferencia— que los cálculos eugenistas de los hombres sólo podrían empeorar. Por otro lado, aunque las diferentes razas humanas se deriven hermenéuticamente de un mismo tronco originario, la conciencia de la dimensión real de la Tierra —un todo paradójicamente finito— indica al género humano la necesidad de un proyecto que, en otras circunstancias, si el hombre no fuera un ser racional terrestre, carecería de sentido. Nos referimos a una comunidad cosmopolita y regida por un Derecho que tenga como eje el derecho a la *hospitalidad*:

La conciencia de la Tierra produce, por tanto, necesariamente, un habitus cosmopolita general. [...] El llamado de la Tierra es, virtualmente al menos, universal y la esfericidad de la Tierra implica desde luego que todas las sociedades y todos los miembros de cada sociedad, no sólo los pueblos de Europa, deben llegar a tomar conciencia gradualmente de la presencia y de la proximidad creciente del resto del mundo, a medida que las luces se extiendan. El concepto de un derecho cosmopolita tiene, por tanto, él mismo la vocación de extenderse gradualmente a todas las relaciones que este llamado de la Tierra engendrará.

En este sentido, nos parece posible sostener que Kant ha aislado bajo el nombre de «derecho cosmopolita» un lugar jurídico, nombrado así, no por el hecho contingente y transitorio de la colonización europea, sino por el hecho universal, aunque no original y, por tanto, evolutivo, del cosmopolitismo (Chauvier (1996: 28 y 31)).

El conocimiento geográfico fomenta, pues, eso que Rousseau denominó la afección por la especie. Lejos de considerar que aquí algún eje sentimental se imponga al del Derecho, es nuevamente la experiencia de lo exterior la que hace necesario configurar una destinación jurídica común para todos los habitantes de la tierra. La consideración de la comunidad o acción recíproca entre los pueblos es “una consecuencia necesaria” de la existencia de los hombres en la Tierra, dado que ésta no es un plano infinito en el que la dispersión nunca tuviera que habérselas con la comunidad. Aquí el *Urbild* o *imagen originaria* de la Humanidad que permitía caracterizar al género humano¹⁸, a falta de un *tertium comparationis*, parece haberse trasladado de la meta al origen, para desde allí arrojar luz sobre lo que la pluralidad humana tendrá que hacer de sí misma. Una vez más, no hay transición entre “lo que la naturaleza ha hecho del hombre” y lo que los hombres deben hacer de ellos mismos, pero en un orden y en otro, del conocimiento teórico del mundo al Derecho cosmopolita aparece una constante: la razón avanza en su autoconocimiento a medida que se mantiene atenta a la geografía, es decir, dejando que la exterioridad le enseñe diferencias específicas y le fije tareas jurídico-morales de las que no puede ni debe desentenderse.

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18. M. Crépon (1996 162) sostiene que «la hipótesis de un tronco único es la única manera de dar razón de la diversidad humana sin comprometer la posibilidad de pensar una destinación común a la totalidad del género humano. En la medida en que permite limitar un máximo de diferencias cuya transmisión infalible se reconoce, encuentra su justificación última en la necesidad de pensar la unidad de la especie humana como finalidad. El pensamiento del origen no tiene sentido más que desde el problema del fin».

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Hegel's strategy The concept of causality between logic and spirit

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Abstract

According to Kantian Critique of the Teleological Judgment, teleology is opposed to the principle of mechanism. However, it is controversial whether the category of causality, deduced in the Critique of Pure Reason, could be identified with the principle of mechanism. On the contrary, Hegel's Science of Logic establishes a dialectical connection between causality and mechanism, within the last part of the "Doctrine of essence" dealing with substantiality. In this paper I will argue that Hegel's strategy is opposed to Kant's theory not so much because Hegel would have argued the ontological status of causality, as because he found a connection between causality and the mechanical process involved in the arise of the Concept.

I will proceed as follows: first, I will briefly resume the Kantian difference between causality and mechanism. Then, I will reconstruct Hegel's treatment of causality and mechanism in the "Doctrine of Essence" focusing on their theoretical meaning. I will also refer to Hegel's treatment of mechanism in the second part of the SL within the section dealing with Objectivity. Lastly, I will conclude by considering the relevance of mechanism in Hegel's theory of intelligence, which latter makes Hegel's philosophy particularly significant.

Keywords

Causality, mechanism, teleology, reciprocity, self-consciousness, recognition

§1. In §65 of the Critique of the Teleological Judgment Kant contrasts two kinds of causal connections. He says that causal connection is linear when a series of cause and effect is always descending, whereas a causal connection is cyclic when the parts of an organism are combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form. The last one characterizes the organism as "self-organizing being". According to Kant linear causality is precisely an effective causality (*nexus effectivus*) and cyclic coincides with purposiveness (*nexus finalis*). Purposiveness is opposed to effective causality, as it implies that something is comprehend-

ed under the concept or an Idea which must determine a priori all that is to be contained in it. Then, purposiveness provides understanding with a regulative use, but it cannot ground any knowledge of empirical objects. By contrast, effective causality is a category of understanding that requires the relation of succession between objects of experience, that is, it implies that something A be such that something else B follows from it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule.

Kant's main argument concerning causality is located in the Second and Third Analogy of Experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant argues that, to have knowledge of objective succession, the object's states must be subject to a rule that determines them as successive. To have knowledge of the successive states of an object, the object's successive states must be dependent on a cause, that is, must stand under a causal rule. The Analogy assumes that neither intuition nor imagination provide knowledge of temporal relations, but that a category of understanding (causality and mutual interaction) is required to establish the necessity for knowledge of objective temporal relations.

According to Friedman (1992), causality is not simply committed to a rule, but to causal law. In this sense, the possibility of particular causal law is somehow grounded on the transcendental principle: «Empirical laws that somehow fall under these transcendental principles are then necessary and a priori in a derivative sense». Instead, Watkins (2005) correctly points out the distinction between “rule” and “law” in the text of the Second Analogy, thereby he argues that Kant's idea is simply that any determination (and therefore successive determinations as well) requires a ground to posit it, otherwise the object in question will be indeterminate in that respect. The same sort of idea was present in the Third Analogy as well. Since the simultaneity of states of two substances is not immediately given along with the mere existence of substances, mutual interaction is required to ground that relation. In other words, causality does not serve the purpose of interconnecting substances into a whole, as purposiveness does, because causality provides above all the necessity for knowledge of objective succession.

Consequently, the Second Analogy is committed to the idea that a cause brings about its effect when an immutable ground on a substance determines the successive states of (another) substance (KrV A205/A206). In order to avoid the infinite regress of causality there must be a permanent substance, which cannot be altered. This means that substance cannot change in itself, since it cannot be active and passive towards itself in one and the same respect. Hence, the mutual interaction established in the Third Analogy seems to hold only for spatial substances (second edition of Third Analogy)

From this necessarily brief reconstruction one might draw the following philosophy @LISBON

ing conclusions: (1) the principle of causality is not the same as the principle of mechanism. Mechanism applies only to the activities and powers of nonliving, non thinking beings, whereas causality, as a transcendental rule, applies to all appearances, without distinctions. (2) The difference between causality and purposiveness does not lie in the mechanical conditions to which the former could be applied, but, more properly, in the ontological model underlying them. Whereas causality entails the asymmetrical succession between the principle of change and the effect, purposiveness points out the symmetrical inter-dependence of every part from the whole. More importantly, causality entails a substance that cannot act upon itself, whereas purposiveness points out organisms' self-activity.

§ 2. Contrary to Kant, Hegel establishes a dialectical connection between mechanism and causality in the *Science of Logic* (hereafter: SL). He does not conceive of mechanism and teleology as two separate uses of understanding, but as different spheres of objectivity that are closely related. I will argue that Hegel's strategy is that of unifying causality, mechanism and teleology insofar as they underly a unitary theoretical structure. Hegel's claim contrasts Kant's theory because (1) Hegel provides causal activity with substance's self-determination; (2) he maintains that mechanism belongs to the structure of thinking's existence. I will proceed by clarifying the role of causality in first part of the SL, then I will point out Hegel's use of mechanism in the second part of the SL.

Within the Doctrine of essence causality identifies the activity of substance over against its accidents. Substantiality is the most encompassing ontological category and causality is the way substance distinguishes itself from its accidents. From the very beginning of this section Hegel stresses that «substance as power determines itself» (SL: 558). Hence, substance is capable of change, contrary to Kant's view, and the causal activity of substance is the way substance explicates itself through the effect. Here it is worth to notice that Hegel's notion of substance shares some similarities with Fichte's explanation of the transcendental Ego in the Doctrine of Knowledge (first edition), since both intend substance as an activity of the form. However, there is an important difference between Hegel and Fichte. According to Fichte the concept of causality is not grounded on substantiality, otherwise there would be a substrate in relation to which the incoming change would be posited in time. Hence, Fichte conceives of substance as the totality of all possible activities posited by the Self.

On the contrary, Hegelian logical determination is not a synthesis provided by the Self. Each category is deduced from an abstract and indeterminate totality, which is gradually distinguished from its indeterminacy up to the Concept. In such a context the concept of the Self should be deduced instead of being presupposed from the very beginning. Therefore,

Hegel conceives the transition from substance to subjectivity a fundamental passage mediated by causality. In this way the ontological substrate provided by substance is grounded and replaced by the absolute activity of the concept. The Concept is deduced as the grounding principle of the entire objective logic, which latter represents the objectivity of understanding.

This is an important remark, which is not so much elicited in the SL as in the *Encyclopaedia*. In §113 of the last edition of *Encyclopaedia* Hegel added that understanding replaces sensibility within essence, hence admitting that the transition from being to essence is the same as the progress from thought's dispersion to analytical understanding. Hegel aims is to deduce the pure use of understanding by explicating within essence its logical categories. In the modern tradition causality is a finite relation referring to substance's alteration and to substances' interaction. Hegel argues that this meaning of causality as external relation is the objectivity of finite understanding, which is not able to ground itself, since it is exclusively ruled by the law of non-contradiction. As a consequence, essential categories are deduced from their reciprocal opposition, but they cannot establish any principle of determination within themselves. The same difficulty surrounds the notion of causality, which is the most encompassing category deduced within Objective Logic. Then, how can understanding be replaced by the Concept?

Hegel's issue is to deduce causality as substance's activity upon itself and not simply as a posited relation between substances or within substance and its accidents. The former implies a continuous and pure self-activity, whereas the latter entails a discrete change or external relation. The transition from external relation to substance's activity is the same as reason and it is fundamentally based on causality. This entails that (1) causality does not belong to an ontology of objects independent from the transcendental ratio that justifies it. On the contrary the objectivity of causality is absolutely grounded on the pure subjectivity of reason. Thereby Hegel's issue is to (2) reveal the inability of understanding to give causality its absolute foundation. More specifically, Hegelian strategy reveals the limits of causality by demonstrating mechanism as its necessary consequence. This is the reason why Hegel investigates the meaning of causality through its different logical determinations, such as formal causality, determinate causality, conditioned causality and reciprocity. The inconsistencies deriving from an intellectual treatment of causality lead to a different order of explanation.

It is important to highlight that Hegel does not deal with the different uses of causality (practical or physical), but rather with the meaning of causality as such. The question he asks is: what does it mean, for a cause, to exercise a causal activity? From this point of view it does not matter whether causality is applied to moral or physical field, but whether the structure of

causality can be absolutely identified in itself.

Hegel proceeds by proving the inconsistency of formal causality. Formal causality is a tautology¹, because cause and effect are only distinct from a particular point of view. A cause only becomes a cause when it has an effect, hence the two apparently opposing terms reverse their roles. The effect is the cause of the cause, and the cause is the effect of its own effect. By formal causality one understands that something derives as an effect from something else, which must be the cause, but this does not explain what is the causal activity in itself. As a result, formal causality is replaced by determinate causality, which points out the meaning of causal action as change.

Determinate causality focuses on the transition from cause to effect as a becoming-other of the cause. At the same time, causality is the subsistence of the relation between passive and active substances. Thereby, causality turns into action-reaction relation that corresponds to the structure of mechanism². The point is that causality is no longer a determination of substance, but rather causality and substance are equally originary, for causality identifies a power to act upon its other and not the formal relation between two objects, one of them follows the other. In Hegel's view, causality becomes conditioned once it generates an asymmetry between active and passive side within substance and this is exactly action-reaction relation.

Mechanical interaction provides substance with the necessary unity between active and passive substance, because here passive and active are reciprocally conditioned. Therefore, the action is bent round and becomes an action that returns into itself, an infinite reciprocal action. It is not substance that acts over against its other, but rather it is substance that becomes cause as a reaction to its being posited as an effect. The point here is that causality is no longer a presupposition, but rather the actualization of substance.

Notice the shift of the argument: we started by considering causality as a formal succession relation between substances and then as power to act. Now the deduction of causality reveals that it is fundamentally substance's actuality. This entails that the meaning of causality does not rely on the distinction between law and rule, but rather in the activity of substance as self-conditioning power. Reciprocity is the key-structure leading to such upshot. Here again the reader gets reminded of the Third Proposition of Fichte's Science of Knowledge, wherein the notion of reciprocity is closely related to the development of theoretic reason. The third proposition of

1. SL: 561.

2. SL: 569: «Mechanism consists in this *externality* of causality, where the *reflection* of the cause into itself in its effect is at the same time a repelling *being*, or where, in the *self-identity* which the causal substance has in its effect, the cause equally remains something immediately *external* to it, and the effect has *passed over* into *another substance*».

the Science of Knowledge states the determination of the Self through the Not-Self, in such a way that the ego limits the non-ego. Fichte adopts reciprocity to explain the synthetic unity by which both ego and not-ego acquire reality. Hegel himself states in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that Fichte's treatment of objective categories is the first rational attempt that has ever been made to deduce categories. However, Hegel's treatment of reciprocity differs notably from Fichte's theory in so far as Hegel is not committed to the idea of synthesis. Contrary to Fichte, Hegel does not adopt the point of view of the Self in order to deduce categories, therefore reciprocity does not display any interaction between the ego and the not-ego. In Hegel's view, reciprocity is substance's reflection within itself, so that substance displays the structure of the subject by being the cause of itself.

Reciprocity removes mechanism precisely because the posited effect does not pass over into another substance, but it is reflected within the same substance. Hence, the meaning of causal activity is the self-relation of substance: «the mutual opacity of the substances standing in the causal relationship has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity (...); the original substance is original in that it is only the cause of itself, and this is substance raised to the freedom of the Notion»³. This means that substance liberates itself, because, in so far it is self-conditioning, its process becomes independent even from a posited cause. Substance reproduces itself spontaneously, turning difference into free actuality in such a manner that it reaches its own "originativeness". Essential causality is now explicated as an appearance, because it displays only external relations, which presuppose a substance lying before them as substrate. The limit of understanding is precisely that of reducing reality into a series of external relations, such as matter and form, whole and parts, cause and effect without pointing out that these categories are thought's determinations. Therefore, causality as such, considered in its isolation from concept's self-activity, cannot be absolutely distinguished from mechanism. Hegel's issue is that understanding is able to justify only the appearance of objectivity, but it cannot ground its own activity, because understanding does not recognize its own entanglement in reality. Once causality is deduced as the capacity of substance to be the cause of itself, understanding is replaced by the Concept. The difference between external causality and the Concept lies in the unity provided by the Concept. This latter is the measure of reality precisely because it is the principle of determination of the totality to which categories belong. Therefore, categories are no longer external to each other, but reciprocally related and mechanism is not absolutely actual, because the Concept is the measure of its truth.

This is the reason why the deduction of the Concept in the SL ex-

3. SL: 582

plicitly mirrors the pure I-think of the KrV. Hegel himself states that the Concept is the structure of the pure unity of self-consciousness. Therefore, causality is nothing but understanding's self-consciousness. It means that understanding has to condition itself in order to recognize its own entanglement in categories. According to this point of view, all previous ontological determinations are finally ordered in relation to the self-activity of the Concept.

More specifically, by the Concept Hegel intends the retrospective structure that, on one hand, unifies the entire ontological process from being to substance and, on the other hand, maintains itself as persistent ground of the universal process developed into the Subjective Logic. Hence, the difference between understanding and reason lies in the fact that only reason unifies ontological categories in a single totality, the Concept. However, the Concept is the totality that contains the principle of determinations of objectivity, that is, it provides finite being with its ultimate justification, but it is not committed to the structure of an organism. The latter is the structure of life deduced in the Logic of the Concept or Subjective Logic. Like Kant, Hegel does not relate causality to the idea of a self-organizing whole. But, contrary to Kant, Hegelian issue is that causality cannot be intended a transcendental rule of temporal succession. By causality thinking recognizes its own entanglement in reality, without producing it. If the Concept had been understood from its very beginning as a self-organizing whole, then there would have been no difference between the pure Concept and an absolute conscience, which latter leads directly to subjective monism. On the contrary Hegel's deduction of the Concept mirrors the Kantian I-think in so far as it is the principle that causally reveals itself to itself. At stake is the recognition of thinking's universality and not yet thinking's self-generation. Certainly, this point of view entails a radical shift of explanation of Kantian I-think, upon which I cannot here expand. However, it is remarkable how Hegel connects the law of causality to pure consciousness by passing through mechanism.

So far I have tried to outline Hegel's concept of causality within Objective Logic, but this is not the end of the story. Subjective Logic displays causality and mechanism as well, therefore, in order to further inquiry Hegelian strategy, one must still consider the use of mechanism in the Subjective Logic.

§ 3. The movement of the Logic of the Concept is radically different from the Objective Logic, because the first part of the SL aims to make the structure of the Concept explicit, whereas the second part lies in the process of unfolding (*Entwicklung*) the Concept as universality. At a first sight it seems that causality does not play any role within Subjective Logic. However, causality is not absolutely removed, for it appears again into

reason's explication as mechanism, as Hegel himself claims (SL: 715). Action-reaction and mechanism differ by degree and not by form. Whereas action-reaction is a reflective relation, mechanism entails the absence of communication between objects and law. Both rely on the absence of communication, as they are devoid of any conscious activity.

It seems that for Hegel causality is twofolds: on one hand, it displays thinking's alienation into objectivity, thereby leading to mechanism; on the other hand, it belongs to the structure of reason as such, therefore it cannot be absolutely sublated. As causality belongs to the structure of Concept's self-relation, the duality between thinking and its otherness is reproduced into objectivity as dichotomy between reason and objects. This also means that mechanism, both as causality and objective existence, is closely related to thinking's logical manifestation. It does not simply represent necessity over against freedom, but it is a sort of inner constraint belonging to the structure of thinking. On one hand, mechanism seems to crystallize categories into passive and active substances and concept's universality into a plurality of objects, on the other hand, mechanism reactivates thought. But what kind of crystallization is mechanism?

I would say that mechanism is the structure of thinking's pure existence, which latter qualifies the coming-to-be of thought in opposition to sheer immediacy. Existence implies the relation to otherness as condition of determination, therefore, it is closely related to the idea of actuality. Logical thinking has to demonstrate its reality by confronting with its absolute being-other-from-itself and mechanism is precisely the structure that maintains thinking in this duality.

More specifically, mechanical objects are supposed to be determined by the law, so they have to satisfy law's conditions and they strive towards it. However, the law has already played a crucial role in constituting anything determined as objective. Therefore the original striving of the self-subsistent object is replaced by the mutual opposition between law and object. Hegel's intent is to stress that there can be no purely given "objectivity" and that one must inquire the mutual interaction between law and object in order to justify mechanism. The liberation from mechanical necessity consists in revealing the interconnection between law and object as conceptual determination, so that they are no longer external and opposite, but reciprocally related.

Here, one can notice that reciprocity is the key structure to escape, once again, from mechanical polarization. The lack of self-subsistence of the object «is in this way no longer merely a striving towards the centre (...); on the contrary, it is a striving towards the object specifically opposed to it. (...) Centrality is, therefore, now a relation of these reciprocally negative objectivities in a state of mutual tension»⁴. The transition from mecha-

4. SL: 726.

nism to chemism can be explained as a change of direction of the logical movement. First, there is the striving towards the centre, which means that objects, as self-subsistent entities, are posited in relation to the law. Then, the striving reaches neutrality through chemism, wherein objects are posited in mutual interaction. The distinctive self-subsistence of objectivity is restored as unity through teleology. Although Hegel contrasts teleology and causality, it is worth to notice that they are not really opposite:

In every transition the Notion maintains itself; for example, when cause becomes effect it is only the cause meeting with itself in the effect; but in the teleological transition it is the Notion that as such already has a concrete existence as cause, as the absolute concrete unity that is free in the face of objectivity and its external determinability.

(...) It can therefore be said of teleological activity that in it the end is the beginning, the consequent the ground, the effect the cause, that it is a becoming of what has become, that in it only what already exists comes into existence, and so forth; which means that in general all the determinations of relationship belonging to the sphere of reflection or of immediate being have lost their distinctions, and what was enunciated as an other, such as end, consequent, effect, ect., (...) is posited as identical with the simple Notion⁵.

Whereas causality mediates the arise of the Concept, teleology is the Concept as concrete causality, which explicates itself or that externalizes itself. This same externalization includes mechanism as one of the moments belonging to conceptual objectivity. Therefore, teleology is not completely other from causality. On the contrary, Hegel explicitly defines teleology concrete causality, because it is the totality of objectivity, which has an immanent principle of determination. Teleology replaces causality because it identifies the structure by means reason is conscious of itself in its other.

Therefore, causality and teleology do not belong to different uses of understanding, as they point out, once again, the theoretical transition from reason's self-alienation to reason's self-recognition. Hegel cannot admit any gap between causality and teleology because they underlie the process of thinking's existence. The self-relation achieved by thought through mechanism reveals the existence of pure thought, which is not conditioned by any externality, as it is the unity of itself and its other. Hence, mechanism is never left behind and it is constantly involved in logic as the emerging and self-revealing structure of thinking's self-relation. Consequently, Hegel's strategy lies not so much in claiming the ontological commitment of Kantian teleology, but rather in giving pure thought its own self-consciousness.

5. SL: 748.

§ 4. As a conclusion, I wish to remark further why a mechanical feature always lies at the core of conceptual activity. Hegel himself introduces mechanism in the Subjective Logic as a general character:

This is what constitutes the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever relation obtains between the things combined, this relation is one extraneous to them that does not concern their nature at all, and even if it is accompanied by a semblance of unity it remains nothing more than composition, mixture, aggregation and the like. Spiritual mechanism also, like material, consists in this, that the things related in the spirit remain external to one another and to spirit itself. A mechanical style of thinking [Vorstellungsweise], a mechanical memory, habit, a mechanical way of acting [Handlungsweise], signify that the peculiar pervasion and presence of spirit is lacking in what spirit apprehends or does. Although its theoretical or practical mechanism cannot take place without its self-activity [Selbsttätigkeit], without an impulse and consciousness, yet there is lacking in it the freedom of individuality, and because this freedom is not manifest in it such action appears as a merely external one⁶.

Mechanism means the lack of essential connection both in theoretical and ontological field. As the relation between objects is a mere aggregation, when it is devoid of a principle of constitution, in the same way a mechanical *Vorstellungsweise* needs self-consciousness in order to transform habit into a complete and free self-activity. But «the presence of spirit» usually lacking in mechanism is not achieved by introducing a conscious agent, but rather by extending to the greatest extent thinking's natural passivity. However, the truth does not consist in asserting the limit of mechanism and leaving it behind, because the activity of reason lies precisely in the constant process of actualizing itself through understanding and objectivity. Mechanism does not provide any complete or satisfactory account of reality, anyway it is only by means of it that thought is able to manifest itself as the same as being.

One can notice that the deduction of the Concept in the SL shares a similarity with the arise of thinking in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Within Psychology mechanical memory plays a crucial role in determining intelligence's development from imagination and representations up to thinking and logic. More specifically, intelligence must undergo its own self-alienation through language and memory before explicating itself as thinking. Remarkable is the fact that the psychological path leading to thinking and logic is described as a teleological process⁷, as if intelligence

6. SL: 711.

7. See also INWOOD (2010: 460).

strived in order to achieve the purest knowledge of itself as concept.

For the sake of brevity, I will focus on the highest moment achieved by intelligence through memory. It is when intelligence, by filling itself with the word, «receives into itself the nature of the thing. (...) Intelligence thereby makes itself into something thingly, in such a way that subjectivity, in its distinction from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless container of words, it becomes mechanical memory»⁸. Hegel adds that «in this way the excess of recollection of the word veers round, so to speak, into extreme alienation of the intelligence». The last passage of the quote is particularly interesting, because it allows to think of an excess of recollection. What does it mean an «excess of recollection»? The filling of intelligence with the name and the way intelligence makes itself thingly is an excess of recollection, because there is no more duality between meaning and language. As a consequence, intelligence does not reflect upon the signs and the determinacy of being outside is the same as the inward determinacy of meaning. This is the reason why mechanical memory represents an empty subjectivity and a petrified objectivity. Mechanism lies precisely in a mindless state, in the absence of consciousness, so that words are spoken and meanings conveyed by simply recollecting them.

It is remarkable that Hegel intends mechanical memory an empty connection between subjectivity and objectivity. More specifically, subjectivity is defined as «the empty bond which establishes within itself series of them [of the names] and keeps them in a stable order». In all the three editions of *Encyclopedia* Hegel defines the connection between intelligence and language a succession of names (series), although he never commits himself to the treatment of syntax, which latter might provide series with a proper meaning. Indeed, it is only in virtue of a syntactical order that language can be meaningfully ordered. But Hegel also seems to argue that a meaningful order can be established by the causal self-determination of intelligence through memory. As successive order is the distinctive character of causal action, mechanical memory is the power (*Macht*) to condition intelligence and to make it objective through linguistic signs. We memorise series of words, whose sequence involves no intelligible principle, and then we are able speak/think/write by using the same principles to convey different meanings. The issue is not so much that syntax is necessary for meaning, as that not-sensible principles comes into existence in virtue of mnemonic causality. In other words, Hegel aims to point out the structure of thought by which we are able to convey meaning. This structure is strongly related to the actualization of a not-reflective and internalized mechanism. The causal action exercised by intelligence upon itself is the way intelligence actualizes itself «in its right mind (*bei sich selbst zu sein*)». At the same time, by the very act of causally determining itself, intelligence

8. HEGEL (2010: 200).

externalizes itself, thereby providing the transition to thinking.

From this point of view, both logic and psychology share mechanism as a fundamental structure mediating the development of thinking. It is then tempting to conceive causality and mechanism transversal concepts, like crossing-concept -models that underlie thinking's alienation in each and every manifestation of thought. The structure of causality entails both thinking's alienation- mechanism- and thinking's self-recognition- *causa sui*. On one hand, this model is intended to contrast Kant's theory of causality with the metaphysical notion of causality as *causa sui*. On the other hand, Hegelian model entails passivity and absence of thought as necessary moment of thought's activity.

Mechanical causality is then necessary to awake- so to say- thought from its natural passivity. One might ask if every mechanism leads to thinking and conscious activity. I would answer: no. It is not that every kind of mechanism leads to thinking, but that every mechanism entails the absence of conscious reason. As a result, thought is never immediately given and requires a specific pattern of retrospective recognition. The structure of such recognition is the restoration of causality as self-activity, but there is no necessity leading to such an acknowledgement. Although logic displays the clarity of pure thought, this is not a rule for subjective thinking. This is the reason why, within psychology, conscious thinking and logic are not immediately given, but require a further effort by intelligence.

In other words, Hegel's philosophy compels us to investigate the structure of thought through its different manifestations, without assuming ontology or psychology as given paradigms. On the contrary, it is possible to inquiry the structure of thought within Hegelian system from different points of view, without assuming neither logic nor psychology as absolutely prior. This is the reason why Hegelian philosophy could provide many suggestions to a research focused on an ecological model of mind. According to Hegel concept is defined not just in terms of exemplary states and their features or properties, but also by the relational structures of these properties, and their capacity to change under different contexts. This might open up new investigations I cannot certainly here expose, but only suggest as a conclusion.

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The Intelligibility of the Mind-Body Union in Descartes' Sailor in a Ship Argument

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Abstract

Descartes' account of the mind-body union has had a long history of critical reception. Perceptive readers such as Princess Elizabeth questioned how the mind and body, two completely different substances, can interact; that is, how can an immaterial mind set a material body in motion and vice versa? I argue that Descartes holds that the union can only be understood in a weak sense. Descartes lacks a precise, scientific language to explain the interaction. I follow Justin Skirry's remarks on causal interaction in this argument, stating that the ordinary terms of mover and moved cannot be employed to account for the mind-body interaction since the mind is intermingled with the body. Descartes cannot provide the appropriate idiom to describe the union. I offer additional support that for Descartes the intelligibility of the mind-body union is limited and cannot be explained scientifically.

Introduction

Descartes' account of the mind-body union has had a long history of critical reception. In Descartes' own time, perceptive readers such as Princess Elizabeth questioned how the mind and body, two completely different substances, can interact; that is, how can an immaterial mind set a material body in motion and vice versa? The stark dissimilarity in kind between the two substances posed a perplexing problem for philosophers to follow. The intelligibility of the union was certainly in question and even inspired some, after Descartes, to produce new and ingenious solutions. Some of Descartes' first reflections on the intelligibility of the union are undeveloped and lack detail, appearing in *Meditations* VI as the sailor in a ship argument. Yet this consideration and several replies that reference this argument offer some insight into how intelligible the mind-body union is to Descartes. The focus of this paper addresses this issue and his reply to the correspondence to which it is referenced, in particular Princess Elizabeth's. I argue that Descartes holds that the union can only be

philosophy@lisbon, 3, 109-115. Lisboa: CFUL.

understood in a weak sense; that is, no objective knowledge of the interaction can be acquired. In doing so, I follow Justin Skirry's remarks on causal interaction in this argument, stating that the ordinary terms of mover and moved cannot be employed to account for the mind-body interaction since the mind is intermingled with the body. I use this to point out that Descartes cannot provide the appropriate idiom to describe the union. In this way, I offer additional support that the mind-body union's intelligibility is limited. Descartes retreats to experience, an empirical framework alone, in describing the intelligibility of the union and concedes that an *a priori* science is elusive. Whenever the senses are involved in gaining knowledge, the understanding is restricted, and this is especially the case with the mind-body union. Thus, it is plausible to conclude that the intelligibility of the union is not equal to his requirements of science and is considerably thin.

The Problem of the Substances and the Real Distinction

The notion of substance has been used in philosophy since ancient times. One purpose for which Descartes rehabilitates the concept is to distinguish mind from matter. Descartes calls the human being a union, a composite of substances, existing "in a real and substantial manner" (ATiii, 692 qtd. In Cottingham 130). Descartes identifies the human being as a composite of two substances: mind and body. Mind is thinking substance; it is immaterial and its attribute is thought. Descartes explains that there are many forms or ways in which the attribute of thought is expressed, and this is described as a mode. Many modes fall under thought such as willing and imagining. The second substance is body which is material; its attribute is extension, and it too has varying modes such as motion, weight, and shape. For Descartes, the attribute determines the substance; that is, thought is what distinguishes thinking substance, and extension clearly identifies body. In knowing the attribute one can know the type of substance in question.

To argue for a substantial union, Descartes has to maintain that a real distinction exists between the substances. This distinction holds when mind can be conceived separately without the body's existence and vice versa. The real distinction advantages Descartes in preserving the separateness of the substances, thus making possible the substantial union. In commenting on the real distinction, Descartes remarks to Caterus that shape and movement are properties of bodies—modes. These properties depend on the bodies to which they belong. Yet a body can be thought of without mental properties. Mind, in likewise fashion, can be conceived without physical properties. In this way, Descartes defends a real distinc-

tion between the substances, one in which mind and body can be known as entirely distinct (Caterus' remarks in Southwell 130). As the example demonstrates, in conceiving each substance separately, there is no necessary link between the substances, and no required connection can be discovered. To this extent, their relationship is a contingent one, not based on necessity. In this way, Descartes maintains the respective individuality of the substances.

The Mind-Body Union—Not Like a Sailor in a Ship

As mentioned above, many of Descartes' correspondents thought the crux of the issue regarding the mind-body union is to explain how two completely different substances can interact. In 1645 Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia asks Descartes, "I beseech you to tell me how the mind of man (being only a thinking substance) can determine the spirits of the body in order to make voluntary actions" (AT 661 Skirry's translation 135). To this, however, Descartes has already anticipated certain critical questions in his sailor in a ship argument, expressing what he does not mean by the union and illustrating that the bond is only intelligible in a weak sense. The sailor in a ship argument appears in *Meditations* VI, with the title "The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body". In short, Descartes discusses the sense in which he can speak of the union between mind and body. He comments on the sensations such as hunger and thirst as confused modes of thinking, making a precise account of the union vague. Descartes writes,

Nature also teaches me, by those sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is in a ship, but that I am very closely joined, and as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form one unit...For those sensations of hunger, pain, thirst, and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body (AT VII 81:CSM II 56).

The passage serves Descartes in several ways. First, Descartes establishes that he is not arguing that the body is a house for the soul as it is portrayed in the Platonic tradition. Human beings do not inspect damage to their own bodies by way of pure intellect alone as a sailor inspects a leak in a ship. Human beings are more closely connected, so Descartes is saying that this analogy does not properly explain the union. Rather, the bond is felt; the union between mind and body is given in experience. Second, the mind is intermingled with the body, and various states of consciousness such as thirst are not capable of being clearly distinguished. This is in absolute contrast to the way in which the individual substances can be certainly

understood independently of one another.

In replying to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes' answer is already contained in the sailor in a ship argument. According to Justin Skirry, if the mind is intermingled with the body, then the ordinary causal interaction, that is, between two separate things, mover and moved, does not apply (139). Princess Elizabeth, in the quote above, questions the mind-body union because she is thinking in terms that are inappropriate to what Descartes characterizes; she is thinking in terms of two separate things that are not united, one impinging upon the other. The mind's intermingling with the body demonstrates a different relationship in which the ordinary causal interaction does not fit with this schematic. So, the Princess has presupposed a causal interaction that does not exist between the two substances since they are already together. Skirry comments, "Descartes explicitly rejects this sailor in a ship view of mind-body union in the argument...he rejects the mover-moveable relation as the relation constituting the union" (139). Descartes' argument appears to be nuanced in retaining the idea of separate substances yet bringing them together to interact in some way. The intermingling of the mind with the body highlights the unfamiliarity and vagueness with which it is difficult to express in terms other than those of mover and moved. To this extent, Skirry's explanation can be used to help explain why Descartes has trouble making sense of the mind-body union since it cannot be expressed in the habitual terms of mover and moved.

Along with Princess Elizabeth, Gassendi, another correspondent, makes the same error, assuming the kind of interaction between two separate things. Gassendi asks, "How can there be effect directed against anything, or motion set up in it, unless there is mutual contact between what moves and what is moved?" (AT VII 341: CSM II 237). Gassendi's question, however, implies that mind and body are like two separate things moving across a surface. Skirry once again makes Descartes' point clear when he explains that the sailor in a ship argument "concludes that mind and body are united so as to form one thing, not two that causally interact as mover and moveable" (139). In this way, because the mind is intermingled with the body, the union is different from those objects that are typically thought of in ordinary experience. However, this is only at the expense of creating a further problem concerning what kind of idiom is appropriate to describe the interaction.

The Stronger and Weaker Senses of Knowledge

After she read the *Meditations*, Princess Elizabeth and Descartes exchanged more letters. Descartes attempted to explain the contact between the immaterial and the material. In one dated 20 June 1643, Descartes

offered a poor explanation that he later admitted (Hatfield 267-8). However, in a following letter soon after to the Princess, dated 28 June 1643, Descartes describes what he calls "primitive notions"; they are of the mind, body, and the mind-body union. In this response, recalling the sailor in a ship argument, Descartes writes,

The soul is conceived only by pure intellect; body (i.e. extension, shapes and motions) can likewise be known by the intellect alone, but much better by the intellect aided by the imagination; and finally what belongs to the union of the soul and the body is known only obscurely by the intellect alone or even by the intellect aided by the imagination, but it is known very clearly by the senses (AT 3: 691-2 qtd. in Hatfield 268).

For Descartes the pure intellect can understand the mind and the body separately; if the latter is helped by the imagination, it is known better. Knowledge of the union, on the other hand, is actually drawn from the phenomenon of living; the bond is close, personal, given sharply in experience. This passage can be understood as a description of Descartes' view of the stronger and weaker degrees by which the mind, body, and the mind-body union are known. The mind is the most intellectual substance, the foundation in Descartes' epistemological architecture. This is especially demonstrated when Descartes says that he can understand himself without the aid of the imagination and sense perception. In one comment, he remarks, "but I cannot conversely understand faculties without me, that is without an intellectual substance to inhere in" (AT 7:78 qtd. in Hatfield 258). Next is the body that can be known by the intellect and better with the aid of the senses. Lastly, there is the union, a combination of the two substances, the self-evident, raw fact of the everyday that cannot be clearly interpreted by the pure intellect. As James Collins remarks, "the only kind of union possible between these two substances is a *contingent* one, that is, one which is not required essentially by the natures in question and hence not capable of an *a priori*, scientific deduction" (47). The mind-body union, in comparison with the certainty of the pure intellect alone, can be understood in a weaker and altogether non-intellectual way in comparison with the mind alone. If one follows the order of ideas in the passage, and the *Meditations* in general, the mind-body union is only intelligible in a weak sense.

Admittedly, the obscure nature of the mind-body union comes to light in the everyday. But, in the *a priori* theoretical sense, that is, in a purely scientific framework, it remains inexplicable and cannot be communicated in those terms. In the passage, Descartes sustains the individual natures of the substances, leaving knowledge of the union disclosed in experience, which is, for all intents and purposes, an inferior mode of cognition when held to the standards of pure rationalism. Descartes explains

that the mind-body union is intelligible to those who never philosophize, since they conceive the union to be one thing, perhaps not following the correct order of ideas, not grasping the distinction between the substances. The conservative answer to whether Descartes thinks the mind-body union is intelligible lies in the fact that the philosopher looks to the self-evident event of the interaction and cautiously withdraws from the confidence with which he discusses the substances independently of one another. Descartes conceives science as based on the pure rationalism of the *a priori* framework. Therefore, any understanding of the union between the substances lies beyond the depth of science.

Conclusion

Descartes' sailor in a ship argument and the replies that reference this claim provide insight into whether Descartes thinks the mind-body union is intelligible. In pointing out that the mind-body union is not like a sailor in a ship, Descartes successfully retains the individuality of the substance but at the expense of creating further questions about the intelligibility of the union. Skirry's interpretation of Descartes' responses to Princess Elizabeth and Pierre Gassendi lend credence to the scientific perplexity with which Descartes views the union. The union cannot be understood in mover and moved terms because the mind is intermingled with the body; there is no surface-to-surface contact. The idiom, therefore, that can best serve Descartes in expressing the union is elusive. Descartes acknowledges that the mind-body union is abstruse in a purely intellectual way and falls back on experience as the final arbiter. Given Descartes' pure rationalism, the union can only be grasped in experience, making a scientific understanding of it limited. Descartes falls short of explaining the union scientifically in comparison with the intelligibility of the substances individually. For Descartes, the mind-body union, on purely intellectual grounds, can, at best, be understood in a weak sense.

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